Special Notice: This article is an original work by Attorney Shao Shiwei and represents only the personal views of the author. It does not constitute legal consultation or legal advice on any specific matter. For article reprints | legal consultation | business exchanges, please contact: sswls66
On July 16, 2025, the People's Court of Pudong New Area, Shanghai, announced a cross-border illegal foreign exchange case involving an amount as high as 6500 million yuan. The protagonists this time are no longer traditional underground banks or cash, but "stablecoins" represented by USDT. In fact, this is not the first time official authorities have reported similar cases. Since 2017, high-pressure crackdowns on virtual currencies and stablecoins have continued for many years, but why do similar cases still persist despite repeated prohibitions, and even grow in scale?
I Author of this article: Attorney Shao Shiwei
1
Why "stablecoins" suddenly became "popular"
Recently, the concept of "stablecoins" has indeed become quite popular. For groups that have never paid attention to Web3 or virtual currencies, "stablecoins" may still be a somewhat unfamiliar term. But as a lawyer who has been deeply engaged in blockchain legal services for many years and deals with related business and cases every day, it now seems to have "broken out of its circle."
However, in just the past few days, putting the following news events together still feels somewhat surreal.
On July 10, 2025, the Party Committee of the Shanghai Municipal State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission held a central group study session, focusing on the development trends and response strategies of cryptocurrencies and stablecoins.

On July 16, 2025, the People's Court of Pudong New Area, Shanghai, announced a major cross-border foreign exchange case using stablecoins as a medium. The case shows that Yang and others, by operating accounts of domestic shell companies, provided stablecoins to overseas accounts of unspecified customers, thereby achieving cross-border fund transfers and obtaining profits. Over three years, the amount involved in illegal foreign exchange trading reached 6500 million yuan.
On July 18, 2025, U.S. President Trump officially signed the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (referred to as the GENIUS Act) at the White House, marking the first time the United States has formally established a regulatory framework for digital stablecoins.

At the same time, Hong Kong will also officially implement the Stablecoins Regulation Ordinance on August 1, 2025, becoming the world's first jurisdiction to establish a comprehensive regulatory system specifically for fiat-backed stablecoins.
Putting these events together, on one hand, major financial centers such as China, the United States, and Hong Kong are promoting the compliance and financialization of stablecoins; on the other hand, some domestic law enforcement agencies still regard stablecoins as a typical scenario of "illegal financial activities."
This misalignment between regulatory pace and institutional concepts seems to remind us that it is time to re-examine the real-world role and institutional position of "stablecoins."
2
Why are illegal and gray-market actors so enamored with stablecoins?
The core reason underground banks treat virtual assets (especially stablecoins, with USDT as the representative example) as the preferred means of cross-border currency exchange is that such assets technically overcome multiple bottlenecks that traditional currency exchange faces, including quota limits, capital pool pressure, settlement timeliness, identity concealment, and differences among judicial jurisdictions. This also directly causes regulatory policy to repeatedly fail in the face of the "anonymity risk of virtual assets" and the "money laundering risk of virtual assets."
The first issue is the "quota limit." Under China's annual individual foreign exchange purchase quota system, each person may purchase no more than 50 thousand US dollars of foreign exchange per year. Traditional underground banks often circumvent this limit by splitting transactions among multiple individuals and forging trade documents. But after the emergence of stablecoins, on-chain transfers through crypto assets such as USDT or BTC can completely bypass this quota ceiling and achieve one-time cross-border transfers of millions of US dollars.
The second issue is "capital pool pressure." In the past, underground banks needed to prepare foreign exchange positions both domestically and abroad, which involved high risk and heavy costs. Stablecoins, however, break the logic of bilateral reserve backing: it is sufficient to pool RMB domestically, and then instant coin-to-coin exchange or coin-to-fiat conversion can be completed on overseas exchanges, rapidly lowering the entry threshold from tens of millions to several hundred thousand yuan.
The third issue is "settlement timeliness." Traditional bank wire transfers usually require T+1 to T+3 business days and must be accompanied by a series of compliance materials. By contrast, on-chain transfers can generally be completed within an average of 10 minutes to 1 hour, operating around the clock with no holiday restrictions, greatly improving the efficiency of fund circulation. This also makes clients generally willing to pay fees of 1% to 3%, or even higher, in exchange for "instant settlement."
The fourth issue is "identity concealment." Traditional cross-border remittances often leave a relatively complete regulatory chain through bank statements, customs declarations, and similar records. In virtual asset transactions, however, by using on-chain address mixers, privacy wallets, and overseas exchanges, the link between the flow of funds and the true identity is fragmented across multiple layers, greatly increasing the difficulty of investigation for law enforcement authorities and significantly prolonging the case-solving cycle.
Finally, there is another regulatory arbitrage point frequently exploited by gray-market actors: differences among judicial jurisdictions. Traditional currency exchange must simultaneously contend with regulation both domestically and abroad, but with stablecoins as a cross-border medium, illicit funds often complete the final fiat currency landing in jurisdictions with lax regulation. Even if a domestic account is frozen, overseas funds can still exit safely, thereby freely moving across "different regulatory regions."
It can be said that the intervention of stablecoin technology has not only restructured the operating methods of illegal currency exchange but also greatly amplified the efficiency and concealment of illegal and gray-market activities. This tool, with its low threshold, decentralization, and strong cross-border capabilities, is becoming new technological infrastructure for the "gray flow" of cross-border funds.
3
Why does the state continue to crack down with high pressure on virtual currency-related crimes?
China's high-pressure crackdown on virtual currency-related crimes is based on the following two core regulatory rationales:
First, virtual currencies possess inherent anonymity and cross-border liquidity, making it difficult for the traditional financial regulatory system to effectively penetrate them, and they are easily used to conceal and transfer illegal proceeds.
In the Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Handling of Criminal Cases of Money Laundering, effective August 20, 2024, the "through virtual asset transactionswas formally listed as one of the money laundering methods, which means that the judiciary's crackdown on "virtual asset money laundering" has entered a stage of clarity and institutionalization.
Second, as a country that implements strict foreign exchange controls, the borderless nature of virtual currencies also readily makes them a technical tool for circumventing regulation and effecting illegal foreign exchange conversion.
Such conduct not only disrupts the financial order but also has a substantive impact on macroeconomic regulation and national economic security, mainly including:
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Statistical distortion: because the virtual currency transaction chain is not under the control of local regulators, actual foreign exchange outflows cannot be accurately included in the official statistical scope, thereby creating a "data black hole" in the balance of payments and foreign exchange reserves;
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Failure of macroeconomic regulation: the central bank cannot accurately grasp the true situation of market foreign exchange supply and demand, may misjudge the timing of exchange rate and interest rate adjustments, affecting the effectiveness of policy, and may even need to deploy substantial real reserves to "fill" the outflow gap;
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Loss of tax revenue and assets: tax avoidance through illegal foreign exchange conversion via virtual currencies leads to the loss of deposit reserves, cross-border tax sources and anti-money laundering data at the foreign exchange settlement and sale stage.
Since the 2017 "94 Announcement" first expressly characterized virtual currency-related business as illegal financial activity, regulatory intensity has been continuously increased. The "card-cutting" special campaign launched in 2020, while cracking down on traditional bank card crimes, also prompted underground banks, online gambling syndicates and others to gradually switch their fund channels to digital asset tools such as stablecoins. Even though the "924 Notice" of September 2021 once again reiterated that virtual currency-related business constitutes illegal financial activity, in reality, owing to the high liquidity, low threshold and strong concealment of stablecoins, their use has instead become increasingly active in the gray industry sector.
It is precisely against this background that a group of intermediaries engaging in "buy low, sell high" arbitrage has emerged, commonly known as "U merchants"—they do not directly participate in cryptocurrency projects, nor are they involved in upstream links of the chain such as money laundering and gambling, yet they are often accused of suspected illegal business operations, aiding information network criminal activities, concealing or disguising criminal proceeds and other frequently charged offenses because they provide matchmaking transactions and earn exchange spreads, and they are also a "high-risk marginalized group" drawn into criminal proceedings in current judicial practice.
4
Can stablecoins really be "eliminated" by continued policy suppression?
From the 2017 "94 Announcement" to the 2021 "924 Notice", and then to the sustained severe crackdowns on virtual currency transactions and illegal foreign exchange conversion across the country since 2023, the density and intensity of regulatory policies have significantly increased. However, as a lawyer who has handled a large number of criminal cases in the fields of virtual currency, illegal business operations and illegal foreign exchange conversion—and who can be described as a "first-hand participant" in the handling of each criminal case—I also constantly reflect during the handling of each criminal case:
Can this sustained severe crackdown approach truly achieve the purpose of effectively combating crime and punishing illegal and criminal activities?
This question also arises because, in the large number of cases I have personally encountered or handled, many involve the following situation:
Those arrested are all "marginal figures":
Whether in the virtual currency trading platform cases I have handled, or in underground banks, currency exchange companies, or money laundering networks, a very common phenomenon is that those arrested are often ordinary salaried employees, "runners" who help move money, intermediaries who introduce currency exchange for a small referral fee, or OTC traders who profit from buying low and selling high; and, of course, corrupt officials who are also drawn into such cases. But these people are often neither the decision-makers nor the core of the chain, let alone the true beneficiaries.
The principal offenders are at large, and law enforcement means find it difficult to pursue them:
In many cases, the operators and big bosses fled abroad long ago, and some even changed their nationality long ago. Cross-border law enforcement is costly; indeed, my clients have repeatedly mentioned to the case handlers that the principal offender is in Hong Kong, China, but the case-handling authorities did not proactively arrest the person, because mainland police also have no law enforcement powers in Hong Kong.
State losses are difficult to recover, and judicial resources are intensively invested with limited returns:
Take the cross-border online gambling case uncovered by police in Jingmen, Hubei, in 2022, involving RMB 400 billion in transaction flow,as an example; this case is known as the country's first "virtual currency case" in which confiscation was ordered by a court judgment.
From case filing to judgment, the case lasted nearly two years and involved a large input of manpower and material resources. Although the court ultimately ordered confiscation of "partially frozen virtual currency," according to people familiar with the matter, the amount actually recovered was far below expectations.
The reason is that a large amount of the assets involved are held in the form of virtual currency in overseas trading platforms or overseas company accounts. For example, Tether, the issuer of USDT, is itself registered in the United States, and Chinese law enforcement authorities seeking its cooperation in judicial seizure also face many practical difficulties.
5
The law enforcement reality of fragmented crackdowns addresses symptoms but can hardly be said to address root causes
The above problems reveal a reality: for the principal offenders who truly do wrong, the cost of illegality is often merely having "marginal figures" serve their sentences in their place; and for those arrested, they are merely one link in the entire chain—neither the organizers or planners, nor persons capable of bearing the consequences of the entire chain. Although criminal law enforcement has a deterrent effect, in practice it makes "introducers," "movers," and "exchangers" the main targets of punishment, addressing symptoms but making it difficult to address root causes.
At the same time, it is worth pondering whether the substantial police manpower and enforcement resources the state has invested in individual cases can yield systemic governance results. Let us review the typical cases officially reported in recent years:
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The Shanghai Pudong Court announced a major case of cross-border illegal foreign exchange involving 6500 million in stablecoins, in which Yang used 17 shell companies to manipulate cross-border "matched transactions" (2025)
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The Beijing police cracked a 2 billion virtual currency chain case involving the use of USDT for "cross-border matched transactions," providing RMB-foreign currency exchange channels for gamblers, cross-border e-commerce businesses and others (2024)
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The Qingdao police in Shandong and the Qingdao Branch of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange jointly cracked a particularly large underground banking case, with an amount involved of as much as 15800 million (2023)
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The Jingmen police in Hubei cracked the nation's first virtual currency case; the Jingmen police in Hubei cracked a cross-border online gambling case, with a transaction volume of 400 billion (2023)
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The Hangzhou court in Zhejiang sentenced Zhao and others in an illegal business operation case involving circular arbitrage by receiving dirhams in Dubai, purchasing USDT, and selling it domestically for RMB, with a transaction volume ofmore than 43850 thousand yuan(2022)
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The Baoshan Court in Shanghai sentenced Guo Mouzhao, Fan Moupin and others in an illegal foreign exchange case involving the establishment of websites such as the "tw711 platform" and the "Huosu platform," with a transaction volume of 220 million (2022)
From practice, there seems to be a sense of loss of control—"the more it is blocked, the more it leaks" and "the more it is cracked down on, the bigger it grows." The state hopes to achieve a warning effect on society as a whole through punishing individual cases one after another; however, the actual situation is that everyone is an isolated island, trapped in their own information cocoons. Before the cases came to light, these people may never have noticed the relevant news, or, even if they saw it, they did not realize the seriousness of the problem or whether it was relevant to them.
6
Dominance over stablecoins is something we proactively abandoned
If cracking down on the gray industry is "defense," then leading the lawful alternative paths should have been "offense." Unfortunately, in this field, we abandoned the initiative ourselves.
Looking back, China was once the world's leading stablecoin power.Today, the exchanges familiar throughout the global crypto community—Binance, OKX, Gate.io, Huobi, MEXC and others—were almost all founded by Chinese nationals. In the past, exchange operating teams were based in mainland China, crypto news platforms clustered there for development, and the vast majority of users settled virtual currency transactions in RMB or RMB-denominated stablecoins.
But today, all of that is a thing of the past. Had it not been for successive policy barriers that forced project teams, platform operators and investment teams to shut down or move offshore, China would have had a strong opportunity to lead the entire stablecoin ecosystem. Today, those who remain in mainland China are often only frontline workers.
Beyond policy containment, China has in fact sought to forge a different path. Since 2016, the People's Bank of China has been developing the digital renminbi (e-CNY), explicitly setting the goal of publicly issuing a digital currency, with Yao Qian serving as the first Director of the Digital Currency Research Institute. To some extent, its design objective was precisely to benchmark against US dollar stablecoins, and it sought to achieve the following aims through the digital renminbi:
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reduce reliance on US dollar channels by using the digital renminbi for settlement in cross-border trade, investment, aid and other scenarios, bypassing SWIFT and the US dollar clearing system and lowering the risk of international sanctions;
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curb capital flight and illegal foreign exchange transactions, and technologically replace the role of USDT and USDC in the underground financial system;
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provide enterprises and individuals with an "officially produced," compliant, fee-free digital cash tool, thereby weakening the grey appeal of stablecoins.
However, because the digital renminbi lacks broad application scenarios and ecosystem support, even though the technical level is essentially ready, market acceptance remains low. A forced melon is not sweet, and this path has not formed a genuinely effective payment alternative. Users are not buying in, and forced promotion through administrative orders alone is not feasible.
In addition, with a touch of dark humor, on November 20, 2024, official notices reported that Yao Qian had committed serious violations of discipline and law, including allegations that during his tenure he abused his power to provide "close" support to specific technology enterprises and was suspected of using virtual currencies for power-for-money transactions, becoming a key cultivation target for those "hunters" who should originally have been subject to regulation.
The failure of digital renminbi promotion to achieve its policy objectives proves, on the one hand, the limitations of the policy path, and on the other hand highlights another aspect of the "crackdown" on stablecoins: policy resistance has not eliminated the problem itself, but has only made grey channels more concealed and underground transactions more complex and hidden. For existing regulators, this has instead brought more troubles.
7
What are the advantages of stablecoins? What are their use cases?
On July 18, 2025, US President Trump signed the GENIUS Act, formally establishing the regulatory framework for digital stablecoins. In this regard, Sun Lijian, Director of the Financial Research Center at the Fudan Development Institute, publicly commented: "The US dollar stablecoin is essentially a tokenized projection of the US dollar in the blockchain world and a digital extension of US dollar hegemony. It amplifies the global penetration of the US dollar through technological means, but it also brings new systemic risks. For nation-states, stablecoins have also become a new battleground in the contest over monetary sovereignty."
Looking back, the very things we once regarded as dross now seem to be treasured by our competitors, and have likewise become a weapon our competitors use to counter us?
From a technical perspective, a stablecoin is a type ofprogrammable digital asset that is pegged to the value of a fiat currency and operates on a blockchain networkIts core mechanism is to map the book value of a fiat currency onto fungible tokens on-chain through the custody of off-chain reserve assets (such as US dollars, renminbi, etc.). It can be transferred without relying on a bank account, executes automatically via smart contracts, and offers features such as high efficiency, decentralization and low cost.
For this very reason, stablecoins are widely used in the following typical scenarios:
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Cross-border trade settlement: enterprises can use US dollar stablecoins such as USDT or USDC to achieve second-level cross-border payments, substantially reducing foreign exchange fees and settlement cycles;
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Payment systems for free trade zones and bonded warehouses: within free trade parks, renminbi stablecoins can be used for one-click account splitting, covering scenarios such as warehousing, customs affairs and logistics;
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Supply chain finance: platform enterprises use stablecoins to discount receivables and automatically complete multi-tier splitting and on-payment between upstream and downstream parties;
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Carbon trading and digital asset markets: "on-chain credit assets" denominated in stablecoins can achieve 7×24-hour automated matching, enhancing the liquidity of asset classes such as carbon credits and digital rights and interests;
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B2B and B2C payment tools: as a seamless intermediary in payment scenarios such as cross-border payroll, overseas study fee payments, offshore wealth management and margin management, stablecoins can effectively bridge the "last mile" between the traditional financial system and the on-chain economy.
We must recognize that stablecoins may indeed be used for illegal activities such as money laundering and private currency exchange, but they also have genuine positive uses, which is precisely why the United States, Hong Kong SAR of China, Singapore and many other places are actively exploring the design of "compliance sandboxes" for them.
Therefore, when assessing stablecoin regulatory policy, we must not fixate solely on risk labels such as "anonymity" and "borderlessness"; we need, rather, to understand in depth their value in cross-border payments, financial services, industrial coordination and other respects. Rather than completely excluding them from the system, it is better to face up to their underlying logic and consider how to make them serve our purposes in a controllable manner.
8
Stablecoins are not a tool of crime; the absence of an institutional framework is the root of the problem.
Stablecoins are not inherently a tool of crime; they are a vehicle for a new financial structure. Whether they will be abused depends critically on whether the institutional framework can keep pace in a timely manner. Repression for its own sake cannot hold back the rapid advance of technology, and what we lose is not merely that regulation fails to meet expectations, but also global competitiveness that we could have commanded. (In fact, it seems we have never actively sought or proactively built it.)
From my experience handling cases as a criminal defense lawyer, the institutional vacuum produces substantive enforcement difficulties.
First, the institutional vacuum leaves case-handling authorities with outdated understanding.
Domestic policy engages in one-sided repression and denies the value and significance of virtual assets, while lacking relevant legal bases and case-handling guidance. From an enforcement perspective, this is in fact not conducive to the smooth handling of cases or the correct implementation of the law.
We represent Web3-related criminal cases in many parts of the country and deal frequently with judicial authorities at different levels. I can say responsibly that the vast majority of frontline case handlers still lack a basic understanding of the technical principles and operating mechanisms of blockchain. This requires us lawyers to first explain the basic concepts to case handlers, and only then, as a second step, to develop arguments on the legal disputes.
For example, in a recent Web3 case we handled, the local judicial authority hoped that our client would voluntarily hand over virtual assets worth hundreds of millions as "illegal gains," yet the presiding judge in that case, in communications with us before the hearing, proactively asked us: what do these strings of letters and numbers (addresses, transaction hashes) mean? The person handling the case who decides the client's fate knew nothing about this field, and this is the norm in the many criminal cases we handle involving virtual assets, Web3 project teams, and exchanges.
Second, enforcement strategy is fragmented, and enforcement actions resemble a game of "whack-a-mole."
At present, China's regulatory approach to stablecoins and virtual assets has not formed a systematic compliance guidance. From the prosecution's perspective, cases involving virtual assets and Web3 often lack clear boundaries in legal characterization, which easily leads to wavering in the application of law and leaves enforcement personnel exhausted, trapped in a perpetual "whack-a-mole dilemma."
The judicial authorities have long maintained the bottom line by "plugging loopholes and catching offenders in the act," a method destined to be high-cost and low-yield. As long as real demand exists in the market, and as long as there is still room for cross-border payments and on-chain transactions, "alternative solutions" will always be developed. At that point, going after "marginal players" and shutting down "downstream outlets" merely continues the traditional logic of combating crime; it is destined to treat the symptoms rather than the root cause and can hardly form a truly sustainable governance system.
Truly effective institution-building is neither "reliance on enforcement alone" nor "working behind closed doors," but rather the construction of a system that achieves a dynamic balance between security and efficiency. This is the direction future financial governance should take.
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Conclusion
The real way forward lies not in blocking technical tools such as "stablecoins," but in building a compliance ecosystem capable of guiding, substituting for and regulating them, so that virtual currency regulatory policy can function precisely and effectively. Those activities that should be targeted must be given nowhere to hide, while those that can be put to use should serve our purposes.



