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Recently, in a case handled by Lawyer Shao involving a U merchant buying and selling USDT (Tether), the client was accused by judicial authorities of suspected illegal business operations in the category of illegal foreign exchange trading, using virtual currency as the medium.

 

Although, in Lawyer Shao's view, the evidence chain in this case is not yet complete enough to establish guilt, the amount involved is as high as several billion, and in recent years the client used dozens of bank cards belonging to relatives and friends to collect and make payments for virtual currency transactions. From the perspective of the case-handling personnel, this operating model indeed does not look like a "normal" business. Therefore, the prosecutor believes that even if the crime of illegal business operations is not established, they are still considering accusing the client of other crimes, such as the crime of obstructing credit card management, the crime of assisting information network criminal activities, and the crime of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds.

 

In "Case Handling Notes | What are the risks of borrowing another person's bank card to receive payment when buying and selling USDT? — Examining the boundaries of establishing illegal business operations, the crime of assisting information network criminal activities, the crime of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds, and key defense points through a multi-billion virtual currency case", I have already conducted a preliminary review of the relevant issues. This article will further focus on practical disputes and systematically discuss the following core issues:

 

Why should buying and selling virtual currency to earn the price difference not constitute the crime of illegal business operations in the category of illegal foreign exchange trading, the crime of assisting information network criminal activities, or the crime of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds?

 

I Author of this article: Lawyer Shao Shiwei

 

 

 

1

The guilty-presumption logic from a judicial perspective: Is buying and selling virtual currency to earn the price difference an abnormal business?

 

From the perspective of case handling, the model by which U merchants earn the price difference usually has two characteristics:

First, using multiple bank cards to collect and make payments; second, an enormous volume of funds.

 

Compared with traditional businesses, this fund path is more likely to be presumed to carry compliance risks. For this reason, even if the crime of illegal business operations is difficult to establish, case-handling authorities often seek other "fallback charges."

 

However, Lawyer Shao wishes to emphasize that, under domestic policy, the buying and selling of virtual currency (over-the-counter OTC) is not prohibited by law, and it is an objective fact in China that a large number of USDT merchants, arbitrageurs and ordinary investors participate in OTC transactions.

 

Taking the Binance exchange alone as an example, opening the C2C section and selecting CNY (Renminbi) as the exchange currency shows 1,300 merchants (10 per page, 130 pages) — this shows that OTC USDT merchants are not an isolated phenomenon but exist on a large scale.

In addition, in the C2C sections of mainstream trading platforms such as OKX, Bybit, Bitget, MEXC and Gate.io, USDT merchants generally register on the trading matchmaking pages as compliant merchants.

 

It should be noted that platform merchants are only the tip of the iceberg. In practice, there are also a large number of purely offline USDT merchants who complete transactions through community groups, acquaintances' circles or channels such as Telegram and WhatsApp, and this volume is likewise enormous.

 

Judging from the types of cases in recent years, Lawyer Shao believes that the focus of judicial enforcement is not "buying and selling USDT itself" but three categories of conduct:

  • continuing to trade while knowing that the funds received are involved in fraud;

  • using virtual currency to assist in money laundering;

  • providing assistance while knowing that the upstream party is engaged in disguised foreign exchange trading.

 

Therefore, whether the model of OTC merchants earning the price difference is "normal" should not be benchmarked against traditional business; instead, the perspective should be placed on the normal model of the USDT merchant industry to compare whether the party's conduct is abnormal.

 

Otherwise, if one always views this industry and group through tinted glasses merely because the model is unfamiliar, there is a suspicion of "presumption of guilt."

 

Next, Lawyer Shao will systematically explain why this conduct does not constitute the crime of illegal business operation, nor the crime of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds, nor the crime of assisting information network criminal activities.

 

 

 

2

Reasons why it does not constitute the crime of illegal business operation

 

The prerequisite for determining that an actor constitutes the crime of illegal business operations by using virtual currency to buy and sell foreign exchange is that there is evidence proving that the actor subjectively knew the upstream party was engaging in “matched-order currency exchange” and still provided assistance to the upstream criminal activity.

The Supreme People's Procuratorate, in the document released on December 21, 2024, the Lin and Yan illegal business operations case, is a typical case of this type:

  • Fromthe degree of subjective knowledgeperspective, Lin provided assistance to the Nigerian “Prince” after Prince clearly informed Lin of his intention to exchange currency, and Lin did so with such knowledge;

  • fromthe perspective of fund flowsperspective, Lin participated in the entire process by which Prince used virtual currency as a medium to convert the Nigerian local legal currency, the naira, into RMB;

therefore, Lin's so-called “brick-moving arbitrage” was in substance carried out under the instructions of the Nigerian “Prince”: Prince transferred naira into Lin's Binance account, and Lin then sold the received USDT to domestic U merchants for RMB and returned the funds to Prince. Lin set the purchase price at 5% below the day's listed USDT price, then sold to U merchants at the listed price and earned the price difference, thereby constituting the crime of illegal business operations.

 

Therefore, roles such as U merchants a, b, and c do not, merely because they have transacted with Lin, constitute joint offenders in Lin's illegal business operations case. In addition, from the perspective of fund flows, the reason U merchants a, b, and c in the above figure do not constitute the crime of illegal business operations also lies in the fact that the transactions between the U merchants and Lin are limited to those between U and RMBOne-way exchange, and the U merchant only earns the price-difference profit therein. By contrast, the reason Lin was found guilty lies in the fact that, although he was also earning price-difference profits, his transactions in fact used virtual assets as a medium to effect, for the Nigerian Prince, a de facto exchange between different currencies, and therefore constituted the crime of illegal business operations in the category of buying and selling foreign exchange.

 

 

 

3

Reasons why the crime of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds is not constituted

 

Does the mere fact that a case involves the flow of huge funds and the receipt and payment of funds through multiple persons' bank cards suffice to readily determine that a U merchant is suspected of the crime of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds?

 

Lawyer Shao is of the view that determining this crime cannot rest on intuitive judgments such as "complex fund chain", "circulation across multiple cards" and "large-value transactions", but must return to the core question of the constitutive elements of criminal law: what exactly constitutes criminal proceeds in the sense of criminal law?

 

According to the interpretive opinion published on the official website of the Supreme People's Procuratorate[i], so-called criminal proceeds refer to the increase in property interests obtained by the perpetrator through criminal acts and the retention of the portion by which the perpetrator's own property ought to have been reduced. Simply put, criminal proceeds are the "gains" or "costs saved" generated by the crime, rather than the "principal" used for the crime.

 

Taking the typical underground currency-exchange model as an example, the funds provided by currency-exchange clients are often RMB or foreign currency that they originally obtained lawfully, but which were used for illegal currency-exchange conduct. As regards these funds, they are the client's principal; as regards the underground bank, they are not its criminal gains. The underground bank's true "illegal gains" are usually only the currency-exchange service fees or exchange-rate spreads it charges.

 

In other words, the exchange principal itself does not automatically become "criminal proceeds" merely because it was used for illegal currency exchange. Only the benefits actually obtained by the underground bank from providing services may constitute criminal gains.

 

On this basis, let us then look at the role of the U merchant. The conduct of the vast majority of U merchants is in essence merely buying and selling USDT based on market prices and earning price-difference profits. In this process, the funds received by the U merchant are mainly the RMB or USDT principal paid by the counterparty, rather than the underground bank's "criminal proceeds that have already been laundered".

 

In other words, the U merchant is more participating in the circulation of the transaction principal, rather than assisting in transferring, concealing or liquidating the underground bank's criminal proceeds.

 

This is also a point that is easily confused in many cases: investigators often see "upstream crime + downstream receipt of money" and habitually conclude that the downstream party is concealing criminal proceeds; but in fact, if the upstream funds themselves are not criminal proceeds, then even if the downstream party participates in their circulation, the most core object element of the crime of concealment and disguise is lacking.

 

From the perspective of judicial practice, the typical conduct truly targeted by the crime of concealment and disguise is often assisting in transferring fraud proceeds, splitting funds to evade supervision, laundering through multiple layers, withdrawing cash on behalf of others, or converting criminal proceeds into assets that "appear lawful". Mere off-exchange trading by U merchants, normal matching of buyers and sellers, and completion of consideration exchanges based on market prices do not in essence belong to this conduct pattern of "concealing criminal proceeds".

 

Therefore, in most scenarios involving mere buying and selling of USDT to profit from price spreads, if the USDT merchant:

  • did not participate in the underground bank's overall closed-loop currency exchange;

  • did not knowingly assist the underground bank in transferring funds;

  • merely matched normal transactions based on market prices;

 

then, even if illegal currency exchange activity exists upstream, it would be difficult to determine solely on the basis of fund flows that the USDT merchant constitutes the crime of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds.

 

 

 

4

Reasons why the crime of assisting information network criminal activities is not constituted

 

The crime of assisting information network criminal activities is likewise a "high-frequency alternative charge" used by case-handling authorities in such cases. However, under Article 287-2, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Law, the premise of this crime is "knowingly providing assistance to others who use information networks to commit crimes"; therefore, the precondition for applying this charge is that the upstream crime is an information network crime.

 

Thus, whether the USDT merchant's upstream activity constitutes an "information network crime" becomes the precondition for whether the USDT merchant itself can be determined to have committed the crime of assisting information network criminal activities.

 

What is an information network crime? The key question is whether the core actus reus of the crime is carried out and completed by relying on information networks.

 

Even if the buyer and seller in a currency exchange agree on the exchange rate and match funds through messaging software, the actual settlement of RMB and foreign exchange is completed entirely within the territory through offline bank transfers or cash. In this case, the information network is merely a communication tool, and the core of the crime (illegal foreign exchange trading) is realized offline. Therefore, the criminal conduct in this model is not a network crime.

 

If the actor not only communicates through messaging software but also completes the collection and payment of funds entirely online through online banking and third-party payment platforms (in particular, using domestic RMB accounts and overseas foreign currency accounts for "split collection and payment"), then the core element of the crime of illegal business operations (payment and settlement) depends on information networks. Such conduct may then be determined to be "using information networks to commit a crime." Only where the actor provides a bank card to assist such online collection does the scenario fall within the application of the crime of assisting information network criminal activities.

A typical case in which illegal foreign exchange exchange using virtual currency as a medium was convicted as the crime of assisting information network criminal activities is the case included in the case database released by the Supreme People's Court on June 18, 2025 — the case of Guo Mouzhao and Fan Moubin for illegal business operations, and Zhan Mouxiang and Liang Mouzuan for assisting information network criminal activities (database inclusion number :2025-03-1-169-001. At the same time, this case is also one of the typical cases of punishing illegal foreign exchange-related crimes jointly released by the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange in December 2023)

 

 

Basic facts of the case[ii]:

Guo Mouzhao, the builder of an illegal foreign exchange website.

Fan Moubin, a person who traded virtual assets for an illegal foreign exchange group.

Zhan Mouxiang and Liang Mouzuan, persons who provided Fan Moubin with virtual asset trading platform accounts and RMB bank accounts.

 

From January 2018 to September 2021, Chen Mouguo (handled in a separate case), Guo Mouzhao and others built websites such as the "TW711 Platform" and the "Huosu Platform", using the virtual asset Tether (USDT) as the medium to provide customers with foreign currency and RMB exchange services. After foreign exchange customers placed orders in business sections such as stored-value and payment-on-behalf on the above websites, they paid foreign currency to overseas accounts designated by the websites. After the websites used the above foreign currency to purchase Tether overseas, Fan Moubin sold it through illegal channels to obtain RMB, and then paid the corresponding amount of RMB to domestic third-party payment platform accounts designated by customers at the agreed exchange rate, thereby earning the exchange rate spread and service fees. The above websites illegally exchanged more than 220 million yuan of RMB. Among them, Fan Moubin, by operating virtual asset trading platform accounts and RMB bank accounts provided by Zhan Mouxiang, Liang Mouzuan and others, received more than 6 million Tether from Chen Mouguo and exchanged it for more than 40 million yuan of RMB.

 

The reasoning of the judgment in this case is as follows:

 

  • In this case, Chen Mouguo, Wang Mou and others built illegal foreign exchange websites and conducted foreign exchange trading for profit by collecting New Taiwan dollars through overseas accounts and paying RMB through domestic accounts, which constituted the crime of illegal business operations.

  • Guo Mouzhao was responsible for providing technical assistance in the joint crime and did not participate in specific business operations or the sharing of illegal gains; Fan Moubin operated transactions in accordance with instructions during the course of the crime. The two should be determined according to law as accessories to the crime of illegal business operations.

  • Zhan Mouxiang and Liang Mouzuan had generalized knowledge that others were using the information network to commit crimes and provided bank accounts to the defendant Fan Moubin and others, and were therefore convicted of the crime of assisting information network criminal activities.

 

It can be seen from this case that, on the premise that the upstream conduct was convicted of the crime of illegal business operations, the reason Zhan Mouxiang and Liang Mouzuan were determined in this case to have committed the crime of assisting information network criminal activities is that the upstream illegal foreign exchange method was carried out by building illegal foreign exchange websites, and the core link of the crime of illegal business operations depended on the information network.

 

Therefore, if although the actors also communicated online through communication tools (such as WeChat, Telegram and WhatsApp), the information network was in fact merely a communication tool and the illegal buying and selling of foreign exchange was carried out offline, then the upstream crime does not constitute an "information network crime." Therefore, in such circumstances, the precondition for determining the downstream U merchant receiving the funds to have committed the crime of assisting information network criminal activities is absent.

 

In addition, judicial authorities also commonly take the circumstances in which the actor's bank card was frozen or subjected to restricted non-counter services in the course of buying and selling virtual assets as grounds for finding that the actor meets the subjective knowledge requirement of the crime of assisting information network criminal activities. However, according to the following judicial interpretation, only where funds such as 'fraud-related funds' have been received can 'knowledge' under the crime of assisting information network criminal activities be established; that provision in fact regulates actors who provide assistance to telecom and online fraud. But as stated above, in the crime of illegal business operations involving the buying and selling of foreign exchange, the reason the U merchant is implicated is that, without its knowledge, it received exchange remittances from clients of an upstream underground bank (usually the lawful income source of the person exchanging currency), and not the 'fraud-related' funds referred to in the following judicial interpretation.

 

Opinions of the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Ministry of Public Security on Issues Concerning the Handling of Criminal Cases Such as the Crime of Assisting Information Network Criminal Activities

5. Accurately determining 'knowledge' under the crime of assisting information network criminal activities...

(2) where, due tofraud-relatedor other abnormal circumstances, the person has been subjected to measures such as restriction or suspension of services by a financial institution, a telecom business operator or an internet service provider, and still carries out the relevant conduct;

 

 

 

5

Concluding Remarks

 

In cases involving virtual assets, whether conduct constitutes a crime should still be examined by returning to the chain of evidence and the elements of the offense themselves. As emphasized in the discussion by the Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People's Court, 'given that China has no virtual asset legislation and financial regulation is insufficient, presumptions should be used prudently in light of China's national conditions and the spirit of relevant policies, and the scope of determining knowledge should be strictly controlled[iii].' Therefore, conduct such as buying and selling USDT to profit from price differences and collecting and making payments on behalf of others should be characterized prudently, and subjective intent should not be inferred backwards from the result.

 


 

[i] Defining criminal proceeds based on criminal illegality and property attributes_ Supreme People's Procuratorate of the People's Republic of China https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/llyj/202201/t20220128_543091.shtml

[ii] The Supreme People's Procuratorate and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange jointly release typical cases of punishing illegal and criminal activities involving foreign exchange https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/A7f6-gzWNb8sfvrIZR6YkA

[iii] Overview: Zhizheng · Theory and Practice in Parallel | Uniform application of law in criminal cases involving virtual assets https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/4VumDORFAcI9BOWNJaHmiw

 

 

 

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