Defense on Charges, Amount, and Hierarchy in a Virtual Currency Platform Fraud Case
By Lu Haoxin
Introduction: The Third Meeting at the Detention Center
At 6:30 a.m. on Thursday, I drove from Shanghai to a county-level city detention center in Jiangnan. This was my third meeting with the client since I was retained.
Across the iron bars of the meeting room, he looked thinner than the last time. He said:
"Lawyer, I have thought it through this time. I want to tell the facts exactly as they are."
From the time of his arrest until now, he had maintained zero statements across six interrogations. It was not that he did not know that "pleading guilty and accepting punishment" might bring leniency; rather, he had always felt that he was being made to bear blame that was not his to bear.
On the highway back, I thought for a long time. The real difficulty in this case is not whether the client is willing to tell the truth, but three core questions:
- Is this platform a fraud tool or an online casino?
- How much of the criminal amount should this so-called "teacher" actually bear?
- What position does he actually occupy in the overall criminal hierarchy?
The first question determines the charge and may mean the difference between a ten-year fixed-term imprisonment and life imprisonment; the second question determines the criminal amount and may mean the difference between several hundred thousand yuan and several million yuan; the third question determines principal or accessory status and may significantly affect the final sentencing.
When these three issues are combined, the ultimate range of sentencing may differ by more than ten years.
This article is the answer I have produced in response to these three issues.
To protect the privacy of the parties and other persons involved in the case, all individuals in this article are referred to by pseudonyms or role designations, and the handling authorities and specific place names have also been omitted.
I. Case Reconstruction: How a "teacher" entered and exited the scheme
How the platforms operated
The case involves two virtual-asset contract trading platforms, referred to as "Platform A" and "Platform B"; in fact, they were two small overseas trading platforms.
The basic operational chain of the platforms was as follows:
Boss → "teacher" (head group leader) → group leader → salesperson → client
The specific mode of operation was as follows:
The boss, Lao Yuan, connected with the platform operators through an introducer, obtained the platform interface, then formed a team and divided the team into four tiers.
Salespersons first placed low-priced sell orders for USDT on large, legitimate exchanges in order to attract potential clients and screen out those interested in virtual-asset investment. The salespersons then added clients on WeChat using carefully crafted personas and first led the clients to trade profitably on legitimate platforms in order to build trust.
Once the clients had developed trust in the salespersons, the salespersons then "switched" the clients to Platform A or Platform B and guided them to engage in high-leverage virtual-asset contract trading.
The platform typically offers ultra-high leverage of 200 to 300 times. At this leverage level, even if market conditions merely fluctuate normally, clients may rapidly have their positions liquidated. The platform and the business team, in turn, take a share of the clients' losses at an agreed ratio.
This model is known in the industry as "eating client losses."
At which tier is the client located?
My client is accused of being a "teacher"-level person, that is, a so-called senior group leader, who could receive a 15% commission on the amount of client losses.
However, the actual circumstances reflected in the case file materials are as follows:
Around July 2025, he was brought into the team by his boss, Lao Yuan, and subsequently recruited several fellow townsmen to participate in the business. These individuals worked under him for only one or two months before leaving one after another. During this period, they did not facilitate a single transaction and did not generate any performance.
The destinations of these individuals after leaving can be roughly divided into four categories:
- Some joined another completely independent major ringleader, leaving Lao Yuan's chain of interests;
- Some formed their own teams and operated independently, with the relevant performance settled directly with Lao Yuan;
- In some cases, the funds never passed through my client's account;
- And some of the individuals, together with their group members, have not been brought to case.
That is to say, if calculated strictly according to the standard of "whoever managed the team is responsible for the performance generated during the management period," the amount of client losses that can truly be attributed to my client is almost zero.
However, in this case, all the performance generated after these individuals left was attributed to my client.
What is the basis for that?
It rests solely on one statement by the boss, Lao Yuan:
"He was the first teacher I brought in."
Amount-based attribution cannot be extended indefinitely
The defense logic I advanced is as follows:
In organized crime, attribution of amounts should be limited to the period during which the actor actually participated in management and to the performance generated within the scope of his direct authority. Performance generated through independent operations after the relevant individuals left should not be counted toward the original manager's criminal amount where there is no financial overlap and no management-subordination relationship.
There is an issue here that is often overlooked:
"Being the first to be brought in" does not equal "being responsible for everything that happened later."
Where members recruited by one person later left the original team, began operating independently, or even joined other major leaders, requiring the original recruiter to remain responsible for all of those individuals' conduct after their departure would be equivalent to making an "introducer" bear unlimited joint and several liability.
This approach to attribution lacks a basis in the theory of joint crime and is inconsistent with the principle of individual criminal responsibility.
This is precisely the logical starting point of the entire defense on the amounts.
Compliance note: Virtual currency contract trading constitutes illegal financial activity within the territory of China. This article discusses case characterization solely from the perspective of criminal defense and does not constitute an endorsement of the legality of any related trading conduct.
II. The Defense on the Charge: Fraud or Operating a Casino?
This case is currently characterized as the crime of fraud.
Based on the amount at issue as charged, if it is found to constitute a "particularly huge amount" of fraud, the defendant may face fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years or even life imprisonment.
My primary defense strategy is to seek to have the charge changed from fraud to operating a casino. Even where the circumstances of operating a casino are serious, the statutory maximum penalty is generally ten years' fixed-term imprisonment, which differs markedly from the sentencing range for fraud.
I know that changing the charge is very difficult, but if certain issues are not contested, there will be no possibility of any change at all.
Why this platform is more akin to a casino
First, most customers' forced liquidations were not caused by backend manipulation
The statements of several co-defendants in the case file collectively point to one fact:
The market movements of mainstream virtual currencies on the platform, including Bitcoin and Ethereum, were basically consistent with those on large, legitimate exchanges.
Although the platform had the capability to manipulate the market through "exclusive coins" by inserting price spikes, it actually used this capability only rarely.
One co-defendant stated:
“Doing this easily raises client suspicion; it is too risky.”
Others stated explicitly:
“Our own team has never encountered this.”
So why did the clients suffer forced liquidation?
The main reason is ultra-high leverage of 200x or even 300x.
Another person involved in the same case testified:
“Under normal circumstances, even a slight market fluctuation triggers forced liquidation.”
Combined with sales staff deliberately steering clients toward heavy positions and failing to set stop-losses, any normal market fluctuation could rapidly wipe out a client's position.
This does not fully align with the causal chain typically required for fraud: “fabricating facts and concealing the truth, causing the victim to fall into a mistaken understanding and, on the basis of that mistaken understanding, to dispose of property.”
The direct causes of client losses may be:
ultra-high leverage + heavy positions + failure to set stop-losses + normal market fluctuations.
From this perspective, the losses are closer to the realization of high-risk trading outcomes rather than results directly caused entirely by deceptive conduct.
Second, the platform allowed customers to make small withdrawals
Customers could withdraw profits normally up to an amount below 2,000U to 3,000U.
This differs from a pure fraud model that completely prohibits withdrawals, directly appropriates all funds, and shuts down the platform. In fact, some clients did successfully withdraw their profits and leave the platform.
Casinos may likewise allow participants to win money and leave. Casinos primarily profit from a probability advantage and from taking a cut, rather than directly withholding all of the participants' funds.
Third, "taking a share of customer losses" is similar to certain business models in the gambling industry
In the model at issue in this case:
- The platform provided a trading venue, similar to a casino providing a gambling venue;
- Sales staff guided customers in conducting transactions, similar to personnel guiding bets;
- The platform shared in customer losses, similar to a casino taking a cut of the profits.
Persons involved in the same case also stated in their statements:
"Customers themselves also have a gambling instinct; they were attracted by the high payout rates and high leverage and believed they could make more money."
If customers knew that the transactions carried high risk and still decided independently to deposit funds and trade, and the platform primarily profited from a probability advantage and customer losses, then the model in question has certain gambling characteristics.
Fourth, the deceptive conduct may not necessarily be sufficient to support the core causal relationship required for the crime of fraud.
The sales staff did indeed engage in deceptive conduct, such as fabricating personas and sending false profit screenshots.
However, such conduct may also be closer to the use of shills and solicitation tactics in casinos, that is, attracting others to participate through false promotion, without necessarily directly determining each disposition of property by the client and the ultimate loss.
The following facts also exist in this case:
- The clients' deposits were made with a certain degree of autonomy;
- Specific trading instructions were operated or confirmed by the clients;
- Market fluctuations were objective in nature;
- Some clients did in fact make profits and successfully withdraw funds.
If the above facts can be proven by evidence, the causal chain required for the crime of fraud between the deceptive conduct, the mistaken understanding, the disposition of property and the resulting loss may not be complete.
Consider this from another perspective:
If a casino uses "beautiful dealers" or "solicitation shills" to attract gamblers, and the gamblers ultimately lose money, the entire casino would not ordinarily be characterized as a fraudulent platform merely because false promotion exists; rather, it is necessary to further determine whether it has the substantive characteristics of gambling activity.
The role that the platform in this case may play is precisely akin to that of an "online casino." The sales staff's fabrication of personas may merely be a solicitation tactic, while "taking a share of client losses" is closer to taking a cut of profits.
Without a specific review of trading market conditions, backend control capabilities, withdrawal rules, and clients' autonomy in trading, directly characterizing the platform as a fraudulent platform may be an oversimplification in terms of legal characterization.
Practical risks faced by a defense against the charge
This defense strategy against the charge also carries obvious risks.
First, it is objectively true that the sales staff engaged in deceptive conduct such as false promotion and misrepresenting their identities.
Second, in judicial practice, cases of this type—'fake platform + sales staff inducement + client losses'—are typically handled as fraud offenses as a matter of inertia.
Third, the platform's imposition of restrictions on withdrawals above 2,000U may also be used as evidence that the actors possessed the intent of illegal possession.
Therefore, I have made the defense against the charge the primary strategy, while also preparing other progressive defense plans.
Even if the charge ultimately cannot be changed, the arguments concerning the platform's operating model, its ability to control market conditions, and the causes of client losses can still lay the foundation for a subsequent mitigation defense.
III. The dispute over the amount: How exactly should his 'performance' be calculated?
Even if the fraud charge is ultimately established, the amount of the crime must still be calculated clearly.
This is the first line of defense for a mitigation defense.
What evidence is missing from the existing case file?
At present, the evidence in the case file has not yet been fully collected.
The investigating authority has issued a notice to obtain evidence, intending to obtain the WeChat, Alipay, and bank account transaction records of several dozen persons involved in the case, as well as the trading data of a certain large virtual currency exchange, and has also applied to obtain the backend data of the platform involved.
However, at this stage, the notice to obtain evidence has been included in the case file, but the actual data materials have not been included in the case file.
The case file lacks:
- complete platform backend data;
- detailed bank account transaction records;
- virtual currency exchange account data;
- actual profit-sharing and settlement records;
- forensic accounting appraisal report;
- audit report.
The currently available amounts of victim losses are mainly calculated based on the victims' own statements and a small number of transfer screenshots.
Some victims even stated:
“More than 100,000 yuan in cash was transferred directly to a U merchant, and none of this was recorded.”
In the absence of complete fund flow records and professional audit materials, whether the relevant amounts can serve as a basis for the verdict still requires assessment in light of subsequently supplemented evidence.
More noteworthy is that different victims were handled by different sales staff, and these sales staff in turn belonged to different team leaders for management.
Which sales staff member corresponded to whom, which victims each sales staff member corresponded to, and which team each victim's losses should be attributed to—no clear and complete correspondence table was formed in the case file.
If the loss amount self-reported by a certain victim were merely mechanically attributed to a certain “teacher,” this would neither conform to the rules of criminal evidence nor accord with the principle of personal responsibility for guilt.
Four categories of amounts should not be counted
Even if the overall loss amount can ultimately be verified, the following four parts should not be calculated against my client.
Team members generated no performance during their management period
During the one or two months in which the relevant seven or eight persons worked under my client, they did not facilitate any transactions, nor did they develop any effective clients.
During this period, there is no criminal amount that should be attributed to my client.
If the so-called “team performance” during this period were counted, that would amount to finding a criminal fact that did not actually exist.
Performance from independent operations after leaving is settled separately
After the three individuals left, each formed their own team, and the relevant performance was settled directly with the boss, Lao Yuan.
The funds did not pass through my client's account, and in terms of management they were no longer subordinate to my client; the performance subsequently generated by them should not be recalculated and attributed to my client.
The boss, Lao Yuan, himself also stated:
"I settle accounts with these teachers based on the screenshots."
It should be noted that what he described was settling accounts separately with "these teachers," rather than having a single teacher uniformly manage and settle the performance of all personnel.
Since the settlement relationships were mutually independent, the relevant performance should in principle also be attributed separately.
Neither the team leader nor the team members have been brought to justice, and the performance cannot be verified
One group of personnel left and set up on their own, but neither the team leader nor any of the team members of that group have been brought to justice.
The actual operating period, number of clients, transaction amounts and flow of funds of the relevant personnel cannot be verified.
If even the identities of the personnel and their basic activities have not been clarified, it is difficult to attribute the so-called performance to my client.
Performance that has already broken away from the original system should even less be counted
One of the individuals who left directly went over to another completely independent major ringleader.
There is no financial connection or management relationship between the three teams he led and the boss, Lao Yuan, and certainly no management or profit-sharing relationship between those teams and my client.
Whether this portion of customer losses falls within the scope of this case itself requires examination, and it certainly cannot be directly counted toward my client's criminal amount.
Basic formula for sentencing mitigation on amount
The amount of fraud should be based on the amount of property the perpetrator actually participated in defrauding. For portions lacking objective evidence, lacking audit materials, lacking fund-flow records, or whose connection cannot be ascertained, the amount should be reduced in accordance with the principle of resolving doubt in favor of the defendant.
Three key individuals have not yet been brought to justice
More critically, the three core individuals who could explain the team hierarchy and attribution of performance have all not yet been brought to justice, including:
- the person who operated independently after leaving the original system;
- the team leader who left and set up his own operation;
- the key figure referred to by others as the "supervisor."
The fact that these individuals have not been brought to justice means that some team relationships, scope of management, and attribution of performance have not yet been clarified.
It is not permissible to attribute the performance of multiple individuals entirely to a single "teacher" based solely on the statement of the boss, Lao Yuan, alone.
IV. The Defense on Hierarchy: Principal Offender or Accessory?
Who could directly identify him?
I reviewed the statements of all co-defendants in the case one by one, and the results were somewhat unexpected.
The only person able to directly identify my client as "Teacher" was the boss, Lao Yuan, alone.
And Lao Yuan, as the boss, has a certain motive to shift or diffuse responsibility. Attributing part of the organizational and management responsibility to subordinates may objectively be beneficial to reducing his own responsibility.
Among the several other individuals identified as being at the "Teacher" level, not one of them, across multiple interrogations, directly mentioned my client's real name.
One of the co-defendants once stated:
"Qiang Ge—specifically, I don't know his name."
If even the real name and identity cannot be confirmed, whether such a statement can serve as an effective identification of my client requires careful examination.
More noteworthy is that Lao Yuan's statement also contains obvious contradictions.
When discussing the number of teams managed by my client, he said at one point "one group" and at another point "four groups," with inconsistent statements before and after; yet when discussing the so-called "15% commission rate," he was unusually definite.
This characteristic of statements—emphasizing accusatory conclusions while treating foundational facts lightly—should be given attention.
The case file contains 19 items of so-called evidence pointing to my client, but all are testimonial evidence, with no objective documentary evidence, electronic data, or bank records to corroborate them.
Such an evidentiary framework is not yet sufficient to support, as a matter of course, a finding that he is a principal offender.
He did not control the following core matters
In determining whether a person is a principal offender or an accessory in a joint crime, one must look not only at the title attached to that person, but also examine whether that person has actual control and decision-making authority.
Based on the available materials, my client did not control the following core matters:
- He was not the person who raised the criminal intent. It was the boss, Lao Yuan, who took the initiative to approach him, rather than his initiating or planning the relevant business.
- He did not control platform resources. The platform contact communicated with Lao Yuan on a single, direct line through instant messaging software, and he was not aware of the true identity of the platform side.
- He did not control overseas communication channels. He had no channel for direct communication with the overseas platform or other overseas persons involved in the case.
- He did not control the overall allocation of funds. All funds were arranged uniformly by the boss; he was only responsible for forwarding the portion of the payments he received to the lower-level business personnel.
- did not control the core business functions. The merchant accounts were registered by the boss, the traffic-driving funds were provided by the boss, the office rent was paid by the boss, and the financial accounting was also handled by the boss.
Based on these facts, he did not control the platform resources, funds, personnel, or core business decision-making authority.
The scope of his authority was relatively small, and some personnel had already become independent
A lateral comparison of the actual scope of management of several so-called "teachers" makes the differences even more apparent.
Some managed five or six teams, while others managed seven or eight teams. As for my client, the existing evidence cannot even clearly establish:
- exactly how many teams he managed;
- specifically who the team leaders were;
- what the roster of salespersons in each team was;
- how the performance of each team was attributed.
At the same time, some of the personnel he recruited early on had already begun operating independently and were completely separated from him in terms of funding and management.
Under these circumstances, it may be argued, pursuant to the provisions of Article 27 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China concerning accomplices, that the role he played in the joint crime was relatively secondary or of an auxiliary nature.
For an accomplice, the punishment shall, in accordance with law, be lighter, mitigated, or exempted. Under some sentencing guidelines, accomplice status may have a significant impact on the baseline sentence.
V. Closing Remarks
This case has led me to reflect repeatedly on one question:
When a platform's operating model falls between a "fraud tool" and a "casino," when an individual's actual role falls between a "principal offender" and a "marginal participant," and when a determination of amount falls between a "precise audit" and "hearsay," what should defense counsel do?
My answer is:
Amid uncertainty, secure every fact that can be established for the client.
If the charge is disputed, seek a charge that better reflects the substance of the conduct and carries a lighter statutory penalty; if the amount is in question, seek to reduce the amount lacking evidentiary support; if status is disputed, seek a finding of accomplice status.
Not every step is certain to succeed, but every step is worth raising in accordance with law.
The significance of criminal defense lies not in promising that a case will certainly be overturned, but in subjecting the exercise of public power to the scrutiny of evidence and law at every stage of case handling, and in giving each client's fate one more opportunity to be carefully examined.
The three-tier defense in this case comprises:
- the charge defense as the foundation;
- the amount defense as the safeguard;
- The principal-versus-accomplice argument serves as the fallback.
These three levels do not operate in isolation; rather, they form a progressive defense path:
If the charge cannot be changed, seek to lower the sentencing baseline through argument on the amount; if the amount cannot be substantially reduced, seek further leniency through principal-versus-accomplice status.
Each level builds on the previous one, and each seeks a more reasonable sentencing range for the client.
This "three-stage progressive defense" approach is also worth considering for fellow practitioners handling similar cases.
The person who told me in the detention center, "I want to make the facts clear," is waiting for just such an opportunity.
VI. Digression
After engaging in criminal defense work for a long time, one notices a pattern:
The more complex the case, the more likely it is that disputes arise over characterization.
The same conduct, if different charges are applied, may result in sentencing outcomes that differ by ten years or even more.
Therefore, whenever there is reasonable room for argument on the charge, even if the probability of success is not high, it is worth setting out the factual and legal reasoning clearly.
Even if the charge ultimately remains unchanged, a thorough argument on characterization may also lead the judge to be more cautious at sentencing.
I have another observation:
In organized-crime cases, a clear hierarchy chart may be more valuable than an isolated statement.
In this case, I spent a great deal of time sorting out the team structure, the whereabouts of personnel, and the attribution of performance.
In the end, I found that what truly has probative value may not be a particular statement made by a particular person, but a complete chart of personnel movements:
- who joined and when;
- who left and when;
- where they went after leaving;
- who subsequently managed them;
- with whom settlements were made;
- through whose accounts the funds passed.
Statements may change, but personnel movements, fund relationships and timelines do not change easily.
Therefore, when handling organized-crime cases, it is advisable to draw the chart first and then analyze.
Finally, I would also like to offer a suggestion to fellow practitioners handling virtual currency cases:
Do not let the word “fraud” easily constrain your thinking.
Under the same “platform plus taking customer losses” model, whether the conduct constitutes the crime of fraud or the crime of operating a casino may result in sentencing outcomes that differ by more than ten years.
The following facts should be investigated with emphasis:
- whether the platform's market quotations are consistent with real market conditions;
- the leverage multiple used by the platform;
- whether customers can withdraw funds normally;
- whether the platform is able to control transaction outcomes;
- whether back-end adjustment or control measures are actually used;
- whether customers were aware of the risks and participated voluntarily;
- whether there is a direct causal relationship between the deceptive conduct and the property loss.
These facts determine the charge in the case, the charge determines the sentence, and the sentence determines the next decade or more of a person's life.
VII. Legal Basis, Judicial Interpretations and Reference Cases
(1) Relevant Legal Provisions
1. Article 266 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China: Crime of Fraud
Whoever defrauds public or private property, where the amount is especially huge or there are other especially serious circumstances, shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years or life imprisonment, and shall also be fined or have property confiscated.
2. Article 303, Paragraph 2 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China: Crime of Operating a Casino
Whoever operates a casino shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, criminal detention or public surveillance, and shall also be fined; where the circumstances are serious, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years but not more than ten years, and shall also be fined.
3. Article 27 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China: Accessory
A person who plays a secondary or auxiliary role in a joint crime is an accessory.
For an accessory, the punishment shall be lighter or mitigated, or the person shall be exempted from punishment.
(2) Judicial Interpretations and Normative Documents
1. Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Online Gambling
Jointly issued by the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Ministry of Public Security.
Establishing gambling websites, accepting bets, and taking a cut of the profits from such activities are, in accordance with law, convicted and punished as the crime of operating a casino.
2. Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases Such as Telecommunications and Internet Fraud
Jointly issued by the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security.
In principle, the amount of fraud should be determined on the basis of the amount of property the perpetrator actually obtained by fraud.
3. Article 55 of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China
In the adjudication of all cases, emphasis shall be placed on evidence and investigation and research, and confessions shall not be readily believed.
Where there is only the defendant's confession and no other evidence, the defendant may not be found guilty and sentenced; where there is no defendant's confession but the evidence is reliable and sufficient, the defendant may be found guilty and sentenced.
(III) Directions for Reference Cases
Among the relevant cases published by the Supreme People's Court, there are adjudicative views that distinguish "operating online casinos" from "online fraud."
When searching for similar cases, particular attention may be paid to the following review factors:
- whether the perpetrator was able to control the gambling or transaction outcomes;
- whether participants knew of the risks and participated voluntarily;
- Whether the platform market quotations are genuine;
- whether the platform is able to make payments as they fall due;
- whether the deceptive conduct served merely as a solicitation device or was the core means that directly determined the victims' disposition of their property;
- whether the platform primarily profited by taking a cut, or aimed to illegally possess all of the participants' funds.
In judicial practice, "whether the platform's back end can and does in fact control transaction outcomes" is often an important fact affecting the determination of the charge.
If the platform's back-end data is missing and the available evidence cannot prove that the actor actually carried out market manipulation, the relevant facts should be carefully determined in accordance with the principle of adjudication based on evidence.
This article has been prepared based on the handling of cases in which we acted and has been de-identified as to the case-handling authorities, the names of persons involved and other identifiable information. The legal analysis in this article represents only professional discussion from a criminal defense perspective; it does not constitute an endorsement of the legality of any trading conduct, nor does it constitute any commitment as to the outcome of any specific case.

