Earlier this year, the family member of a site operator engaged in an API relay business came to see me. The first thing she said upon entering was:
"Lawyer Lu, his server handles millions of requests every day, but he has always thought it was just a pile of transaction records that nobody looks at."
Her husband's business is familiar to people in the industry: he set up an AI relay station that forwards and encapsulates the APIs of overseas large models such as OpenAI and Claude for domestic developers to call on a paid basis. Users do not need to circumvent the internet firewall, nor do they need corporate qualifications; they pay according to actual usage.
According to public reports, since 2026, AI relay station operators in multiple locations have been criminally detained. In the investigation directions of the relevant cases, in addition to common issues such as illegally obtaining computer information system data and providing programs or tools for intruding into or illegally controlling computer information systems, another lead that practitioners had previously rarely taken seriously has emerged — cross-border data transfer violations.
What exactly was the problem with this operator?
His relay station by default recorded all user request logs in full, including conversation content, code snippets and account information, and stored this information on domestic servers. Later, a "data company" approached him on its own initiative and proposed to purchase the logs on a per-item basis for model training.
He believed that as long as the logs were simply desensitized, no legal problems would arise. Thereafter, he sold several hundred thousand logs in succession, and the illegal gains amounted to only a few tens of thousands of yuan.
It was not until after the case came to light that he learned that these logs contained a large number of conversation records of real users, including names, telephone numbers, addresses, ID card numbers and other personal information capable of identifying specific natural persons. At the same time, the API forwarding link he operated was also continuously transmitting data of domestic users to overseas servers.
His wife asked me:
"How can logs that sell for a few yuan each be connected to a big national-level term like 'data security'?"
This is precisely the question this article aims to answer.
The case in this article is adapted from public judicial documents and public reports. All names are pseudonyms, and some details have been literary embellished.
I. Case Review: How the Threefold Risks of an API Relay Station Operator Were Triggered
Let us first break down the business structure of an AI API relay station.
In a typical relay station, the data flow path is as follows:
Domestic users or developers → relay station server (within China) → overseas large-model API server → response returned along the same path
In this chain, data typically leaves traces at two points:
- the relay station's own logging system;
- the overseas servers connected via the cross-border link.
Based on publicly reported criminal detention cases, the relevant risks are typically triggered progressively along the following three paths.
First risk: illegally obtaining data or providing intrusion tools
Some relay stations obtain upstream API calling capability through reverse engineering official clients, misappropriating account pools, or bulk-registering accounts to obtain free quotas.
Such conduct may directly implicate the crime of illegally obtaining computer information system data under Article 285 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, as well as the crime of providing programs or tools for intruding into or illegally controlling computer information systems.
This is also the only criminal risk that most relay station operators were previously able to clearly perceive.
Second risk: reselling log data may constitute the crime of infringing on citizens' personal information
The conversation content that users send to large models may include:
- medical records;
- contracts;
- résumés;
- internal company documents;
- computer source code;
- personal information such as names, telephone numbers and identity card numbers.
If such logs are sold externally after so-called "desensitization," but the processed data can still identify a specific natural person, the relevant conduct may still be found to constitute selling or providing citizens' personal information, potentially violating Article 253-1 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China.
Under the judicial interpretation in Fa Shi [2017] No. 10, reaching 5,000 or more items of ordinary citizens' personal information, or unlawful gains of 5,000 yuan or more, may meet the criminal threshold for conviction; reaching 500 or more items of specific categories of information such as location and movement trajectories, communication content, credit information and property information may also meet the threshold for conviction.
The logs retained by relay stations often number in the tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of items, so it is not difficult to meet the relevant quantity thresholds.
Third risk: cross-border data transfer violations, where administrative liability may further connect to criminal risk
This is the focus of the discussion in this article.
Under the framework of the Data Security Law of the People's Republic of China and the Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China, the forwarding links of a relay station may constitute a typical act of "providing data to overseas parties," that is, conversation data of domestic users is transmitted to overseas servers, or is stored and processed by overseas servers.
Where a data processor meeting the prescribed conditions continues to transmit data overseas without lawfully completing a cross-border data transfer security assessment, without concluding the standard contract for outbound transfer of personal information, and without obtaining personal information protection certification, it may first face administrative liability under Article 46 of the Data Security Law of the People's Republic of China and Article 66 of the Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China.
In circumstances such as refusal to rectify or the causing of serious consequences, the relevant leads may also be referred to criminal proceedings and investigated and handled together with crimes such as illegally obtaining computer information system data and infringing on citizens' personal information.
Some criminal detention cases that have emerged since 2026 are precisely the concentrated detonation following the superposition of multiple risks.
II. Why the Law Is So Strict: The Three Red Lines for Cross-Border Data Transfer
First Layer: Cross-border data transfer is not simple "technical forwarding," but a legal act
Many relay station operators believe:
"I am merely a transmission conduit; the data only passes through my server."
However, the Data Security Law of the People's Republic of China and the Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China focus not only on whether data is stored for the long term, but also on the operator's control relationship over data processing activities.
If data is transmitted from a server controlled by the operator to overseas parties, the operator may be identified as a data processor and become the responsible entity for the relevant cross-border data transfer activities.
Therefore, the so-called explanation that "I am merely a conduit" does not automatically exclude legal liability.
Article 38 of the Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China provides that where a personal information processor, due to business or other needs, truly needs to provide personal information outside the territory of the People's Republic of China, it shall satisfy the corresponding conditions, including:
- passing a security assessment organized by the national cyberspace administration;
- undergoing personal information protection certification by a professional institution in accordance with the provisions of the national cyberspace administration;
- entering into a contract with the overseas recipient based on the standard contract formulated by the national cyberspace administration;
- satisfying other conditions prescribed by laws, administrative regulations or the national cyberspace administration.
If a transit station takes no corresponding measures yet continuously provides personal information overseas, the relevant data transmission activities may present compliance risks.
Second layer: "small scale means exemption" is a dangerous misconception
The cross-border data transfer management system does indeed set different conditions for the applicability of filing or record-keeping. Some operators therefore believe:
"My number of users does not reach the threshold for filing a security assessment, so I am not subject to the cross-border data transfer rules."
This is a mistaken understanding of the regulatory system.
The relevant quantitative thresholds are mainly used to determine whether a data processor needs to perform specific procedures such as cross-border data transfer security assessment or standard contract filing, and do not mean that an operator that does not reach the filing threshold may refrain from performing other personal information protection obligations.
For example, the personal information protection impact assessment obligation under Article 55 of the Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China, the entrusted processing obligation under Article 59, and the liability for unlawful processing of personal information under Article 66 do not, in principle, automatically disappear merely because the operator is small in scale.
A small-scale processor may be exempt from a particular filing procedure, but this does not mean it is exempt from all legal liability.
More importantly, if the resale of logs is suspected of the crime of infringing on citizens' personal information, the criminalization threshold focuses primarily on factors such as the type of information, the quantity of information, the illegal gains and the harmful consequences, and bears no necessary relationship to the overall scale of the operating platform.
Third layer: the points at which criminal liability may be triggered
Cross-border data transfer violations generally give rise first to administrative liability, but in the following circumstances the risk may escalate further into a criminal case:
- The transferred data contains citizens' personal information and is sold or illegally provided
- The relevant conduct may be suspected of the crime of infringing on citizens' personal information as provided in Article 253-1 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China.
- Refusal to comply with a regulator's rectification requirements, resulting in serious consequences
- If the actor refuses to perform the information network security management obligations, resulting in serious consequences such as the widespread dissemination of illegal information or the leakage of user information, this may further involve the crime of refusing to perform information network security management obligations as provided in Article 286-1 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China.
- The cross-border data transfer conduct serves other illegal or criminal chains
- For example, where a person knows that an overseas fraud ring or other illegal or criminal organization is using the relevant data to commit crimes and still provides data or technical support to it, the relevant conduct may be investigated and handled together with the upstream crime.
In some cases, the investigating authorities may first conduct an investigation around technical conduct such as illegally obtaining computer information system data, then inventory the types and quantities of personal information in the logs, while also reviewing the cross-border data transfer process, the rectification status and the operator's subjective knowledge.
When evidence from multiple aspects corroborates one another, the room for defense in the case will be significantly compressed.
III. Industry Risks: Risk Coordinates Across Different Business Models
This table reveals at least two signals worthy of attention.
Signal One: The window for waiting for a rectification notice before taking action is narrowing
In the past, cases in the data field typically went through a process of interviews, orders to rectify, administrative penalties, and then referral for criminal proceedings.
However, where multiple unlawful leads coexist, the case-handling authorities may directly approach the suspected criminal technical conduct or personal information trading conduct, and then concurrently review data compliance issues.
For practitioners, the wishful thinking of "waiting to receive a rectification notice before making changes" may come at a cost far higher than an administrative fine.
Signal Two: Purchasers of log data may likewise be placed on the risk list
AI companies and data annotation companies that acquire user conversation logs for model training, if they know the relevant data was obtained unlawfully and still acquire, receive, or use it, may be found to be the unlawful acquirer in the criminal chain of infringing citizens' personal information, and may even be held liable as joint offenders.
In addition, the relevant enterprises may also face administrative liability for failing to perform obligations such as reviewing data sources and conducting personal information protection impact assessments.
Therefore, whether the sources of training data are lawful has become a core business issue for AI companies, and is no longer merely an "elective course" for the legal department.
IV. Compliance Self-Remediation Guide: Data Compliance Checklist for API Relay Business
Relay station operators should immediately examine five aspects
Implement log minimization
Disable non-essential full-request logging and retain only metadata necessary for billing, such as Token usage and call times.
As for user conversation content, whether to retain it should be carefully assessed based on business necessity. Where not necessary, it should not be written to disk, backed up, or analyzed, thereby reducing the risk of personal information leakage and unlawful use at the source.
Promote compliance of cross-border transmission links
For business that can be completed using domestic large models, priority may be given to using domestic services.
Where data truly needs to be transmitted overseas, the Provisions on Promoting and Regulating Cross-Border Data Flows and other rules should be considered to determine whether an exemption applies and whether a security assessment for cross-border data transfer, the conclusion of a standard contract for outbound transfer of personal information, or the obtaining of personal information protection certification is required.
Where the corresponding conditions are met, procedures such as security assessment or filing of the standard contract should be completed in a timely manner.
Re-examine the user agreement and privacy policy
Users should be clearly informed of:
- which data may be transmitted overseas;
- the overseas recipient to which the data will be provided;
- the specific purpose and method of data processing;
- the data retention period;
- the methods and procedures for users to exercise their personal information rights.
Article 39 of the Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China provides that where personal information is provided to an overseas recipient, the separate consent of the individual shall be obtained.
Therefore, authorization obtained merely through general clauses or a uniform check-the-box method may not satisfy the compliance requirements applicable to cross-border data transfer scenarios.
Ensure that upstream API sources are lawful
The API invocation capabilities used by the relay station should derive from official authorization or other lawful channels.
Obtaining upstream service capabilities by stealing account pools, reverse engineering official clients, or bulk-registering accounts to obtain free quotas may give rise to the risk of computer information system data-related crimes and should be stopped immediately.
Properly handle historical data
Logs that have been retained but are no longer necessary for continued storage should be handled in compliance with legal requirements and after a full assessment of the risks involved in the case.
If data resale has already occurred, information such as the transaction time, data type, data volume, purchaser and transaction amount should be compiled to form a complete ledger.
Particular attention should be paid to the following: if an investigation has already been opened or the relevant data may become evidence in a case, the data should not be deleted without authorization. Deletion may be characterized as destruction or fabrication of evidence or as obstruction of an investigation.
AI companies procuring training data should conduct proper due diligence on data sources
Before procuring data, at a minimum the following three questions should be clarified:
- What is the source of the data?
- Has user authorization been obtained in accordance with the law?
- Has identifiable personal information been removed, and has the data reached a degree that it cannot be identified or restored?
If the supplier cannot answer the above questions, or cannot provide corresponding supporting materials, procurement and use should be undertaken with caution.
In the procurement contract, representations regarding the lawfulness of the data source, ongoing compliance assurances and breach compensation clauses may also be added, so as to clarify the supplier's data compliance responsibilities.
It should be noted, however, that liability-transfer clauses in a contract do not as a matter of course exempt the procuring party from the review and protection obligations it itself bears under the law.
How operators already involved in a case should handle the matter
If the relevant business has already entered investigation proceedings, the following measures should be taken promptly:
- Immediately cease any further transfer of the relevant data;
- properly seal the servers and preserve the state of the original data;
- do not delete, modify, or overwrite data that may become evidence without authorization;
- retain a lawyer with experience in relevant cases as soon as possible.
The defense in such cases typically focuses on:
- whether the resold data could potentially identify specific natural persons;
- whether the volume of personal information has been accurately counted and deduplicated;
- how the types and sensitivity levels of the data involved are determined;
- whether the cross-border transfer conduct meets the relevant exemption conditions;
- how administrative violations should be distinguished from criminal offenses;
- whether the actor and upstream or downstream participants shared a common criminal intent.
Data-related cases are highly technical and specialized. The earlier one intervenes, the more conducive it is to communicating on case characterization, electronic data review, and the boundaries of liability.
V. Concluding Remarks
The AI industry is prone to a seductive illusion: data is fluid and intangible, so responsibility is also blurred.
However, since the Data Security Law of the People's Republic of China came into effect, the relevant boundaries of responsibility have become increasingly clear—every piece of user data that an operator handles corresponds to a specific legal responsibility.
The relay-station business may originate from technological and market opportunities, but it cannot be built on responsibility arbitrage.
Treating user privacy as a stream that no one reviews, and treating cross-border data transfer obligations as optional formalities, the relevant risks will sooner or later enter the business ledger in another form.
Criminal law is the bottom line, not the ceiling of compliant operation. The line of data security may be thought of as a rubber band before it is touched; only after it is truly touched will one discover that it is a high-voltage line.
VI. Digression
While writing this article, I re-read the meeting records with that site operator.
He said something that left a deep impression on me:
"If I had known earlier that selling logs was illegal, I would have shut down the site and gone to deliver food—even that would be better than this."
Technical personnel's sensitivity to data can often reach the atomic level: how many bytes a log occupies, how many tokens a request consumes—all can be calculated with complete clarity; yet their sensitivity to the "people" behind the data sometimes appears unusually dull.
Behind every conversation record is something a real person said—perhaps his illness, work, family, property, or perhaps a secret never disclosed to others.
In this business, the most expensive thing has never been the API quota.
VII. Relevant Legal Provisions
Article 253A of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China
Crime of Infringing on Citizens' Personal Information
Whoever, in violation of the relevant provisions of the State, sells or provides citizens' personal information to others, where the circumstances are serious, shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention, and shall also, or shall only, be fined; where the circumstances are especially serious, shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than seven years, and shall also be fined.
Whoever, in violation of the relevant provisions of the State, sells or provides to others citizens' personal information obtained in the course of performing duties or providing services shall be given a heavier punishment in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
Whoever steals or illegally obtains citizens' personal information by other means shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1.
Article 285 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China
Crime of Illegally Intruding into a Computer Information System; Crime of Illegally Obtaining Computer Information System Data or Illegally Controlling a Computer Information System; Crime of Providing Programs or Tools for Intruding into or Illegally Controlling a Computer Information System
Whoever, in violation of the provisions of the State, intrudes into a computer information system other than those specified in the preceding paragraph, or uses other technical means to obtain data stored, processed or transmitted in that computer information system, or implements illegal control over that computer information system, where the circumstances are serious, shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention, and shall also, or shall only, be fined; where the circumstances are especially serious, shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than seven years, and shall also be fined.
Whoever provides programs or tools specially used for intruding into or illegally controlling a computer information system, or, knowing that another person is carrying out the illegal or criminal act of intruding into or illegally controlling a computer information system, provides programs or tools for that person, where the circumstances are serious, shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
VIII. Relevant Judicial Interpretations and Normative Documents
- Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Handling of Criminal Cases of Infringing on Citizens' Personal Information (Fa Shi [2017] No. 10);
- Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Handling of Criminal Cases Endangering the Security of Computer Information Systems (Fa Shi [2011] No. 19);
- Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China;
- Data Security Law of the People's Republic of China;
- Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China;
- Interim Measures for the Administration of Generative Artificial Intelligence Services;
- Measures for Security Assessment of Cross-border Data Transfer;
- Provisions on Promoting and Regulating Cross-border Data Flows.
IX. Case and Source Materials Notes
According to public reports, since 2026, cases involving criminal detention of operators of AI relay stations have emerged in multiple locations.
The cases in this article are adapted from publicly available judgments on China Judgments Online and public news reports; all names are pseudonyms, and some details have been literary reworked.
— Lawyer Lu
Focused on AI and internet criminal defense

