Special Notice: This article is an original article by Attorney Shao Shiwei and represents only the author's personal views. It does not constitute legal consultation or legal advice on any specific matter. To repost the article, seek legal consultation, or engage in peer exchange, please add: sswls66.
Recently, news that c, the founder of a certain cross-border criminal group, was repatriated has attracted widespread attention. Out of professional interest, Attorney Shao read through the publicly disclosed law enforcement information on this case over the weekend.
She unexpectedly found that many of the behavioral patterns, division-of-labor structures, and fund pathways presented in the documents could almost all be matched to specific scenarios in cases she had personally handled in the past.For her, this document is like a piece that completes a puzzle, clearly assembling the individual cases she had previously handled in a fragmented manner into a complete cross-border crime and money-laundering chain.
In her daily work, Attorney Shao has handled many criminal cases involving illegal and gray-market industries and telecom fraud: some clients went to the Philippines to work and were assigned to "nurture accounts" and "maintain social media accounts," and were convicted of fraud;
some clients took online part-time work, responsible for recording the list of group members and settling remuneration on a daily basis, with wages paid in USDT, and were convicted of the crime of illegally using information networks;
and some clients provided payment and settlement services for overseas platforms and were ultimately held criminally liable for crimes such as operating a casino and illegal business operations.
At the same time, Attorney Shao has also encountered many people who did not actively participate in crime but were unfortunately drawn into criminal cases in the course of buying and selling USDT, engaging in over-the-counter (OTC) trading, participating in project promotion, or helping to transfer funds.
Almost all clients and their family members are full of confusion when the case first arises: Why is this suspected to be a crime?
The reason is not hard to understand—telecom and online fraud and related crimes have long exhibited highly divided, specialized, and industrialized characteristics. Most people are situated in only one link of the chain and know almost nothing about the upstream and downstream structure. Only when a lawyer starts from the overall structure and helps them locate their "position" do they suddenly realize that they have already been inside a criminal chain all along.
The contents disclosed in the indictment of c's criminal group almost completely present the full-process structure of a cross-border criminal group, from traffic acquisition, collection of payments, diversion of funds, and on-chain processing to offshore monetization and risk management.
Therefore, this article attempts to use that indictment as a sample to systematically analyze the operational chain of such criminal groups and, combined with practical experience, to analyze the possible charges and legal risks faced by personnel in different positions. It should be noted that,The structure presented in this article is not confined to a single case; rather, it is a common modus operandi that recurs in a large number of cases involving illicit and gray-market industries and telecom fraud, and it therefore carries strong educational and cautionary significance.。
Through this article, we hope that more people on the periphery of such chains will be able to see clearly where they stand and what legal consequences they may bear. In practice, I have seen too many parties who, even at the time coercive measures were taken against them, still believed they were merely "working," "helping out," or "only providing technology," and did not understand why their conduct carried legal risk. Had they recognized the risk at an earlier stage, many of them could have cut their losses in time and avoided sliding step by step into more serious legal consequences.
I Author of this article: Lawyer Shao Shiwei
Introduction:
I. Background of the incident in which individual C was repatriated: basic facts of a cross-border group case
II. Deconstruction of the criminal and money-laundering model of a cross-border group: the complete fund chain and division-of-labor structure
1. Step one: the client-acquisition end—from "contact" to "deposit" 2. Step two: the collection end—two deposit channels operating in parallel: U.S. dollar wire transfers and direct on-chain receipt 3. Step three: the diversion end—"order splitting and risk-control evasion" 4. Step four: the on-chain end—withdrawal of tokens, multiple hops, and aggregation 5. Step five: the tainting end—converting "suspicious sources" into "explainable sources" 6. Step six: the exit and feedback end—offshore monetization and recycling through the financial system 7. Organizational safeguard mechanisms: risk control and counter-investigation conduct
III. Offenses that personnel in different positions at a cross-border group may be suspected of committing
1. Core decision-makers and organizational leaders (such as individual C and related co-conspirators) 2. Front-end inducement personnel (including "referrers" and "account managers") 3. Collection-end operators (controllers of shell companies and operators of on-chain receiving addresses) 4. Diversion-end operators (financial operators/order-splitting and account-allocation personnel) 5. On-chain-end operators (on-chain operators) 6. Tainting-end and offshore-end operators (operators of mining farms, money-laundering operations, money-transport teams, and offshore companies) 7. Personnel operating gambling and money-laundering businesses 8. Payment and settlement intermediaries (including OTC settlement providers) 9. Organizational and safeguard personnel (risk control departments and related bribery personnel) 10. Technical support and platform maintenance personnel 11. Daily operations and logistics support personnel
Conclusion
1
Background of the incident in which individual C was repatriated: basic facts of a cross-border group case
1. Case background
In 2015, c, a native of Fujian, China, after acquiring JPZ citizenship, founded a cross-border group. In its early days, the group used legitimate businesses such as real estate and financial investment as a front and rapidly built a vast multinational commercial network in JPZ. However, according to investigations by law enforcement agencies in the United States and other countries, the other side of this commercial empire was a systematic transnational criminal network.
Between 2016 and 2022, c's criminal group, using JPZ xx and other locations as its main strongholds, built and operated at least 10 closed scam compounds. Its core fraud method was "pig-butchering" scams.
On October 14, 2025, U.S. law enforcement authorities formally indicted c, charging him with offenses including conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering. On the same day, the U.S. side announced the successful forfeiture of approximately 127,271 bitcoins associated with c, valued at approximately 15 billion USD at the then-current market value. This action was characterized by the U.S. Department of Justice as the largest forfeiture in the department's history.
2. c has been repatriated; what will the co-conspirators face?
On January 7, 2026, c and two other individuals were repatriated to China. A responsible official of domestic law enforcement stated that the first batch of core members of c's criminal group will be publicly wanted in the near future, that efforts to pursue and arrest them will be continuously intensified, and that the relevant fugitives will be resolutely apprehended and brought to justice. At the same time, law enforcement authorities also issued a clear warning to relevant persons: they should recognize the situation and surrender as soon as possible. Therefore, it is expected that the cases of persons associated with c's criminal group will subsequently be tried by China's judicial authorities in accordance with law.
Judging from the statements of law enforcement authorities, the investigation and subsequent actions in this case are being advanced as an integrated crackdown on cross-border crime.
So, what exactly is the mechanism behind the ability of such criminal activity to form a large-scale, industrialized operating system? To answer this question, we will next sort out the core methods used by this criminal group and the complete path by which its funds are laundered.
2
Deconstructing the Crime and Money Laundering Model of a Cross-Border Group: The Complete Fund Chain and Division of Labor
1. Step One: The Acquisition End—From "Contact" to "Deposit"
The starting point of this chain is a customer acquisition system that has been compartmentalized into roles. According to the indictment, the criminals contacted victims through various means; under the identity of "Introducers," they claimed to have the ability to profit through investment in various investment markets, such as the cryptocurrency market and the foreign exchange market, thereby inducing victims to invest. The introducers were not responsible for collecting or transferring funds; their core duty was to achieve low-cost outreach and screening: using instant messaging software such as WhatsApp and Telegram as their main battleground, they established first contact through methods such as "random approaches," and then, over the following 3–5 days, continuously delivered "profit narratives that could be reused at scale."
The common combination of actions at this stage is: continuously displaying profit screenshots, trading records, and daily consumption scenarios, gradually guiding the focus of communication from "getting to know each other" to "opportunity," and then from "opportunity" to "platform links." The purpose is not to immediately demand a transfer, but to lead the victim to form three judgments cognitively: the platform exists, the profits are visible, and missing out would be a pity. In other words, what the introducers complete is "preliminary persuasion," pushing the victim into a position of "actively asking how to participate."
When the victim shows a willingness to invest, the chain enters the second role: the "account manager" within the compound. Unlike the introducers, the account managers possess a complete set of "trading platform appearance + back-end permissions + script templates." Their core task is to transform the victim's "desire to make money" into sustainable deposits and to lock in trust through a "controllable withdrawal experience."
The typical process is as follows: back-end adjustments are made to earnings data to create a stable daily return; small withdrawals are permitted and processed quickly to establish the experience that the platform can pay out; then, when victims attempt a large withdrawal, obstacles are suddenly imposed in the name of handling fees, channel fees, taxes and similar charges. The key at this stage is that victims have often already incurred sunk costs from their earlier investments, and the account managers exploit this to push them to keep adding funds, repeatedly escalating with reasons such as topping up handling fees, completing verification or raising limits. The division of labor between the lead-generation side and the account-manager side means the fraud no longer depends on a single persuasive individual, but is instead a replicable, shift-based client-conversion mechanism.
2. Step Two: The Receiving Side — Two Parallel Deposit Channels: USD Wire Transfers and Direct On-Chain Receipt
When a victim decides to deposit funds, the money enters the receiving side. The receiving structure presented in the indictment is a parallel dual-channel arrangement: one channel is USD wire transfers into the U.S. banking system; the other is crypto assets received directly into a set of on-chain addresses. Both channels serve the same objective: lowering victims' guard while bringing funds into a controllable scope as quickly as possible.
The first channelcenters on localized receiving networks such as Brooklyn Network. Its business actions are highly specific: providing ready-made corporate shells or quickly registering shell companies, completing account-opening documentation and signature handling under the guise of corporate investment or business dealings, and opening corporate accounts within the U.S. banking system that can receive wire transfers. To victims, such accounts appear markedly more credible than personal or offshore accounts, and receiving payment through a corporate account fits better with the packaged investment narrative. Once funds arrive, the receiving side typically does not hold them for long, but quickly completes the migration from fiat currency to crypto assets.
A typical operational path: after funds are moved through the shell company's bank account, they are converted into USDT and then withdrawn to a cold wallet or other self-custody system. The function of this channel is not only to receive payments; more importantly, it moves funds out of the banking system into an on-chain environment where they can subsequently be processed in multiple layers.
The second channelis direct on-chain receipt through the 0x address group. This channel places greater emphasis on bypassing bank-side freezes and review; a common practice is to provide victims with a QR code for the receiving address and require them to write Investment or similar content in the transfer memo to match the aforementioned investment-deposit storyline. Once on-chain funds are received, they are forwarded to intermediary addresses within a relatively short period, avoiding funds remaining for long at an externally visible receiving address and reducing the risk of being flagged and traced.
The significance of these two parallel channels is that different victims have different forms of funds, and the fraud group minimizes deposit friction through channel configuration; at the same time, all funds are ultimately channeled into the subsequent diversion and on-chain layering system for unified processing.
3. Step Three: The Diversion Side — Splitting Transactions and Evading Risk Controls
Once funds enter the group's control, the first obstacle they face is the risk-control rules of banks and trading platforms. The work tasks of the personnel involved in the case are: through online banking transfers, transaction splitting and rapid coin purchases, to reduce the probability of being identified and frozen. The common action structure at this stage includes:
First, transaction splitting and account poolsFor relatively large deposits, the funds are first split among the accounts of several shell companies, forming a "pass-through chain." Structuring strategies tend to revolve around threshold control: individual transfers are split into amounts below a specific risk-control threshold, and are timed to be as synchronized or staggered as possible, so as to avoid forming an obvious pattern of concentrated deposits.
Second, parallel multi-account activity on the platform sideOnce the structuring is complete, the finance operator logs in simultaneously to multiple exchange sub-accounts and quickly converts fiat currency into BTC or USDT. The key here is to spread risk through "multiple accounts, multiple platforms, and short-term parallel activity": even if an individual account triggers AML/KYC review or is temporarily frozen, the fund chain can continue to operate through other accounts.
Third, speed takes priorityThis stage generally pursues "process upon receipt," avoiding leaving funds at any single node for too long. This is because, whether a bank account or a trading platform account, the longer funds remain, the more likely it is that uncertainties such as joint investigations, payment suspension, and risk-control review will arise. The "speed" on the distribution side does not mean acting arbitrarily; rather, it is a strict risk-control strategy: move the funds as quickly as possible into an on-chain system that is harder to freeze and roll back.
Once this step is complete, the banking traces of the funds are significantly weakened, and the key to subsequent tracing will shift from "bank records" to "on-chain paths and cooperation with trading platforms."
4. Step Four: The on-chain stage—withdrawals, multiple hops, and consolidation
The on-chain stage is handled by "on-chain operators," who usually belong to the same organizational system as the park's finance staff, except that they switch from online banking and trading platform interfaces to blockchain toolchains. Their objective is very clear: create on-chain breakpoints, dilute associations, and ultimately consolidate the funds into a small number of core controlled wallets. This stage can be broken down into three key sets of actions:
First, withdrawals(from platform-internal accounts to self-custody).
When funds remain in exchange accounts, they are still within the scope of "being subject to platform freezes and law-enforcement cooperation controls." Withdrawal means transferring assets from the platform's internal ledger to an on-chain address, entering a state of self-custody. This action is a key step from a "controllable platform" to a "self-controlled wallet."
Second, multi-hop transfers(Layering)。
The indictment clearly presents, through multiple sets of on-chain diagrams, a highly repetitive fund-path structure: funds are split across dozens of different addresses, then re-converged into the same address (a funnel address), and ultimately transferred into a wallet cluster controlled by Chen. In its analysis, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) noted that this pattern recurs repeatedly and that its function is to "make funds more difficult to trace."
Specifically, the indictment sets out two representative examples:
First, funds from a Bitcoin mining pool were dispersed into 22 separate addresses, then re-converged into the same funnel address, and transferred into the target wallet cluster;
Second, funds from a certain trading platform were split across 27 addresses, then re-aggregated into the same address, and then transferred into the core wallet. The above structures were expressly identified as a "recurring fund pattern," and law enforcement authorities noted that their function is to conceal the true source of the funds.
From the perspective of the form of the funds, such transactions exhibit clear unnatural characteristics: complex paths, numerous layers, and a structural arrangement in which deliberate splitting and concentration coexist. Their practical effect is to artificially increase the difficulty of identifying the connection between a single address and the ultimate controlling entity, such that investigators must establish a complete chain of association across multiple layers of addresses before they can form a stable attribution determination.
Third, aggregation and centralized management.
The endpoint of multiple hops is usually aggregation: funds are concentrated into a core wallet or funnel address to facilitate subsequent higher-level handling (for example, mining-pool mixing, offloading through payment-settlement channels, or offshore monetization). In practice, aggregation addresses are often managed by dedicated personnel, with keys stored using cold wallets or multi-signature architectures, forming a "main fund treasury."
The indictment mentions that Chen himself "continuously monitored activity in the wallet addresses he controlled" and maintained a high degree of attention to the flow of funds, which corresponds to this point: these on-chain assets were not randomly dispersed and stored, but were subject to centralized scheduling and continuous management. The essence at the on-chain end is to raise the cost of tracing from "linear verification" to "graph engineering," causing the fund chain to exhibit, structurally, the characteristics of multiple entry points, multiple paths, multiple layers, and multiple convergences.
5. Step Five: The coloring end—converting "suspicious sources" into "explainable sources"
After layering is completed on-chain, one problem remains: however complex the on-chain path, the "source label" of the assets may still be identified in exchange risk controls, on-chain analysis, or mutual-investigation notifications. The group therefore introduces a higher-level handling method to "disguise the source" of the funds; this article summarizes this stage as "coloring," which in essence refers to reshaping the appearance and source of the assets. This beat is usually accomplished through three types of mechanisms working together:
First, mixing with mining farms and mining pools.
The indictment mentions xx and xx mining farms and points to an abnormal ratio of mixing "newly mined coins" with external funds, with only about 30% coming from mining rewards. By mixing externally inflowing funds with mining-pool output and then uniformly transferring them into an aggregation wallet, the external explanation path can more easily be packaged as "mining-pool proceeds" or "hashrate returns." This is also why mining farms are given high priority in the entire money-laundering system: they not only provide cash flow, but also provide a formally more plausible explanation path for the source of funds.
Second, the coordination between the aggregation structure and wallet engineering.
The diagrams attached to the indictment clearly show that the relevant funds repeatedly presented a structure of being "split across multiple addresses and then concentrated into the same address." This structure appeared repeatedly, and the documents expressly identified its effect as increasing the difficulty of identifying fund paths. Structurally, such aggregation addresses perform a centralized management function: funds from multiple sources are progressively narrowed along their paths and ultimately converge into a core address before entering the next stage of processing. It should be noted that this structure does not merely pursue "complete concealment"; its more realistic function is, against backgrounds such as the appearance of a mining pool or the appearance of operating income, to make the flow of funds formally resemble seemingly normal scenarios such as "centralized settlement" and "unified aggregation," thereby weakening the intuitive impact of anomalous features. Third, the "water house" counters and the "fleet" cash-out.
The indictment repeatedly mentions converting crypto assets into cash through professional money-laundering channels, with the cash then re-entering the financial system or being used to purchase crypto assets again. Such channels usually exist in the form of "water houses" or "underground banks," and their function is to sever the direct continuity between on-chain paths and the fiat currency system. This stage is often accompanied by a "fleet" system: responsible for the cross-city transport of cash or valuables, counting and handover, delivery security and route control. The fleet does not appear directly in on-chain records, but it performs the function of physical infrastructure for "translating on-chain value into controllable cash."
For the group, the water houses address the financial break points, while the fleet addresses real-world delivery and security; together they constitute the key modules of "off-chain laundering." Such structures are extremely common in cross-border money-laundering cases, and their core purpose is to further weaken the continuity of on-chain tracing through asset conversion at the physical level. After this stage is completed, the funds formally take on an asset form closer to "explainable source" and are positioned to enter banking and offshore structures.
6. Step Six: Exit and feedback—offshore monetization and recycling through the financial system
At the very end of the entire chain, the "exit" stage addresses the usability of the assets. That is, the funds no longer remain on-chain or in gray channels; rather, they are converted into fiat currency assets that can be publicly consumed, used for corporate payments and deployed in high-value asset markets, and further acquire capital attributes.
First, the offshore company system performs monetization and payment functions.
The entities listed in the indictment, such as xx, xx and xx (controlled by group-affiliated personnel and intended primarily for handling and laundering illicit funds), present a typical offshore structure arrangement. The relevant funds are used to sell crypto assets through over-the-counter trading channels in Hong Kong and other places, enter the US dollar settlement system of offshore banks, and are paid out in the company's name to commercial institutions such as luxury goods merchants, auction houses and yacht dealers. The accompanying contracts, invoices, payment remarks and other documents usually describe the purpose of the funds as service-type categories such as "investment consulting fees" and "consulting fees," so that the relevant transactions appear in the banking system as ordinary cross-border commercial payments. The key to this structure is that the payment conduct has a relatively complete appearance of formal compliance, making the flow of funds explainable in hindsight.
Second, feedback into the financial system and capital circulation.
The indictment mentions the role of xx Bank within the group system: after the relevant funds were monetized, they were used to increase the bank's capital, enhancing its capital strength. After its capital strength increased, the bank then, through credit facilities, loans and other means, channeled funds in the form of financial products to group-affiliated entities, including mining farms, industrial parks and related business segments. As a result, the funds are no longer merely passively "laundered" and consumed; rather, they enter the financial system to create a leverage effect and thereby support business expansion on a larger scale. This means the chain already exhibits clear characteristics of capital circulation.
7. Organizational safeguard mechanisms: risk control and anti-investigation conduct
The indictment also discloses that the group maintained a dedicated "risk control" function internally, which was an important module directly involved in countering law enforcement and sustaining the group's operations. It records that Co-conspirator-2 was responsible for heading this function and communicated with defendant c over "risk control" matters on a long-term basis.
The indictment expressly records that defendant c personally kept systematic bribery ledgers. The document states that these ledgers recorded bribery and luxury-goods expenditures reimbursed to relevant group personnel,amounting to hundreds of millions of US dollars in scaleViewed in terms of the overall organizational division of labor, the risk control department was an important safeguard enabling this cross-border criminal group to achieve long-term, large-scale operations.
The foregoing, from the perspective of fund flows, has fully presented the overall pathway of this criminal system, from customer acquisition and lead generation, fund deposit, diversion and processing, on-chain layering, and tainting and packaging, to offshore monetization and financial reinvestment. This is a highly structured criminal chain capable of operating at scale.
The reason this chain could operate stably over the long term is that a clear organizational structure and division of positions existed behind it. Each link corresponds to specific personnel roles and boundaries of responsibility.
Therefore, after clarifying the criminal methods and operating mechanisms, we return to the level of "people" and, in light of the actual conduct of different positions, further analyze the possible charges and legal liability of various personnel. The following discussion addresses each type of role separately.
3
Possible charges for personnel in different positions within the group
1. Core decision-makers and organizers/leaders
They are suspected of constituting the crimes of [organizing and leading a mafia-type organization], [fraud], [money laundering], and [bribery], among others. They are the principal members of the criminal group and should bear criminal liability for all crimes committed by the organization.
The core leaders were responsible for the criminal group's overall strategy, structural design, and resource allocation. Their conduct includes: establishing and managing the complete criminal industrial chain from customer acquisition and lead generation, collection of funds, diversion, on-chain laundering, to offshore monetization; deciding to establish the "risk control" department and receiving its reports, and directly participating in obtaining intelligence and protection through bribery of foreign public officials; and continuously monitoring and directing the flow and pooling of huge amounts of illicit funds (such as on-chain wallet clusters). The systematic bribery ledgers kept by c, amounting to hundreds of millions of US dollars, as mentioned in the indictment, are direct evidence of the core tool used to organize and lead criminal activities and sustain the organization's survival.
The legal substance of this conduct lies in:
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First, he created, maintained, and directed a tightly structured criminal organization with a clear division of labor and the economic strength and unlawful control capacity,which fully meets the constitutive elements of the crime of organizing and leading a mafia-type organization, and his status is not that of an ordinary participant, but ratherthe core decision-maker who initiated, designed, and actually controlled the operation of the entire system。
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Second, as the principal ringleader, his legal responsibility is not limited to individual acts he personally carried out, but should extend to the systematic fraud, professional money laundering, and bribery committed to sustain the organization's operations that were carried out through the overall operation of the group.
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Third, the harmfulness of his conduct extends beyond infringement at the property level and is further reflected inthe erosion of law-enforcement order through systematic bribery, as well as the damage to financial order and the foundation of social trust。
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In summary, the core decision-maker and organizational leader, becausehe designed the entire criminal structure and coordinated all key linksthe scope should cover all criminal activities organized and led by him.
If the core decision-maker and organizational leader determined the structure and direction of the entire criminal chain, then it is the specific execution personnel distributed across each link who truly kept this system running continuously. It is precisely the sustained coordination of these position-based divisions of labor that enabled the fraud to be carried out at scale, the funds to be processed on an assembly-line basis, and the entire system to possess a high degree of replicability and expansibility. Therefore, it is next necessary to return to each position itself and separately analyze the nature of the conduct of the different roles and the criminal liability they may involve.
2. Front-end inducement personnel (including "referrers" and "account managers")
The nature of this category of persons' conduct is relatively clear; their legal risk lies primarily in the determination of their role in a joint crime and the scope of their liability.
Suspected offense: accomplice to [fraud]. The "referrer" systematically fabricates investment profit opportunities by impersonating experts and displaying false profit records; the "referrer" directly shapes the victim's mistaken understanding by fabricating investment opportunities and displaying forged returns; the "account manager," by manipulating back-end data and setting withdrawal obstacles, ultimately converts this mistaken understanding into actual property loss. The two have different divisions of labor but jointly complete a complete fraud chain. Their conduct connects sequentially and together constitutes a complete chain of fraudulent conduct.
3. Receiving-end operators (controllers of shell companies and operators of on-chain receiving addresses)
The legal characterization of this category of persons involves the concurrence of accomplice liability for fraud and the offense of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds; the core dispute is the specific content and degree of their subjective knowledge.
Suspected offense: accomplice to [fraud]. The controllers of shell companies, by fabricating corporate backgrounds and opening corporate accounts, provide deceptive "legitimate" receiving channels for fraudulent activities and directly receive and transfer victim funds; the on-chain operators directly control the receiving addresses and carry out fund transfers. The conduct of both is the key execution link by which the fraud funds actually leave the victims' control. If it can be proven that they knew the funds received were proceeds of fraud and that their conduct was intended to help complete the fraud, they may be found to share a common criminal intent with the front-end fraud personnel and to constitute accomplices to fraud. At the same time, they may separately constitute the offense of [concealing or disguising criminal proceeds and the proceeds thereof]. The key to applying this offense is whether their conduct constitutes independent "transfer" and "concealment." If they knew the funds came from a crime and still cut off the fund chain through "dual-channel receiving + rapid transfer," their conduct already exhibits the typical characteristics of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds.
4. Distribution-end operators (financial operators / order-splitting and account-splitting personnel)
The conduct of this category of persons occurs at the fund-handling stage after the fraudulent activity is completed; its legal characterization involves the boundary between downstream offenses and upstream accomplice liability.
Possible offenses: primarily suspected of constituting [concealing or disguising criminal proceeds and the proceeds thereof] and [the offense of assisting information network criminal activities]. Their core conduct is the technical processing of fraud funds already received, including: splitting large sums into small transactions below regulatory thresholds and "passing" them through multiple shell company accounts; rapidly completing the exchange between fiat currency and crypto assets and withdrawals across multiple trading platform accounts. The direct purpose of these operations is to sever the link between the funds and the upstream crime and to counter risk-control monitoring, exhibiting the typical characteristics of "laundering" and "concealment."
5. On-chain-end operators (on-chain operators)
The core of this category of persons' legal risk lies in whether their specialized technical conduct is sufficient to constitute an independent money-laundering offense, and in the standard for determining subjective knowledge.
Suspected offense: [concealing or disguising criminal proceeds and the proceeds thereof]. Their core conduct is the use of blockchain technology to carry out systematic "layering" of funds, specifically: conducting "multi-hop" transfers, splitting and re-aggregation through dozens or even hundreds of intermediate addresses (such as the "22 addresses dispersed and then re-aggregated" pattern revealed in the indictment), ultimately aggregating the funds into core control addresses. The direct and primary purpose of this series of operations is to artificially create complex transaction chains and sever the on-chain link between the funds and the upstream crime, which constitutes deep, professional "concealment" conduct.
6. Tainting-end and offshore-end operators (operators of mining farms, money-laundering cash-out operations, money-mule teams, and offshore companies)
The conduct of such personnel marks the entry of the money laundering process into the "deep cleaning" and "legalization exit" stage, and their legal risk is concentrated on the determination of high-level money laundering offenses.
Suspected offenses: [money laundering] or [concealing or disguising criminal proceeds or the proceeds derived from criminal proceeds]. Their core operational model is to systematically create a legitimate facade for criminal proceeds: mining farm/pool operators mix illegal funds with their own mining output, using the appearance of "production and business income" to "obscure the source"; money laundering operations/underground banks and associated teams use cross-border cryptocurrency-cash exchange or offsetting transactions, using physical settlement to sever the digital chain; offshore company operators, through forged commercial contracts and invoices (such as "consulting fees"), inject funds into the formal financial system under the guise of legitimate cross-border payments, and use them to purchase high-value assets (luxury goods, real estate) or inject capital into affiliated entities, achieving "financial backfeeding".
7. Personnel operating gambling and money laundering businesses
The conduct of such personnel reflects a complex model of using illegal businesses themselves as money laundering tools, and their legal risk is concentrated on the concurrence of offenses and the determination of the purpose of conduct.
Suspected offenses: May simultaneously involve [the crime of opening a casino] and [money laundering]. Their conduct is composite: on the one hand, by operating gambling "mirror sites" to evade regulation and continuously providing online gambling services, they meet the elements of the crime of opening a casino; on the other hand, the indictment shows that they used gambling platforms to carry out "self-circulation" operations (depositing "clean" cryptocurrency and quickly withdrawing it, forging profit records), and reinvested illegal proceeds into gambling, mining, and other businesses, with the aim of creating a legitimate appearance of "gambling proceeds" or "business income" for criminal funds. This series of conduct has the clear nature of concealing and disguising the source of funds.
8. Payment and settlement intermediaries (including OTC dealers)
Such personnel provide illegal financial channels and currency exchange services for criminal activities, and the core of their legal risk lies in their unlicensed business operations themselves and the substantive facilitating effect of such conduct on upstream crimes.
Suspected offenses: Primarily suspected of constituting [the crime of illegal business operations]. Their conduct patterns mainly include: 1. Illegally engaging in fund payment and settlement business, such as operating underground banks or illegal fourth-party payment platforms, providing unregulated cross-border fund transfer and settlement services for criminal groups; 2. Illegally buying and selling foreign exchange, that is, acting as OTC (over-the-counter) dealers, engaging on a large scale in exchange business between RMB and foreign currencies (including cryptocurrency and traditional fiat currency) without obtaining the corresponding administrative license. Both types of conduct directly violate the mandatory state regulations requiring special licensing for payment and settlement business and foreign exchange business, and disrupt the order of the financial market.
9. Organizers and support personnel (risk control departments and associated bribery personnel)
The conduct of such personnel is aimed at providing systematic protection for criminal groups, and their legal risk touches on the core characteristics of organized crime and associated offenses of obstructing justice.
Suspected offenses: May involve [the crime of organizing, leading, or participating in a mafia-like organization], [the crime of bribery], and related offenses of obstructing justice (such as [the crime of obstructing testimony]). Their core conduct is systematically confronting law enforcement and the judiciary: by establishing illegal contacts with specific state law enforcement personnel, implementing bribery in exchange for law enforcement intelligence, "extrication" assistance, and even attempting to manipulate law enforcement agencies to serve their illegal purposes (such as the instruction mentioned in the indictment to "rob first, then discuss protection fees"). The detailed bribery ledgers kept by core members of the group are direct evidence of the long-term and organized nature of such conduct.
10. Technical support and platform maintenance personnel
Personnel in this category provide the infrastructure and professional services required for criminal activity. The core of their legal risk lies in determining the degree of subjective knowledge and in characterizing the nature of the assistance they provide.
Suspected offenses: They may primarily be involved in the crime of [aiding information network criminal activities], and under specific conditions may also constitute an accomplice to an upstream offense (such as [fraud]). Specific conduct includes: 1. developing and maintaining fraudulent fake investment platforms, and providing back-end systems whose data can be altered and whose deposits and withdrawals can be controlled; 2. providing supporting services such as the bulk registration of shell companies, the fraudulent issuance of corporate accounts, and agency bookkeeping.
11. Daily operations and logistics support personnel
Personnel in this category provide foundational support for the continued existence and operation of a criminal organization. Although their legal risk is relatively indirect, in the context of organized crime they may still constitute criminal offenses.
Suspected offenses: Depending on the specific content of their conduct and their subjective awareness, they may be involved as accomplices to [fraud] or to the crime of [concealing or disguising criminal proceeds or the proceeds derived from criminal proceeds]. Where a criminal group may be characterized as a whole as a mafia-type organization, they may also be pursued for criminal liability as "other participants" in the crime of [joining a mafia-type organization].
From front-end traffic acquisition and account operations, to collection, diversion, and on-chain processing, and further to offshore monetization, risk management, and logistics support, these roles appear dispersed and carry different responsibilities, yet from a judicial perspective they are often evaluated as a whole within the same criminal structure. The more professional the conduct, the more stable the division of labor, and the closer the coordination, the higher the risk of being characterized as an accomplice or as a downstream offense.
In reality, a large number of parties have run afoul of the law precisely because they knew only what they themselves did, yet never clearly saw their position within the entire chain.
4
Conclusion
What this article analyzes is not an extreme individual case of a certain criminal group, but rather a cross-border criminal industry model that has become highly mature and possesses standard operating procedures. Its true harmfulness lies in its "refined" division-of-labor design, its "position-based" operating model, and its "replicability" and capacity for rapid expansion. From traffic acquisition and collection to money laundering and risk management, the entire chain resembles a precision criminal machine, and the absence of any single "part" does not impede its overall operation.
It is precisely this division of labor that causes a large number of marginal executors—those responsible for "account farming," "promotion," "technical support," "fund transfers," or "OTC settlement"—who may never have come into contact with core decision-making and may not even understand the overall criminal model, yet whose indispensable "function" has firmly bound them to the unlawful purposes of the entire criminal machine. Therefore, explanations such as "I did not know" raised by parties before judicial authorities can hardly sever the legal causal relationship between their conduct and the ultimate criminal result.
On this basis, the analysis in this article aims to present the organizational structure and operating logic behind such cases and to flag the legal risks that different roles may face, so that the relevant persons can more clearly understand the legal evaluation of their own conduct within the overall chain, and so that those still on the margins can identify the boundaries of risk in advance and avoid bearing unnecessary criminal consequences due to a misjudgment of the situation.

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