Starting from the implementation rules of the National Security Law, this article breaks down the applicable boundaries and practical impact of Hong Kong's device password rules.

Recently, a widely circulated piece of information in the crypto community has been roughly this: Hong Kong can already require the surrender of electronic device passwords, failure to cooperate constitutes a criminal offense, and even hardware wallets may be covered. The direct source of such claims is a security alert issued by the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong and Macau in March 2026. The original text is in fact quite direct:

“On March 23, 2026, the Hong Kong government changed the implementing rules relating to the National Security Law. It is now a criminal offense to refuse to give the Hong Kong police the passwords or decryption assistance to access all personal electronic devices including cellphones and laptops. This legal change applies to everyone, including U.S. citizens, in Hong Kong, arriving or just transiting Hong Kong International Airport. In addition, the Hong Kong government also has more authority to take and keep any personal devices, as evidence, that they claim are linked to national security offenses.”

Reading only this passage, it is easy to form an intuitive impression: upon entering Hong Kong, one may be required to surrender device passwords. After fermenting on social media, it became a more emotionally charged version—"do not bring hardware wallets to Hong Kong." But if one follows this information further, it is easy to overestimate the risk, or even to understand it as a general rule applicable to everyone. The problem is that such alerts often emphasize only the outcome without clearly explaining the applicable preconditions and scenarios.To understand this matter clearly, it is still necessary to return to the legal rules behind it.

 

What exactly did Hong Kong change in this rule adjustment?

What triggered the discussion this time is not an entirely new law, but a strengthening of the "acquisition of electronic evidence" section in the Implementation Rules under the framework of the Hong Kong National Security Law. The core change is in fact concentrated on one point:Law enforcement authorities may not only access your device, but may also require you to "cooperate in opening up the data."There is a key statement in the relevant provisions:

“A person must comply with the requirement to provide such assistance as is reasonably necessary to enable an officer to access the information.”

Read in isolation, this sentence is somewhat abstract; what it really seeks to express is that law enforcement authorities may require you to assist them in "understanding the contents of the device." This "assistance" is not a vague reference—the subsequent provisions set out the scope very specifically:

“The assistance may include providing access to an electronic device, providing any password, decryption key or other information necessary for gaining access to the information.”

Putting these two sentences together, it is in fact a very realistic scenario: law enforcement authorities may not only take away your device, but may also require you to provide passwords, unlocking methods, and even mnemonic phrases—such "access paths"—together.

More critically, such "assistance" is no longer a question of whether you are willing, but a mandatory legal obligation. The provisions immediately state:

“A person who fails to comply with the requirement without reasonable excuse commits an offence.”

That is to say, where the applicable conditions are met, refusing to provide a password or refusing to cooperate in unlocking may itself constitute a criminal offense; and if false or misleading information is provided, even heavier liability may be faced.

From an enforcement-logic perspective, the change at this step is in fact quite direct:

In the past, even if enforcement authorities obtained a device, they might not be able to obtain the data; now, the law allows them to directly require you to hand over the "data entry point."

Many people feel an instinctive discomfort upon reading this, and the reason is simple: what the rules touch upon is not the device, but control itself. This is especially sensitive for crypto assets, because the device is merely the shell; what truly determines the ownership of the assets is that string of information that you may or may not be willing to disclose.

 

Devices can not only be searched, but may also be continuously detained

In the notice from the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong, there is another sentence:

“the Hong Kong government also has more authority to take and keep any personal devices, as evidence, that they claim are linked to national security offenses.”

If this sentence is rendered in more straightforward terms, it means: not only can your device be searched, it can also be taken away and retained for a period of time as evidence. What lies behind this is the expansion of powers regarding "seizure and detention" in the implementation rules. The relevant rules allow enforcement authorities, where they consider a device to be related to a national security case, to seize that device and preserve it as evidence.

Looking at "seizing devices" alone, this is in fact not unusual in criminal cases; similar arrangements exist in various jurisdictions. But if it is placed together with the "obligation to assist in decryption" mentioned in the previous section, one will find that the focus of this adjustment is not on any single rule, but on the combination among them.

The enforcement path in reality will roughly become this: devices can be taken away directly, data can be required to be unlocked, and failure to cooperate in unlocking itself will create additional legal risk. These three steps, taken together, basically cover the most critical stages of digital forensics. The previous situation in which "the device is in the hands of enforcement authorities, but the data cannot be obtained" has been substantially compressed at the institutional level.

From a practical perspective, the impact of this change lies not in ordinary inspections, but in the fact that once a device is brought into a specific case, it is no longer merely an object briefly examined, but may enter a state of continuous control and analysis. This is also why many people instinctively feel discomfort toward such rules: because what they touch upon is not the device itself, but your continuing control over the device.

 

Under what circumstances will these powers actually be used

The rules mentioned above, if viewed in isolation, can easily give rise to a misunderstanding: does it mean that as long as you enter Hong Kong, enforcement authorities can require you to unlock your device at any time? But if the provisions are placed back into their original legal structure, this conclusion does not hold.

These measures in the implementation rules do not exist independently; they all depend on one premise—

“for the purpose of the investigation of an offence endangering national security”

In other words, this entire set of powers to "require assistance in decryption" servesthe investigation of national security cases, rather than being a general law enforcement tool.

Two levels of limitation require particular attention here.

The first is the type of case itself.The Hong Kong National Security Law covers only specific categories of conduct, such as secession, subversion of state power, terrorist activities, and collusion with foreign forces. These all fall within the scope of criminal offences, rather than administrative violations in the ordinary sense.

The second is the threshold for initiation.In actual law enforcement, the standard of "reasonable grounds to suspect" must usually be met—that is, there must be reasonable suspicion sufficient to support an investigation—before this stage is entered.

Viewed together, these two conditions yield a judgment closer to reality: this set of rules is not a routine inspection mechanism aimed at everyone, but is directed at subjects who have already been brought within an investigative framework. This is also why the phrase "applies to everyone" in the U.S. consulate notice is easily misread. It emphasizes the scope of application of the law, not the probability that enforcement will occur.

 

Why hardware wallets are mentioned, yet are not the focus of the rules

Many discussions focus on "hardware wallets," which is in fact a typical point of amplification in the course of dissemination. From the perspective of the legal text, no rule is specifically directed at crypto wallets. The relevant provisions use more abstract formulations, such as "electronic device," "information," and "information system"; this drafting itself shows that the legislative focus was not any particular tool, but all carriers that may hold data or control.

As a matter of interpretation, hardware wallets can of course be brought within the scope of "electronic device," and there is no dispute on this point. But looking one level further, one finds that the law enforcement logic is not organized around "the type of device," but around "whether it is related to the case."

Here is an approach that is closer to actual practice: law enforcement will not take an interest in a hardware wallet simply because you hold one; what actually triggers attention is whether that wallet is connected to a particular account, a particular pool of funds, or a particular investigation. If such a connection exists, then this device is no different in essence from a phone or a computer, and you may be required to unlock it; if no such connection exists, then it is merely an ordinary electronic device. Many people frame the issue as “Hong Kong has started targeting cold wallets,” which is in fact a misreading. What the rules actually reach is “who controls the data,” not “where the data is stored.”

 

Comparison with the United States: the underlying logic of the password issue is entirely different

Putting the same question in the US context yields a very different answer. The United States can of course also search devices, seize devices, and even obtain data through technical means, but once it comes to “making you state the password yourself,” the law immediately becomes cautious. At the core of this is a sentence in the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution:

“No person… shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”

Around this principle, US courts have long grappled with one question: is entering a password an act of “testifying”?

The prevailing judicial approach has roughly formed a relatively clear dividing line:

  • Information held in memory, such as passwords and mnemonic phrases, is more readily characterized as “testimonial” and in principle cannot be compelled to be disclosed
  • Physical characteristics such as fingerprints and facial recognition are closer to providing a “key” and, under certain conditions, may be compelled to be used

On this basis, the United States has further developed the “foregone conclusion doctrine.” If law enforcement can already prove the existence of certain data and to whom it belongs, it may require the individual to cooperate in accessing it, but this standard itself has a relatively high threshold, has a limited scope of application, and frequently becomes a focus of dispute.

Looking at these rules together, it can be seen that in the United States, law enforcement may find ways to obtain your device and may approach your data through various paths, but requiring you to hand over the password yourself is itself constitutionally constrained and cannot be easily achieved.

By contrast, the path taken by Hong Kong in this regulatory adjustment does not introduce the limiting logic of “self-incrimination”; instead, it incorporates “assisting in decryption” into the system of legal obligations, so that once a matter enters the framework of a national security investigation, refusal to cooperate itself gives rise to legal risk.

Placing the two regimes side by side makes the contrast very intuitive: in the United States, a password is closer to a kind of “protected information”; in Hong Kong, in specific cases it is treated as a kind of “assistance that must be provided.” This is also why, for the same encrypted device, the risk assessment under the two jurisdictions will differ markedly.

 

What this means for ordinary crypto asset holders

Once the rules are clearly explained, the question can actually be narrowed down to something simpler: how much impact does this change have on a person who holds and uses crypto assets in the ordinary course?

If your own conduct is clean—you merely hold coins, trade, make investments, or take part in some routine on-chain activity—then this change in Hong Kong's rules will basically not alter your day-to-day risk. It is not a general screening mechanism aimed at ordinary people, and it will not trigger additional law-enforcement attention simply because you carry a hardware wallet.

But if the perspective is raised one level, this adjustment does indeed send a clearer signal: in specific cases, the ability of Hong Kong law-enforcement authorities to obtain on-chain control is growing stronger, and they no longer rely entirely on technical means but can achieve it directly through legal obligations. This will have a substantive impact on conduct involving complex fund structures, cross-border flows, or grey boundaries.

From a practical standpoint, what deserves more attention is not "device security" but "structural security." Whether your assets are concentrated under a single private key, whether your addresses may be linked to high-risk labels, and whether your fund paths can withstand explanation—these questions are far closer to real risk than "whether to bring a wallet into the jurisdiction."

If this news item must leave behind one practical meaning, it probably lies not in travel habits but in a more realistic change: in certain scenarios that have already come within the law-enforcement gaze, control over on-chain assets is no longer determined entirely by technology unilaterally.

 

Author of this article

Shao Jiadan, Partner at Mankun (Shenzhen) Law Firm. Graduated from the National University of Singapore, and has previously served as a lawyer, head of compliance and risk management, and vice president of legal affairs at institutions including a red-circle law firm, a central state-owned enterprise's cross-border investment platform, and a hundred-billion-yuan fund of funds. Focused on new economy fields such as Web3.0, and skilled at creatively providing clients with one-stop solutions to legal and compliance needs including global architecture setup for Web3 projects, license applications, project financing, real-world assets (RWA), and the establishment of crypto funds.

 

About Mankun

Mankun Law Firm was established in 2015 and is a boutique law firm in China focused on the Web3.0 new economy and deeply engaged in the blockchain industry. Members of the Mankun team possess uniquely diverse industry backgrounds, coming from well-known legal service institutions, state judicial organs, internet technology companies, crypto asset institutions, blockchain industry think tanks, and other organizations.

Based on a deep understanding of the new economy, continuous attention to and research on policies and regulations, and rich practical experience, the Mankun team is skilled at providing, from the perspectives of business models and legal practice, comprehensive legal services to new economy enterprises in Web3.0, blockchain, AI, NFT, digital collectibles, crypto funds, crypto payments, DeFi, real-world assets (RWA), GameFi, and other fields, including business architecture design, project investment and financing, transaction planning, business compliance, resolution of complex civil and commercial disputes, prevention and control of criminal risks, and criminal defense.

Mankun Law Firm is headquartered in Shanghai and has branches in Hong Kong, China, Silicon Valley in the United States, Shenzhen, Hangzhou, Zhengzhou, Chengdu, and other places. In response to the global compliance development needs of Web3.0 industry clients, Mankun has established local offices in major global crypto finance cities and selected local professional blockchain service partners to provide clients with professional legal and compliance services with global breadth and China depth.