Possible scenarios

An operating entity directly collects fiat cash (or bank transfers) from customers through offline physical stores or designated channels, and delivers an equivalent amount of Tether (USDT) to customers in an internal system or third-party wallet. The business involves frequent cash pooling, fiat currency and stablecoin conversion operations, and fund settlement and reconciliation between stores and upstream suppliers.

Why this requires attention

This type of transaction structure—"fiat in, virtual assets out"—severs the direct correspondence with traditional bank transaction records and can readily be reconstructed by judicial authorities as a money-laundering channel or a link in the transfer of fraud proceeds. Referring to the "Bixiang Technology" case, if a store cannot demonstrate that it exercised a duty of prudent verification of the source of funds, or if there are acts such as settling with upstream parties at abnormally high premiums or assisting in splitting funds, it may be found to have colluded with a fraud group or money-laundering ring, and thus face criminal charges of aiding information network criminal activities, concealing or disguising criminal proceeds, or being an accomplice to fraud. The core issue lies in the determination of "subjective knowledge" and "objective acts of assistance" in the transaction chain.

What can be done now

  • Obtain and preserve a complete evidence chain for all offline transactions, including customer identity verification (KYC) records, cash receipt vouchers, surveillance footage, and USDT transfer hashes, to ensure that each transaction can be traced to a specific natural person.
  • Review contracts and settlement records with upstream virtual currency suppliers, focusing on verifying whether the pricing mechanism significantly deviates from fair market prices and whether there are frequent large-value fund transfers without a genuine trade background.
  • Establish and implement strict anti-money laundering (AML) internal compliance procedures, and retain records of interception, reporting, and refusal of service for abnormal transactions (such as large cash amounts, frequent small amounts, and funds from high-risk regions).
  • Separate store operating accounts from the company's main accounts, clarify fund pooling paths, avoid commingling with personal accounts, and ensure clear financial reconciliation so that the virtual asset delivery obligation corresponding to each fiat currency inflow can be independently explained.
  • Investigate employee operating permissions and approval records to confirm whether there are unauthorized personal operations on behalf of customers, private currency exchange, or use of company channels for unregistered transactions.

1. This Q&A is based solely on the news leads provided and does not constitute legal advice on any specific case or a prediction of conviction. 2. The "Bixiang Technology" case is only a first-instance judgment in Taiwan; different jurisdictions have differing standards for the characterization of virtual currency, the elements of money laundering offenses, and the determination of "subjective knowledge," and analysis must be conducted in light of the specific applicable law. 3. References in the news to "collusion with fraud groups" and "laundering over RMB 2.3 billion" are allegations or media reports, and the final facts are subject to effective legal documents. 4. As no specific business contracts, fund flow charts, or internal compliance policy texts were provided, no definitive conclusion can be made regarding the compliance of an individual case.