Abstract:

Are you or your family members under investigation for promoting a virtual currency project, or for serving as a node agent or community leader? This article addresses the core concern directly: does purchasing tokens, setting direct-referral rewards, and establishing team hierarchies necessarily constitute the crime of organizing or leading pyramid schemes? Using the real Terra collapse case and the Xinkangjia multi-billion-yuan case as examples, this article explains clearly how judicial authorities determine "entry fees," the "three levels and thirty persons" threshold, and "obtaining property by deception." You will understand where the boundary lies between technical packaging and recruitment-based pyramid schemes, and which key points you should address next or on which to seek a lawyer.

Keywords:

crime of organizing or leading pyramid schemes, virtual currency pyramid schemes, team-based compensation, determination of entry fees, hierarchical relationships

 

Main text:

In recent years, cases that present the outward appearance of virtual currencies, node devices, dual-token mechanisms, and team promotion systems have increasingly come within the scope of review for the crime of organizing or leading pyramid schemes. Compared with traditional commodity-based pyramid scheme cases, such cases often simultaneously exhibit multiple features, including technical mechanisms, token structures, community governance, and tiered agent systems, which gives rise to considerable controversy in judicial determinations concerning membership qualifications, hierarchical relationships, team-based compensation, and subjective knowledge.

 

In view of this, this article takes two publicly reported cases—Terra (UST &LUNA) and the particularly large "Xinkangjia" pyramid scheme case—as analytical samples, and provides a research-oriented review of the common determination logic, investigative priorities, and disputed issues when virtual currency projects are charged with the crime of organizing or leading pyramid schemes, with the aim of providing a reference for relevant case-handling personnel, researchers, and those concerned with the approaches to handling such cases.

 

The core thesis of this article is that when virtual currency projects are charged with the crime of organizing or leading pyramid schemes, judicial determinations generally revolve around membership qualifications, hierarchical relationships, team-based compensation, obtaining property by deception, and the status of organizers and leaders; among these, dual-token models, algorithmic stablecoin mechanisms, node qualifications, direct-referral and indirect-referral rewards, and agent systems do not automatically mean that the constitutive elements of the pyramid scheme crime have been established, and substantive judgment is still required in light of the specific rules, sources of funds, evidentiary structure, and the role of the actor.

 

 

I Author of this article: Lawyer Shao Shiwei

 

 

 

1

The model and mechanics of the Terra and Xinkangjia cases: dual tokens, algorithmic stablecoins, hierarchical promotion, and team-based compensation

 

(1) Terra (UST &LUNA): how the dual-token model, algorithmic stablecoin mechanism, and appearance of high returns affect legal evaluation

 

The Terra project is a blockchain project co-founded by Do Kwon and Daniel Shin in 2018. The project rose rapidly in 2021 and became one of the most popular public blockchains after Ethereum. However, its core product—the algorithmic stablecoin UST, which was claimed to be pegged to 1 US dollar—suddenly collapsed in May 2022, entering a "death spiral" together with the LUNA token and causing approximately 40 billion US dollars in market value to evaporate within days. On December 11, 2025, Do Kwon was sentenced by a United States court to 15 years in prison.

 

In the publicly described operating logic of the Terra project, UST served as an algorithmic stablecoin and LUNA as the core token operating in tandem with it, and together the two formed a relatively typical dual-token structure. The basic design idea was to maintain UST's price peg through minting and burning mechanisms, with LUNA assuming the functions of absorbing price volatility, adjusting the mechanism and carrying value. As regards the project's outward appearance, this arrangement was not a direct entry fee in the traditional sense, but it did, through technical mechanisms, price mechanisms and the token structure, present participants with a picture of participation in which stability and growth could coexist.

 

The research value of Terra lies in the relatively concentrated way it displays several key outward features of virtual currency cases: first, how the dual-token model was packaged as a technical solution; second, how the algorithmic stablecoin mechanism formally created the impression of sustainable operation and self-balancing; and third, how high-yield products and the token ecosystem reinforced each other, thereby affecting participants' judgments about risk, returns and value support. As regards the habits of discussion in practice, the Terra sample also helps in understanding the technical packaging logic commonly seen in algorithmic stablecoin pyramid scheme cases, dual-token model pyramid scheme cases and certain DAO project pyramid scheme cases. In particular, in the market perceptions formed around UST, LUNA and related yield scenarios, what participants saw was often technical descriptions such as protocol, peg, stability and appreciation, rather than legal descriptions of the source of funds, value support and liquidity risk.

 

Terra provides us with a "technical mechanism sample." It reminds us that when reviewing virtual currency pyramid scheme criminal cases, the technical structure and the criminal law assessment must not be severed from each other, nor may substantive review of the source of returns, participation thresholds, value support and the manner in which risks are disclosed be omitted merely because the project has an on-chain mechanism, algorithmic rules or the appearance of protocol governance. As for controversial concepts such as algorithmic stablecoins and the dual-token model, the significance of the Terra case lies more in illustrating how technical packaging affects legal characterization, rather than in showing that any project with such technical designs may as a matter of course be handled according to pyramid scheme logic.

 

(2) The "Xinkangjia" case: how entry thresholds, hierarchical relationships, direct-referral and indirect-referral rewards, and team dividends formed a sample for pyramid scheme review

 

The Xinkangjia project was a platform founded in Guizhou in 2024. The project rose rapidly in the first half of 2025, under the banner of being the "China branch of the Dubai Gold & Commodities Exchange (DGCX)," and attracted approximately 2 million investors. However, its core model—promising an ultra-high daily return of 1%, using the USDT stablecoin as the payment instrument, and recruiting members through a nine-tier pyramid scheme structure—collapsed completely in June 2025. Before the collapse, founder Huang Xin transferred approximately 1800 million USDT (equivalent to approximately RMB 12900 million) overseas, after which the platform closed withdrawals. At present, public security authorities in multiple localities have characterized it as suspected fund-raising fraud and the organization and leadership of pyramid selling activities.

 

Unlike Terra, which primarily reflects technical mechanisms, the major Xinkangjia pyramid scheme case presents another, relatively typical logic of organizational expansion. According to public information, the case's operating method is closer to the "qualification threshold—hierarchical development—team-based compensation" structure commonly seen in traditional pyramid scheme crimes: participants must obtain entry qualification in a certain manner, and the system then relies on layer-by-layer referrals, team fission and tiered rebates to achieve continuous expansion. In its organizational model, there is usually a strong correspondence among the joining threshold, agency tiers, team performance and rebate ratios, and mechanisms such as direct-referral rewards, indirect-referral rewards and team dividends also became important arrangements for sustaining personnel growth and strengthening organizational control.

 

The practical research significance of this type of case lies in the fact that its public information relatively completely presents several core structures with which the crime of organizing and leading pyramid selling activities is concerned: first, participants are not merely consuming goods or services, but after obtaining qualification enter a system in which they can continue to develop others and obtain rebates; second, clear superior-subordinate hierarchical relationships exist within the organization, and rules are designed to bind personnel development and team size to income levels; and third, the distribution of returns does not mainly depend on genuine independent business operations, but rather on the expansion of funds and personnel formed by the continuous joining of subsequent members.

 

Viewed in the practical contexts of "recruiting members through digital currency," "getting arrested for promoting crypto-circle projects" and "whether the node model is a pyramid scheme," the Xinkangjia case is more like an "organizational structure sample." It reminds case handlers that when reviewing certain cases that outwardly appear to be crypto-circle projects or Web3 project criminal cases, they should focus on whether a stable agent network, hierarchical rebate relationships and a team-based compensation mechanism centered on the number of persons recruited have already formed, and in particular on the central position occupied by direct-referral rewards, indirect-referral rewards and team dividends in the overall return structure. Compared with the "technical mechanism appearance" reflected in Terra, the Xinkangjia case corresponds more directly to the issues of hierarchy, compensation and organizational control in the traditional pyramid scheme review framework.

 

(3) From Terra to "Xinkangjia": why virtual currency projects simultaneously have technical packaging and member-recruitment structures

 

What Terra and "Xinkangjia" represent are in fact two outward forms that frequently intertwine in current virtual currency cases. The former mainly reflects technical packaging such as the dual-token structure, algorithmic stabilization mechanisms and high-yield designs; the latter more concentratedly reflects organizational expansion logic such as joining qualifications, hierarchical organization, team dividends, and direct-referral and indirect-referral rewards.

 

The complexity of some current cases lies precisely in the fact that they may use technical mechanisms to create the appearance of project legitimacy and sustainable returns, while also using agent systems, node qualifications and team fission to form a promotional return structure.

 

Therefore, the legal assessment of such cases must look not only at their technical design but also at their promotional methods; rather, the token mechanism, entry thresholds, organizational structure and source of rebates should be reviewed as a whole.

 

 

 

2

How to Determine the Crime of Organizing and Leading a Pyramid Scheme: Entry Fees, Three Tiers and Thirty Persons, Team-Based Compensation, and Fraudulently Obtaining PropertyArticle 224-1 of the Criminal Law provides that organizing or leading, in the name of business activities such as selling goods or providing services, an operation that requires participants to obtain membership qualifications by paying fees or purchasing goods or services, that arranges participants into tiers in a certain order, that directly or indirectly uses the number of persons recruited as the basis for compensation or rebates, that induces or coerces participants to continue recruiting others, that fraudulently obtains property, and that disrupts economic and social order constitutes the crime of organizing and leading a pyramid scheme. Regarding the application of this crime, the Opinions of the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Organizing and Leading Pyramid Schemes further address issues such as membership qualifications, tier relationships, organizers and leaders, and prosecution standards. In virtual currency cases, there is a relatively clear correspondence between the above provisions and the two categories of cases, Terra and "Xinkangjia."

 

Article 224-1 of the Criminal Law provides that whoever organizes or leads, in the name of business activities such as marketing goods or providing services, an operation that requires participants to obtain membership qualifications by paying fees or purchasing goods or services, forms hierarchies in a certain order, directly or indirectly uses the number of persons recruited as the basis for remuneration or rebates, lures or coerces participants to continue recruiting others, defrauds property, and disrupts economic and social order commits the crime of organizing or leading pyramid schemes. Regarding the application of this crime, the Opinions of the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Ministry of Public Security on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Organizing and Leading Pyramid Schemes further clarify issues such as membership qualifications, hierarchical relationships, organizers and leaders, and prosecution standards. In virtual currency cases, there is a relatively clear correspondence between the above provisions and the two types of cases, Terra and "Xinkangjia."

 

)Whether purchasing tokens, devices, or node qualifications constitutes an "entry fee" under the crime of pyramid schemesIn practice, investigating authorities generally consider that the key to determining "obtaining membership qualifications by paying fees or purchasing goods or services" lies not in the label of the payment, but in whether the payment substantively constitutes a precondition for entering the system, obtaining promotion qualifications, or obtaining rebate qualifications. The basic approach reflected in the Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Organizing and Leading Pyramid Schemes (hereinafter referred to as the "Opinions") is also to emphasize substance over form, that is, the existence of goods, services, or a technological appearance cannot by itself exclude the nature of a pyramid scheme.

 

In the Terra project, participants' contributions did not manifest in the form of entry fees commonly seen in traditional pyramid scheme cases, but rather more often in the form of purchasing, holding, exchanging, or entering a certain token yield structure. Such structures remind investigators that in virtual currency cases, the legal appearance of consideration paid often changes: what participants deliver may not be a single fiat currency, nor necessarily an offline charge, but may manifest as stablecoin purchases, governance token holdings, access to yield scenarios, staking arrangements, or other on-chain operations. In this regard, the "entry fee" issue in virtual currency cases often needs to be understood from the relationship between token functions and participation qualifications.

 

By contrast, the "Xinkangjia" case is closer to the traditional determination path. If participants must first pay consideration and thereby obtain the qualification to join the system, develop downlines, be promoted through tiers, or participate in team rebates, such payments are more likely to be interpreted by investigating authorities as the entry threshold under the crime of organizing and leading a pyramid scheme. Especially in some cases, where there is a close binding relationship between the payment and subsequent promotion qualifications, investigating authorities generally tend to find that it already meets the constitutive characteristics of "obtaining membership qualifications by paying fees or purchasing goods or services."

 

From a defense perspective, there remains some room for dispute around the entry fee element.

 

Lawyer Shao believes that,

 

in virtual currency cases, purchasing devices, subscribing for nodes, holding tokens, and completingstakingPledgewhether it necessarily constitutes an entry fee under the crime of pyramid selling cannot be determined solely on the basis of the fact of payment itself, but rather the following matters should be examined: whether the relevant equipment, services or tokens have genuine use value independent of the qualification to promote; whether the payment is necessarily tied to recruiting personnel and team-based remuneration; and whether participants can obtain their principal rights and interests in the same legal relationship without recruiting others. In other words, whether node models, dual-token models or token participation arrangements in DAO projects necessarily amount to "paying an entry fee" cannot be treated uniformly under the crime of organizing and leading pyramid selling activities.

 

(2) How to calculate "three or more tiers and thirty or more persons" under the crime of pyramid selling: identification of agency tiers, invitation-code relationships and actual headcount

 

According to the Opinions, where the persons participating in pyramid selling activities within an organization number thirty or more and the tiers are three or more, the organizers and leaders shall be prosecuted. In practice, the case-handling authorities usually make a quantitative assessment of the number of persons at each tier and the organizational network based on materials such as referral relationships, registration links, back-office tier diagrams, profit-distribution paths and team performance structures.

 

The "Xinkangjia" case is relatively suitable as a typical case for this issue. If within the system there are clear relationships of upline, downline and further downline, and rules create stable pass-through of team performance and rebate distribution among different tiers, then it is more readily characterized as a "three or more tiers" hierarchical structure in the sense of criminal law. At this point, the determination of "thirty or more persons" is not limited to the number of persons directly recruited at a particular tier, but often includes both direct and indirect recruits throughout the entire network in the count.

 

However, the Terra case also reminds us that relationship tiers in virtual currency projects do not necessarily equal tiers in the sense of pyramid-selling law. Token-holding relationships, protocol participation relationships, ecosystem governance relationships and node collaboration relationships may technically also manifest as some kind of upstream-downstream, early-late or core-periphery structure, but such a structure does not necessarily possess the organizational-control attributes of "upline-downline-further downline" under criminal law. If all on-chain participation relationships, community governance relationships or token-holding relationships are mechanically equated with pyramid-selling tiers, there is a risk of expansion in legal evaluation.

 

From a defense perspective, the determination of tier relationships in virtual currency cases,common disputes mainly include: whether wallet addresses, device numbers, back-office accounts and natural-person identities can be stably matched; whether there are situations such as one person with multiple accounts, multiple persons sharing one account, test accounts, empty accounts or duplicate accounts; and whether nominal titles such as city partner, regional node or community leader are consistent with actual management authority and organizational-control functions. Common disputed issues in practice, such as how to calculate three or more tiers and thirty or more persons under the crime of pyramid selling and whether agency tiers necessarily count as pyramid-selling tiers, in fact all center on this core dispute.

 

Lawyer Shao is of the view that in such cases,a formal referral relationship diagram, device activation sequence or community stratification cannot necessarily replace the determination of tiers in the sense of criminal law; the establishment of tiers should still be based on a comprehensive review of genuine participation, stable relationships and rebate rules.

 

(3) Do direct-referral rewards, indirect-referral rewards and team dividends necessarily constitute pyramid-selling remuneration and obtaining property by deception

 

In the judicial determination of the crime of organizing and leading pyramid schemes,team-based compensation and "obtaining property by deception"are usually the two most contentious elements. In practice, the investigating authorities typically focus on examining: whether the returns are primarily based on the number of recruited persons, team size, and downline performance as the basis for rebates; whether the source of rebates primarily depends on the flow of funds generated by the continuous entry of subsequent participants; and whether the project, by exaggerating returns, downplaying risks, and packaging technical mechanisms, causes participants to continue delivering property based on a mistaken understanding.

 

As for Terra, its value lies in explaining how the technical mechanism itself affects participants' cognition. Algorithmic stablecoins, dual-token structures, high-yield scenarios, and related promotional narratives often lead participants to form an understanding that the project can self-balance, that returns are institutionally guaranteed, and that risks can be absorbed by technology. Such technical expressions do not necessarily constitute false advertising in the crime of pyramid schemes, but the insight they offer is that, in virtual currency cases, the examination of "obtaining property by deception" cannot be divorced from the manner in which technical mechanisms and market promotion are combined. Particularly where high-yield design and risk concealment coexist, whether participants' delivery of property was based on a mistaken understanding often becomes the focus of dispute in a case.

 

The "Xinkangjia" case, by contrast, reflects another determination path that is closer to traditional pyramid schemes. If the direct-referral rewards, indirect-referral rewards, and team dividends within the system are primarily based on the number of recruited persons and the scale of team expansion, and the source of rebates is not independent business operations but primarily the consideration paid by subsequent participants, then it is more readily interpreted by the investigating authorities as "directly or indirectly using the number of recruited persons as the basis for compensation or rebates." On this basis, if the project party further continuously attracts members to join through stable returns, rapid recovery of principal, and profits from team fission, the investigating authorities are also generally more readily able to develop arguments toward "obtaining property by deception."

 

However, from a defense perspective, team-based compensation does not automatically equal obtaining property by deception, and the collapse of a project does not automatically lead to a retroactive criminal-law assessment at the time of the conduct. This article holds that, in virtual currency cases, the determination of team-based compensation and "obtaining property by deception" should at least focus on examining four levels: first, whether the source of returns is genuinely independent of the entry of subsequent persons, or primarily depends on the continuous entry of new participants; second, whether the project has verifiable independent business scenarios, technical services, or ecosystem support; third, whether the relevant high-yield promotion constitutes a market vision or commercial statement, or a factual promise sufficient to cause participants to form a mistaken understanding; and fourth, whether the direct cause of participants' delivery of property is investment judgment, technical participation, or the purchase of equipment, or rather the expectation of hierarchical rebates and stable returns. If these issues are not specifically examined, and the crime of pyramid schemes is established merely on the basis that there are "tokens, promotion, and returns," there is clearly a risk of oversimplification.

 

 

 

3

How Virtual Currency Pyramid Scheme Cases Are Investigated: The Evidentiary Path of On-Chain Data, Electronic Data, and Agent Testimony

 

After a virtual currency project is accused of the crime of organizing and leading pyramid schemes, the investigating authorities' evidentiary path is usually markedly different from that in traditional offline pyramid scheme cases. Its core feature is that the facts of the case are often not formed solely through physical ledgers, offline training materials, and personnel statements, but rely more on cross-verification among on-chain data, backend data, electronic data, and testimonial evidence. Therefore, analyzing the investigative focus of such cases is in fact also an important prerequisite for understanding their legal assessment logic.

 

(1) How On-Chain Data Is Used to Prove Hierarchical Relationships, Fund Pooling, and Rebate Mechanisms

 

In virtual currency cases, the investigative significance of on-chain data usually goes beyond proving that transfer records exist between certain addresses; rather, it lies in reconstructing the internal flow of property and the return rules of the project through materials such as transaction hashes, address pooling, contract invocation records, staking and release records, and return distribution paths. The investigating authorities typically attempt to prove: how the virtual assets delivered by participants enter the control path of the project party; whether stable pooling relationships exist between certain addresses; whether the distribution of returns at different levels structurally corresponds to referral relationships and team relationships; and whether on-chain conduct such as staking, redemption, additional issuance, and dividends is consistent with the return mechanism claimed by the project. For the crime of organizing and leading pyramid schemes, the most important evidentiary direction of on-chain data is not that transactions actually occurred on-chain, but how those transactions form an institutional connection with joining qualifications, hierarchical structures, and rebate mechanisms.

 

(2) Why Chat Records, Training Materials, and Backend Screenshots Become Key Evidence in Pyramid Scheme Cases

 

In addition to on-chain data, electronic data is usually one of the most central evidentiary carriers at the investigation stage. Common materials include group chat records, training courseware, recruitment posters, roadshow videos, voice presentations, APP backend screenshots, device activation records, server image files, and email correspondence. These materials often collectively point to several issues: how the project introduced itself to the outside; how returns were explained and displayed; how the agent system was established and managed; and how direct-referral rewards, indirect-referral rewards, and team dividends were fixed in the rules. For criminal cases involving Web3 projects, the significance of electronic data lies in the fact that it can often place technical statements, marketing statements, return statements, and hierarchical statements within the same chain of evidence for verification, thereby influencing the investigating authorities' overall judgment of the nature of the project.

 

(3) The extent to which the testimony of agents, community leaders and promoters can prove the facts of the case

 

In such cases, the testimonial evidence of agents, promoters, community managers and ordinary participants usually also occupies an important position, and is of direct value in particular in proving training content, organizational structure, promotion methods and rebate rules. In practice, however, the probative force of agents' testimony is not necessarily stable as a matter of course. On the one hand, participants at different levels differ in their degree of understanding of the project mechanism, depth of involvement and interest positions; on the other hand, some testimony may reflect more their personal understanding and may not necessarily be fully equivalent to the project rules themselves. Therefore, when using testimonial evidence, the case-handling authorities usually still need to corroborate it against backend data, electronic materials and on-chain records. It should also be emphasized that agents' testimony is often important in such cases, but it cannot as a matter of course independently complete the entire task of proving hierarchical relationships, the profit structure and organizational control.

 

 

 

4

The main points of dispute and defense footholds in such cases

 

In such cases, in particular, the persons involved and their family members often focus on these questions: how the crime of virtual currency pyramid selling is determined, what to do if one is apprehended for promoting a crypto project, whether the dual-token model constitutes pyramid selling, whether the node model constitutes pyramid selling, and whether city partners count as organizers or leaders. Although the above questions are expressed differently in legal terms, they can broadly be reduced to the following points of dispute.

 

(1) The main points of dispute in criminal cases of virtual currency project pyramid selling: common defense footholds and the boundaries of determination

 

In virtual currency cases, the forms in which participants pay consideration are more diverse than in traditional pyramid selling cases, and may take the form of equipment purchases, node subscriptions, token holdings, stablecoin exchanges, protocol staking and the like. The case-handling authorities usually tend to proceed from the legal function of the payment act to determine whether it constitutes a threshold for joining.

 

However, from a defense perspective,the purchase of equipment, tokens or node qualifications does not as a matter of course equal an entry fee in the sense of criminal law.The core of the dispute is not whether there was payment, but whether that payment was substantively used to obtain promotion qualifications, rebate qualifications and hierarchical qualifications, and whether the relevant equipment, services or tokens have genuine value independent of organizational expansion. For cases of the dual-token model involving pyramid selling and algorithmic stablecoin pyramid selling, this is often one of the first points of dispute to arise.

 

(2) Whether the existence of referral relationships and agent hierarchies necessarily satisfies the "thirty or more persons, three or more levels" requirement

 

For cases of the type in which persons are apprehended for promoting crypto projects, one of the most common charging logics is the view that, since invitation-code relationships, agent levels, referral networks and team performance structures exist within the project, pyramid-selling hierarchies must necessarily have been formed. However, from the perspective of normative judgment, formal referral relationships and hierarchical relationships in the sense of criminal law cannot simply be equated. In virtual currency projects in particular, complex mapping relationships often exist among wallet addresses, device accounts, node numbers and natural-person identities, and the number of persons on a hierarchy chart does not necessarily equal the actual number of participants. Therefore, the determination of "thirty or more persons, three or more levels" still requires specific examination of its authenticity, stability and legal relevance, and cannot be determined in a generalized manner merely on the basis of system diagrams or title names.

 

(3) Whether the existence of direct-referral rewards, indirect-referral rewards and team dividends necessarily constitutes pyramid-selling remuneration

 

Direct referral rewards, indirect referral rewards, and team dividends are among the most closely watched structural features in crypto asset cases involving recruitment of participants. Investigating authorities typically treat them as important indicia that rebates are based on the number of persons recruited.

 

From a defense perspective, however, the names of bonuses cannot substitute for legal analysis. The key questions remain: whether the rebate basis is the number of team members or some independent transaction, service, or ecosystem activity; whether the source of returns is primarily the entry of new participants or whether genuine independent business support exists; and whether the bonus scheme's position within the overall project is an ancillary promotional arrangement or the core mechanism driving the project's operation. Absent substantive review of these questions, team rewards can easily be over-simplified as necessarily constituting pyramid-scheme remuneration.

 

(4) Whether agents, city partners, and community leaders necessarily qualify as "organizers or leaders"

 

In virtual asset projects, roles such as agents, city partners, regional nodes, community leaders, and guild heads are relatively common. But a title does not equal a criminal-law characterization, and receiving a certain percentage of returns does not automatically mean that the person has reached the level of organizer or leader. In practice, determining whether someone is an organizer or leader still requires assessing factors such as whether the person participated in designing the scheme, whether the person held control over the team, whether the person was responsible for training and recruitment, whether the person had back-end permissions, and whether the person could actually decide the distribution of returns. In other words, nominal hierarchy and market titles do not necessarily coincide with the organizational control status recognized in criminal law. This issue will be discussed separately below.

 

(5) How responsibility boundaries are drawn among technical, operations, marketing, and community roles

 

Within the same virtual asset project, different individuals often differ markedly in their positions, stages of participation, scope of authority, and return models. Core technical personnel, operations managers, marketing and recruitment personnel, community maintenance personnel, and ordinary agents differ in their conduct patterns, subjective knowledge, and degree of control over project rules, and criminal liability should not be handled in a uniform, one-size-fits-all manner. Particularly in some Web3 project criminal cases, outsiders readily conflate participation in a project with automatic assumption of equal criminal liability; but under normative analysis, different positions, different authority, and different knowledge may themselves correspond to entirely different responsibility boundaries. This issue also warrants separate systematic analysis.

 

 

 

5

Virtual asset projects, DAO projects, and dual-token model cases should not be treated as homogeneous

 

After a virtual asset project is charged with the crime of organizing or leading pyramid schemes, the simplification most to be avoided in judicial determination often takes two opposite forms:First, because a project has technical appearances such as blockchain, dual tokens, algorithmic stability, and node ecosystems, substantive review of its organizational structure, sources of returns, and rebate rules is automatically relaxed; second, because a project has promotional relationships, team rewards, and an agency system, it is automatically treated as fully homogeneous with traditional pyramid-scheme cases.What the two cases of Terra and "Xinkangjia" illustrate is precisely the current reality in such cases, where "technical mechanisms" and "organizational structure" often coexist and overlap. In handling such cases, one should still return to the specific rules, actual operation, evidentiary structure, and the role of the individual actor, and analyze item by item the qualifications for joining, hierarchical relationships, team-based remuneration, delivery of property, and subjective knowledge.

 

This article primarily discusses the general standards for determining when a virtual asset project involves the crime of organizing or leading pyramid schemes. Subsequent articles will separately discuss two issues of greater practical significance:

 

First, whether agents, city partners, and community leaders in virtual asset projects will necessarily be found to be organizers or leaders;

Second, how should the boundaries of criminal liability be drawn among personnel in different roles—technical, operational, marketing, community, and others—within the same project?

 

The former will focus on addressing whether agents and city partners necessarily constitute organizers or leaders, while the latter will focus on discussing the boundaries of criminal liability for personnel in different roles in Web3 projects and DAO projects.


 

Special statement: This article is an original article by Attorney Shao Shiwei and represents only the personal views of the author. It does not constitute legal consultation or legal advice on any specific matter. To repost the article, seek legal consultation, or engage in peer exchange, please add: sswls66.

 

 

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