Abstract:Your USDT still shows in your wallet, but you can no longer transfer it out — this is very likely not a private key leak, but rather your wallet having been maliciously placed under a multisignature arrangement. This article breaks down a new type of USDT theft in offline in-person transactions: the fraudster gets hold of your phone for less than a minute and, through the built-in browser of the TP Wallet, tampers with the account permissions on the TRON chain, turning your wallet into one that requires multiple parties' approval before funds can be transferred. You will understand the technical mechanism, learn how to check whether your wallet has been placed under multisignature, and why the police may not accept your case after you report it. If you or a friend are experiencing a similar situation, this article can help you judge what to do next.

Keywords:USDT theft rights protection, TRON chain multisignature scam, risks of offline virtual currency transactions, TP Wallet permission tampering, criminal reporting of cryptocurrency

Special Statement:This article is an original article by Lawyer Shao Shiwei and represents only the author's personal views. It does not constitute legal consultation or legal advice on any specific matter. To repost the article, seek legal consultation, or communicate with peers, please add: sswls66.

 

Main text:

In her usual consultations, Lawyer Shao encounters a certain type of consultee: they know full well that their virtual currency was taken by the other party — sometimes the other party is even a friend of many years — yet they have no evidence at all. Local police do not understand it either, so they do not accept the case. Or even if the police communicate with the other party, the fraudster or thief often has strong psychological resilience and gambles that the police will not be able to find out. So no matter how they are questioned during the investigation, they will insist that they did not steal it. In such situations, rights holders are often at their most desperate.

 

Some time ago, Lawyer Shao also encountered a consultation in which virtual currency worth millions was taken by a close friend of many years, leaving the consultee helpless — the case was reported, and the police questioned the friend, but because the other party denied stealing the USDT, the police did not accept the case.

 

Today Lawyer Shao likewise received a consultation about stolen virtual currency. According to the consultee, the two parties conducted the virtual currency transaction offline and in person. The other party transferred tens of thousands of USDT to the consultee and then said they wanted to look at the phone to confirm whether the virtual currency had arrived. The consultee said they only let the other party look at the phone, and as a result the wallet was placed under multisignature — the USDT still shows in the account, but it can no longer be transferred out.

 

I Author of this article: Lawyer Shao Shiwei

 

 

The consultee's exact words were:

The other party took my phonefor less than a minute, saying he wanted to check whether the funds had arrived. After the transaction was completed, I found that my wallet had been converted to a multisignature arrangement.

 

Clearly, this modus operandi differs from the common scenario in which a person trusts a friend, discloses the mnemonic phrase, and consequently has virtual assets transferred away. This case is therefore worth discussing in order to analyze the possible methods the other party used to steal USDT and to remind everyone to protect their assets.

 

 

1

How was the USDT stolen?

 

According to the consulter's own analysis, the other party may have used a concealed camera (such as in glasses or a button) to transmit the wallet's private key or mnemonic phrase to an accomplice in the background.

 

However, exporting a private key or mnemonic phrase from the TP Wallet ordinarily requires entering the payment password or completing biometric authentication, and it is unlikely that the other party could have broken through this step in less than one minute. Moreover, if the private key had been obtained, the more reasonable course for the fraudster would have been to transfer the USDT directly rather than to expend effort setting up multisignature.

 

This would not be the case unless the fraudster's strategy was to first set up multisignature to lock the wallet and prevent the victim from transferring the USDT before reacting, while secretly exporting the private key as a fallback for later transferring the assets by other means. That, however, would require completing two steps in less than one minute, which is relatively difficult.

 

Furthermore, a remote accomplice who sees the screen cannot directly operate the victim's phone; the final on-chain transaction signature still has to be completed on the victim's phone. A remote accomplice can therefore at most play a "guiding" role—telling the person on site where to tap and how to operate. If the other party is already proficient in this process, remote assistance is not a necessary condition.

 

2

Analysis of Technical Methods of Multisignature USDT Theft on the TRON Chain

The offline in-person handover scam involving multisignature occurs most frequently on the TRON chain. This is because, for offline in-person handovers of USDT, nine out of ten use the TRON chain—transfers are fast and fees are low. The TRON chain happens to have an underlying design that differs from Ethereum: each account comes with a native permission management system, divided into three levels—Owner permission, Active permission and Witness permission. Owner is the highest permission and can modify everything, including itself; Active permission controls day-to-day transfers and contract calls.

 

The original purpose of this permission management system was to better protect user assets, but once exploited by fraudsters, it instead became a tool for stealing assets.

 

Possible reconstruction of the modus operandi:

After obtaining the phone, the other party most likely used the browser built into the TP wallet to visit a pre-prepared malicious page. That page triggered a transaction on the TRON chain,AccountPermissionUpdateand, exploiting the fact that the wallet was unlocked at the time, completed signature confirmation, changing the Owner/Active permissions of the victim's wallet to multisignature, or directly transferring them to an address controlled by the fraudster.

 

Through this route, the malicious page can have all parameters pre-written (the newly added permission addresses, thresholds, etc.), and on site one need only open the link and tap confirm, which can be completed within tens of seconds. This is entirely consistent with the "less than 1 minute" described by the consulter.

 

Why did the victim not notice at the time?BecauseAccountPermissionUpdateit was an independent on-chain transaction that did not involve any token transfer, so the wallet balance did not change. The USDT still appeared in the account, and on the surface everything looked normal. Only when the victim later attempted a transfer would they discover that an additional signature was required and that they could not operate the wallet alone.

 

Put simply: the USDT is still in your wallet, but the lock on the wallet has been changed, and the key is in the fraudster's hands.

The above is an analysis of the possible scenarios in which the consultee's virtual assets were stolen. However, the other party was originally someone contacted on Telegram, and after the incident the consultee also attempted to report it to the police, but the public security authorities did not accept the case, so this money most likely cannot be recovered.

 

3

Lawyer's note: how can you check whether your wallet has been subjected to malicious multisignature?

If you are also conducting offline transactions, or are concerned whether your wallet permissions have been tampered with, you can check it yourself:

 

Open the TRON block explorer TRONSCAN (tronscan.org), enter your own wallet address (the string of characters beginning with T) in the search bar, and after entering the account details page, scroll down to the "Account Permission" section. Under normal circumstances, under Owner permission there should be only your own address, with a weight of 1 and a threshold of 1. If you find an unfamiliar address has been added, or the threshold has been changed to 2 or higher, this indicates that your wallet has been subjected to malicious multisignature.

 

In the aforementioned case, the person seeking advice was using a TP Wallet. In fact, TP Wallet has long supported warning prompts for TRON permission-change operations, and the SlowMist security team has also analyzed the risk of wallets being maliciously multi-signed and listed related cases (see the figure below). However, this type of professional criminal technique still presents a certain threshold for ordinary traders. This is also why virtual currency theft cases exist in large numbers.

 

4

Digression

In terms of evidence collection, virtual currency cases are indeed more difficult than traditional cases to a certain extent. This leads many wrongdoers to harbor the hope that they will not be caught. From the large number of consultations and cases that Lawyer Shao receives every day, cases of virtual currency double-crossing, theft, and fraud are in fact occurring in large numbers every day. But whether a person will be caught is a matter of probability.

 

Some people win the gamble, obtain huge illicit wealth, and are not held accountable; of course, some people lose the gamble, have a case opened for investigation, and face imprisonment. This is also why we, as criminal defense lawyers, handle a large number of coin-related cases.

 

But from a practical perspective, virtual currency cases involve a relatively high technical threshold, and some grassroots case-handling units do indeed face certain difficulties when accepting and investigating such cases. This is also an objective reality.

 

Therefore, a final reminder to everyone: guard your wallets well. Otherwise, from a practical perspective, safeguarding your rights is truly extremely difficult.


 

 

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Does "Double-Crossing" Theft of Another Person's Virtual Currency Constitute a Crime? — A Network Engineer Stole Funds from a Gambling Website and Had 183 Bitcoins Seized

 

 

 

About the Author:

 
 Lawyer Shao Shiwei has long focused on criminal defense and compliance in the Web3 and cryptocurrency fields, and has accumulated substantial practical experience in economic crimes, cybercrimes, and new types of virtual currency-related cases. She is skilled in handling major, difficult, and complex criminal cases involving suspected casino operation, fraud, illegal business operations, and occupational embezzlement. She provides legal services including full-process criminal defense, the establishment of corporate criminal compliance systems, and criminal legal risk prevention and control for individuals and enterprises. Since beginning practice, she has handled more than 300 criminal cases in total, of which more than 60 cases successfully achieved substantive defense outcomes such as withdrawal of the case, non-prosecution, application of probation, and reduction of charges.