Special Notice: This article is an original work by Attorney Shao Shiwei and represents only the author's personal views. It does not constitute legal consultation or legal advice on any specific matter. To repost the article, seek legal consultation, or engage in peer exchange, please contact: sswls66.
From a Criminal Defense Lawyer's Perspective: How Can Overseas Businesses Build Sustainable Compliance Development Strategies?
Introduction:
On December 25, 2025, according to media reports, Trip.com, the overseas platform under Trip.com Group, has launched stablecoin payment functionality for global users, supporting the use of USDT and USDC to book hotels and flights. This move unexpectedly placed it ahead of many Chinese internet giants in the field of digital payment innovation—previously, both Ant Group and JD.com had "suspended" their stablecoin plans in Hong Kong.
This attempt by Trip.com should not be viewed merely as a simple upgrade of payment methods, but rather as a highly representative strategic choice against the backdrop of a still ambiguous global regulatory landscape for digital assets. It not only explores a possible path forward for its own business but also provides the entire industry with an important observational sample and reference point.
Author」Attorney Shao Shiwei
I. Trip.com's Overseas Version: How It Quietly Entered the Stablecoin Payment Track
According to media reports and user testing, after downloading and logging into trip.com in Vietnam on December 24, 2025, a user successfully used USDT to complete a local hotel booking in Vietnam, and the next day used USDT to purchase a flight ticket from Nha Trang to Ho Chi Minh City, with both payments successful. Notably, the user reported that paying with USDT yielded a better price than traditional methods.
Currently, Trip.com's crypto payment supports multiple public blockchains, including Ethereum, Tron, Polygon, Solana, Arbitrum One, and TON. Triple-A (a licensed crypto payment institution headquartered in Singapore that primarily provides payment gateway and settlement services for cryptocurrencies and stablecoins) provides Trip.com with crypto payment-related services.
II. Compliance Misconceptions for Overseas Businesses from a Criminal Risk Perspective: Corporate Structure Design Is Not a "Firewall"
Currently, China maintains a clear prohibition stance toward virtual currencies and related financial businesses. Therefore, virtual currency and trading-related businesses have absolutely no soil or space to survive in mainland China.
As a result, many enterprises intending to go overseas to conduct such businesses first think of "structural isolation" as their compliance strategy—moving the operating entity, servers, and even the team overseas. In Attorney Shao's work, one of the most frequently asked questions is: "We are an xx company, but our business carries risks in China. We currently plan to move the company entity to Hong Kong, China, or overseas regions. What corporate structure setup or other compliance suggestions do you have?"
In fact, the flaw in the way the questioner frames the question is that they first assume that merely establishing the corporate entity and servers overseas will naturally block domestic criminal jurisdiction.
However, China's criminal law adopts a principle of piercing review, the core of which lies in the substantive connection between conduct and result, rather than the superficial place of registration of the legal entity. Under the relevant provisions of China's criminal law on personal jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction, as long as the actor holds Chinese nationality, or the relevant conduct occurs within China's territory, China's judicial authorities have the power to exercise jurisdiction; this has no necessary relationship with how elaborate the corporate structure is or whether the servers and corporate entity are established overseas. More importantly, this is not confined to legal theory; there have long been numerous cases in judicial practice. For example, a case previously shared by Lawyer Shao [insert article — practical case of a payment company characterized as the crime of assisting information network criminal activities]: a certain payment company took its technology overseas, all of the company's employees were arrested on suspicion of the crime of assisting information network criminal activities, and nearly ten million in the company's revenue was recovered as "illegal gains."
Therefore, for enterprises seeking to expand overseas, if they wish to minimize criminal legal risks that may originate domestically, they cannot be satisfied merely with building a formal compliance structure; they must pursue and achieve "substantive compliance" — this requires that the enterprise's overseas operations establish clear and credible risk-isolation walls with domestic entities at core levels such as business flows, personnel organization and capital chains.
So why was Ctrip able to take the lead in launching stablecoin payment business in overseas markets under the domestic regulatory environment of sustained high pressure on virtual currencies? We cannot look only at the surface and assume that it is because Ctrip's overseas version is operated by the group company through its overseas entity. If that logic held, other domestic internet giants with stronger capital and technological strength should have completed their arrangements earlier and faster, and Ctrip would not have been the one to "get a head start" in this field. Therefore, the key to the question is not the superficial place of registration of the legal entity, but rather thinking from a substantive perspective about what aspects of its business conduct are worth learning from.
It should be specifically noted that, as of now, the Trip.com Group has not issued any official announcement on this matter. Therefore, the following analysis is deduced based on limited public information and the general logic of commercial compliance, and is intended to dissect its possible risk-isolation design approach, thereby providing enterprises seeking to expand overseas with a reference framework for seeking dynamic balance within policy gaps, rather than constituting a business or legal characterization of Ctrip's actual operations. This is hereby stated.
III. Three Core Points for Overseas-Expanding Enterprises to Build a Substantive Compliance Framework
1. Key Points of Structural Review under the Principle of Piercing Regulation
According to public information, from the perspective of corporate structure and legal entities, Trip.com Group, in order to separate its domestic business from its overseas business, established a typical "Cayman Islands–Hong Kong–mainland China" VIE structure, and operates markets under different brands through different subsidiary entities.
It can be said that almost all mainstream Chinese internet technology companies listed overseas have adopted the VIE structure. These enterprises establish a listing entity in the Cayman Islands, then establish a wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE) in mainland China through a Hong Kong subsidiary, and finally, through a series of agreements between the WFOE and the domestic operating company holding the actual business licenses (VIE), achieve financial consolidation and effective control.
However, after observing this phenomenon, many entrepreneurs easily fall into a misconception: since many internet giants use the VIE structure to expand domestic and overseas business, then if they adopt the same structure themselves, they can naturally avoid domestic criminal jurisdiction.
It must be made clear that, as of now, no law or administrative regulation in China expressly prohibits or approves the VIE structure. In essence, it is a commercial and capital arrangement formed at a particular historical stage to circumvent administrative access restrictions in the industry. But it is by no means a basis for exemption from criminal liability.
In fact, as stated above, domestic law enforcement authorities uphold the principle of "piercing regulation." This means that the focus of regulatory and judicial review is not the superficial legal structure, but the substantive control relationships and business essence behind it. When combating criminal conduct, judicial authorities have the ability and will inevitably see through layer by layer such legal forms as the "Cayman company," "WFOE" and "VIE domestic company," pointing directly at the core — reviewing the actual flow of funds, the ultimate attribution of interests, and the actual place from which business decisions are issued.
However, criminal enforcement requires a very high degree of certainty and evidentiary support. Where a business is strictly isolated from overseas operations, proactively initiating a criminal investigation against an enterprise lawfully operating abroad would give rise to significant international legal conflicts and jurisdictional disputes.
Based on Attorney Shao's experience in handling specific criminal cases in practice, the focus of regulatory authorities' review often lies in assessing the "connection" between overseas business and the domestic jurisdiction, and they tend to adopt a "risk isolation" governance approach. Specifically, if an enterprise can achieve a comprehensive overseas expansion of its business, personnel and funds, such that a clear and effective isolation is established between its overseas innovative business and the domestic market, then regulators are more likely to adopt a tacitly permissive attitude of non-intervention toward its overseas business that may fall within a policy grey area. The analysis follows below:
2. Business Going Overseas
One of the core criteria for "business going overseas" here is "not providing services to users in mainland China." This point can be corroborated by the practice of Trip.com's overseas version. According to prior media reports, when a user in Vietnam used the app to book a hotel with USDT, only a name and email address were required, and the process was extremely simplified, which accordingly raised questions as to whether its KYC (know-your-customer) measures were adequate.
To verify the actual isolation of its business, Attorney Shao (based in Shanghai, China) conducted a hands-on test:
Searching for "Trip" in the local mobile app marketplace showed that the app was not available for download;
Turning to the official Trip.com website, the overseas version of its App could be downloaded without difficulty;
Selecting a hotel located in Tokyo at random within the App and attempting to book it showed that no cryptocurrency payment method appeared among the payment options displayed.
On this basis, it may reasonably be inferred that the app should have a mechanism for monitoring the user's actual geographic location or login IP address. Within mainland China, even if the overseas version of the App is installed, the cryptocurrency payment function cannot be used. This also explains why the user in Vietnam referred to in the report was able to complete an order with minimal information—this is related to the user's location.
A further question, then, is whether Chinese citizens traveling overseas can use Trip.com's cryptocurrency payment function. At present, there is no clear answer to this question in publicly available information.
However, judging from the technical blocking measures Trip.com has already implemented, its business logic has at least clearly responded to one core concern of domestic regulators: it does not target the mainland China market as its service object, nor does it provide convenience for it.
It should be noted that one important reason why many virtual currency exchanges we represent were placed under investigation on suspicion of the crime of operating a casino is that they did not block users in mainland China. Under domestic policy, overseas exchanges have in substance provided a channel for domestic users to participate in illegal financial activities.
Beyond technical isolation, Ctrip's cautious approach at the marketing level also merits attention. The stablecoin payment function has not been publicized or promoted in any form within China. On the one hand, this reflects the legal team's emphasis on compliance risks; on the other hand, it also demonstrates, from the perspective of subjective intent, that it has no intention to attract or encourage domestic users to use the function. This proactive "low-profile" posture is fundamentally different in nature from public promotion and user acquisition directed at domestic users, further reducing the legal risk that it be characterized as "providing domestic users with a channel to circumvent foreign exchange controls." It may be inferred that this was also a prudent decision made at the group level to prevent and manage risk.
3. Personnel going overseas:
When founders and legal personnel from many companies consult us, one unavoidable question is how to arrange personnel.
The ideal state of structure design is that all decisions and conduct related to technology development and business operations occur outside China and are governed by employment contracts subject to overseas law. This avoids, to the greatest extent possible, directing the "place of criminal conduct" or "place of business operations" toward China, making the principle of "territorial jurisdiction" in Chinese criminal law difficult to apply.
Once domestic employees substantively participate in overseas business, the entire legal nature may change fundamentally. Such commingling of personnel renders legal entity isolation meaningless, and regulators will view this as the typical "two signboards, one team" arrangement, where the overseas entity is merely a department of the domestic entity, and part of the "place of criminal conduct" or "place of business operations" clearly falls within China. Judicial authorities may fully assert jurisdiction on this basis.
We understand that, based on cost-control considerations, enterprises tend to have domestic teams support overseas business. After all, although the corporate entity may be established in Hong Kong or Singapore, hiring local employees would significantly increase both user costs and communication costs.
However, behind this convenience, the company itself and its domestic employees are both exposed to legal risk. This is also something Attorney Shao often says: if an overseas project is involved in a case, a very common situation is that the boss is fine abroad—because the company's servers are overseas, even involvement in a case generally does not affect normal operations—while those arrested are often the domestic employees.
In addition, in light of Attorney Shao's own practice, I have observed an interesting phenomenon:
For crypto asset exchanges in the Web3 sector, even top-tier platforms, based on cost considerations and despite knowing that domestic policy does not permit engaging in virtual currency trading business, still hire large numbers of domestic employees to work remotely and openly post various recruitment information and wealth stories on job-search websites and Xiaohongshu.
However, when I briefly searched job-search apps such as BOSS Zhipin and Zhaopin, although I cannot be one hundred percent certain, it can almost be inferred that the stablecoin business of Ctrip's overseas version most likely involves no domestic employees.
So here is the question: the profit margins of crypto asset exchanges are necessarily higher than those of traditional Web2 companies, so why would the former, based on cost considerations, openly violate domestic policy by hiring large numbers of domestic employees to work remotely, while the latter shows no similar practice?
In fact, the level of profit margin does not determine an enterprise's risk appetite; rather, it is the legality of the business model itself that determines all of this.
Ctrip's core business is entirely lawful in China and is the cornerstone of its value. Although its profits are lower relative to those of Web3 crypto exchanges, they are sustainable and protected by law. For Ctrip, exposing itself to policy risks that could upend its main business for the sake of an overseas innovative business is absolutely not worthwhile. Its primary task is to protect existing profit streams, not to pursue high profits under high risk. Therefore, when conducting innovative businesses overseas, it will adopt the most conservative strategy, strictly separate operations, and prevent any risk from being transmitted back to China.
Moreover, as a mature listed company on the U.S. and Hong Kong stock markets, it is required to submit detailed financial and operational reports to the U.S. and Hong Kong securities regulators on a regular basis and to undergo strict audits. It must be accountable to thousands of institutional and individual shareholders worldwide. Any major legal risk or regulatory penalty could trigger a sharp drop in its share price and class action lawsuits. Its status as a listed company dictates that it must adopt a prudent, low-risk strategy.
The high profit margins of crypto exchanges stem precisely from their businesses that operate in gray areas (such as high-leverage derivatives trading). Where Chinese regulators expressly prohibit such businesses, their high profits are inherently accompanied by extremely high policy risks. Therefore, they have become accustomed to surviving amid risks and regard "gaming with regulators" as a cost.
In addition, crypto exchanges are far less transparent than listed companies in terms of financial data, equity structure and internal operations. Not being strictly bound by listed-company rules, they can make decisions more quickly and aggressively. Where they cannot obtain fully lawful status, their priorities are market share, technological iteration and user experience, which includes leveraging the most cost-effective talent globally—employees in mainland China.
4. Cross-border movement of funds:
In this context, "cross-border movement of funds" mainly refers to whether and how business profits are repatriated to China. The risk in this link varies enormously and often becomes the key to determining whether a business has truly achieved "risk isolation."
If profits generated by an overseas business are not repatriated but retained in the overseas entity for local reinvestment or distribution to overseas shareholders, the risk is relatively manageable. In substance, this practice severs the financial umbilical cord between the sensitive overseas business and the domestic entity. The overseas subsidiary, as an independent profit center responsible for its own profits and losses, sends a clear signal to regulators:
This is a purely overseas business, and its success or failure and risks are borne by the overseas entity itself; it will not directly affect China's financial system and economic order through fund flows. Therefore, the urgency and grounds for pursuing liability under the principles of "personal jurisdiction" or "territorial jurisdiction" are greatly reduced.
Conversely, if profits from an overseas business are repatriated to China through various channels (including virtual currency exchange, sham trade, underground banks and other means), the nature is entirely different. This not only provides regulators with clear leads for fund investigations, but more importantly, it constitutes substantive evidence that relevant domestic persons or entities directly profited from overseas "gray businesses."
For example, one of the reasons why many platforms involved in cases handled by Lawyer Shao, although operating their businesses overseas, were still placed under investigation by domestic judicial authorities is that the relevant revenues obtained by these platforms overseas were repatriated to China, either in the form of virtual currency or by other means. Once profits are repatriated, this provides a basis for penetrating supervision by domestic law enforcement authorities.
IV. Leveraging strengths: Ctrip's overseas compliance path and market selection strategy
After establishing the basic framework for isolating domestic legal risks, the next key challenge facing companies going global is how to achieve locally compliant operations in target markets. Ctrip has adopted a strategy of "license cooperation and scenario entry," that is, leveraging licensed partners to resolve the most complex financial compliance issues while focusing itself on the tourism scenario operations and user services at which it excels.
The stablecoin payment feature recently launched by Trip.com's international version is not directly handled by Trip.com itself for the receipt and payment of crypto assets. This service is entirely supported technically and through compliance channels by its partner—Triple-A, a Singapore-licensed crypto payment institution. This means that Trip.com does not need to directly apply for the complex cryptocurrency payment licenses of various countries, but instead "outsources" the professional technical and compliance responsibilities to a partner that has already obtained licenses from authoritative institutions such as the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). This approach greatly reduces the compliance thresholds and time costs for entering new markets.
A specific example is its implementation in the Vietnamese market. Why can users in Vietnam use stablecoin payments for hotels and flights through Trip.com? Although Trip.com or Triple-A have not disclosed specific details, it is highly likely that this utilizes Vietnam's flexible local regulatory pilot framework.
In recent years, Vietnam's attitude towards cryptocurrencies has undergone a significant shift, moving from a previous comprehensive ban to building a legalized regulatory experiment. In particular, in 2025, the Vietnamese government launched a five-year pilot program for the crypto asset market, aimed at establishing a controlled "regulatory sandbox" environment. Previously, places such as Da Nang had discussed stablecoin payment pilots for international tourists. It can be inferred that Triple-A, as a licensed service provider, likely based on its primary Singapore license, connected with Vietnam's local regulatory sandbox or specific exemption framework, thereby enabling its payment services to legally cover tourism consumption scenarios in Vietnam.
This market choice is inseparable from Vietnam's own extremely high crypto asset adoption rate. Data shows that the total value of Vietnam's cryptocurrency market has exceeded 220 billion USD, with a massive user base. A Chainalysis report also points out that Vietnam has consistently ranked among the top in the global cryptocurrency adoption index. Choosing such a market with a clear shift in regulatory attitude and huge real demand as an entry point not only reduces market education costs but also makes the cooperation model based on the "regulatory sandbox" more feasible.
In summary, Trip.com's approach provides clear insights for companies expanding overseas: when developing cutting-edge businesses such as stablecoin payments, rather than applying for high-threshold licenses alone in unfamiliar jurisdictions, it is better to prioritize cooperation with compliant service providers that have obtained strict licenses in major financial centers (such as Singapore), and precisely select countries and regions that are undergoing regulatory innovation and have huge market potential as testing grounds. This is essentially a strategy of "leveraging strengths," capturing market opportunities efficiently under the premise of risk management through professional division of labor.
V. Insights and Recommendations: Building a Sustainable Overseas Expansion Framework in Dynamic Balance
It should be clarified that Trip.com's international version's trial of stablecoin payments is essentially a dynamic balance sought between business innovation and compliance red lines against the backdrop of globally unformed regulation. This article uses this as an example for discussion, intending to provide a reference for risk prevention and control for companies expanding overseas, rather than making a "fully compliant" legal characterization judgment on its business model.
In cross-border business, risk is never an absolute proposition of "present" or "absent," but rather a relative assessment of "high" or "low" under different periods and policy environments. Based on the foregoing analysis, we propose the following framework recommendations for payment companies or technology companies seeking similar overseas expansion:
First, architecture and risk isolation.
Enterprises should operate innovative businesses through the establishment of completely independent overseas legal entities, thereby building a clear "firewall" in legal personality, finance, and operations between them and domestic entities. The core of this move is to predefine the boundaries of risk responsibility in legal form, ensuring that potential disputes or regulatory investigations arising from overseas business will not directly penetrate and impact the core domestic entity, thereby achieving truly effective risk isolation.
Second, a prudent compliance strategy.
When entering new markets, priority should be given to establishing cooperation with local licensed institutions that have complete qualifications, while participating as a "technical service provider" or "scenario provider." This is essentially a wise strategy of "borrowing a boat to go to sea," which can help enterprises avoid the huge costs, long cycles, and policy uncertainties faced by directly applying for high-threshold financial licenses in the initial stage, thereby quickly and steadily entering the market using the partner's existing qualifications.
Third, differentiated KYC/AML design.
While meeting the global regulatory baseline for anti-money laundering and customer identification, enterprises should adopt flexible and pragmatic strategies. The key lies in implementing differentiated processes based on the actual risk level of transactions: for low-risk, small-amount, high-frequency transaction scenarios (such as hotel bookings), simplified verification processes that also take user experience into account may be adopted; for high-risk, large-amount or specially natured businesses (such as flight ticket purchases and cross-border transfers), industry requirements for strengthened supervision must be followed. This approach is intended to safeguard core compliance requirements while seeking the optimal balance between user experience and compliance.
Fourth, precise market selection.
The first step of going global, namely market selection, is itself a key risk decision. Enterprises should prioritize "regulator-friendly" regions with genuine demand as entry points, such as Southeast Asian or Latin American markets where regulatory sandboxes or pilot programs have been introduced, fiat currency volatility is relatively high, and penetration of traditional payment services is insufficient. This can not only effectively reduce uncertainty caused by abrupt policy changes, but also ensure that the business has a solid user base and application scenarios, thereby increasing the probability of a successful pilot and accumulating valuable local compliance experience for future scale expansion.
Fifth, deeply integrated business logic.
It is necessary to adhere to scenario-driven rather than payment-tool-driven approaches. Successful innovative payments should not be isolated financial functions, but should be deeply embedded in an enterprise's existing and mature business chains (such as e-commerce platforms, travel bookings or digital services). The purpose is to directly address users' specific pain points, such as convenient cross-border payments or asset preservation needs, thereby building a complete value loop of "services + payments." Only in this way can payments evolve from a mere transaction channel into a core component that enhances user stickiness and raises business barriers, avoiding becoming an isolated venture detached from the business foundation.
In summary, the goal of enterprises' compliance practices in going global is not to build an absolutely risk-free safe zone, but, on the premise of recognizing that risks inevitably exist, to systematically identify, assess and manage various risks by building rigorous legal structures, selecting reliable local partners, and continuously deepening understanding of target markets and regulatory environments. Ultimately, in a dynamically changing global market, risks should be kept within an acceptable range, thereby supporting the business in seizing opportunities and achieving steady and sustainable long-term development.
Disclaimer: Based on public information and case studies, this article conducts an academic discussion of relevant business models and compliance frameworks. The content does not constitute legal advice, investment advice or commercial promotion in any form. Before making any business decision, you must consult a professional lawyer.



