Introduction

In the early hours of October 30, the crypto industry was flooded with a single piece of news: Binance, the world's largest exchange, had apparently suffered the largest hack in history.

Like most people, the first thing I saw was the shocking headline that "the largest crypto exchange had tens of billions of US dollars stolen." But digging further into the story raises a series of follow-on questions. Today we will analyze three of them:

(1) Binance says there is "no evidence of private key leakage." If the hackers did not crack the private keys, how did they move tens of billions of US dollars out? That brings us to EIP-7702.

(2) The stolen assets are the same in nature, yet USDT and USDC can be frozen with a single action by their issuers, while BTC and ETH cannot be stopped. Why?

(3) If the hackers' stolen coins later flow into your wallet address, what legal risks arise?

I. Recap of the Binance Hack

At 4:20 a.m. Beijing time on October 30, a Type-4 transaction containing 50 sets of EIP-7702 authorizations was recorded on-chain, targeting Binance's Ethereum hot wallet labeled "Binance 14." At around 4:24 a.m., the attacker called a sweeper contract and, in a single transaction, transferred out approximately 167,464 ETH, approximately 1615 million USDT, and more than 60 other tokens including RLUSD and UNI, with an estimated value of approximately 2500 million US dollars. Over the following approximately 40 minutes, funds continued to be transferred out of multiple associated hot wallets of Binance on other public blockchains. The outflows in this attack covered at least 9 chains, including Ethereum, Bitcoin, TRON, Solana, XRP, and Arbitrum, with the total cross-chain scale estimated at between 5500 million and 6300 million US dollars.

The attacker's core method: the attacker had "Binance 14" sign an EIP-7702 authorization with its own private key, delegating the hot wallet's execution authority to a sweeper contract the attacker had deployed in advance. Once the authorization took effect, the attacker no longer needed to request new signatures from Binance; by calling a single contract function, the attacker could drain the wallet's 64 tokens together with ETH in the same block.

After the incident, Tether froze approximately 1380 million USDT, Circle froze approximately 823 million USDC, and Ripple froze approximately 40540 thousand RLUSD. The total value of frozen assets publicly announced by Binance and verified on-chain was revised upward from an initial 2540 million US dollars to approximately 3 billion US dollars. However, native assets such as ETH and BTC could not be frozen at all. Monitoring shows that the attacker has already swapped UNI, ENA, LINK, and others into approximately 70 thousand ETH.

In the hours before this EIP-7702 delegation was revoked, assets subsequently transferred into "Binance 14" were still automatically swept by the contract, including one transfer of approximately 200 million USDT, which was likewise diverted. It was not until around 8:10 a.m. on October 30 that Binance used the wallet's signing authority to sign a new authorization pointing to the zero address, thereby clearing the delegation.

So the core issue here is not that a cryptographic algorithm was broken, nor that the smart contract itself had a vulnerability, but that an EIP-7702 authorization signed by the wallet's own private key was maliciously exploited.

II. What Is EIP-7702?

(1) Legacy EOA Wallets: Nothing Beyond the Private Key

A traditional ordinary address on Ethereum is called an EOA (Externally Owned Account). Whoever holds the private key decides what transactions that address sends. It has no code and therefore no logic of its own; it cannot set spending limits or whitelists, nor can it set a rule that "any single transaction exceeding 1 million requires secondary confirmation." This is what is commonly meant by "the private key is everything."

(2) EIP-7702 Allows the Account's Execution Rights to Be Delegated

EIP-7702 is a protocol change that went live in May 2025 with Ethereum's Pectra upgrade. It allows an EOA to sign an authorization directing its execution logic to a certain contract—in plain terms, installing a replaceable brain on an ordinary address.

The substantive content of the authorization consists of only three items: the chain ID, the target contract address, and the nonce, plus a signature. Once the authorization takes effect, any person calling this address executes the target contract's code, and does so within the context of this address's own balance and storage. From the outside, an ordinary address that could previously only sign and transfer has a behavioral pattern identical to that of a contract account.

However, this mechanism carries two risks:

1. Once the delegation authorization takes effect, it persists. Only a new authorization signed with the original private key can override and replace it; merely changing the login password or rotating companion keys cannot revoke the delegation.

2. If the chain ID is set to 0, the authorization becomes cross-chain universal: the same signature can take effect simultaneously on multiple compatible chains.

(3) EIP-7702 and ERC20 Approvals Are Not the Same Thing

An approve authorization grants that "a certain contract may use up to a certain amount of a certain token of mine." Its boundaries are relatively clear: a single token, a cap, and the ability to reset to zero at any time. Even if the approval is granted to a malicious contract, the loss is capped.

EIP-7702, by contrast, hands over the execution decision-making rights of the entire account. The differences between the two lie in three respects:

1. Authorized object. What approve grants is the right to move a sum of money; EIP-7702 hands over command of the entire account;

2. Scope of coverage. approve is limited to a single token and subject to a cap, whereas EIP-7702 encompasses all assets under that address, including ETH, various tokens and NFTs, and at the same time inherits all capacities for action under that account identity: continuing to issue approve, participating in on-chain voting, signing various authorizations, and so on;

3. Method of revocation. approve can be revoked with one click, whereas EIP-7702 has no separate revocation entry point; a new authorization pointing to the zero address must be re-signed using the original private key in order to override the old delegation.

(IV) Returning to this incident

What the attacker needed was not a signature for each transaction, but a single authorization: having [Binance 14] delegate execution authority to his sweeper contract. The logic is simple: recognize only one owner and do only one thing, transfer money. Thus an operation that would originally have required requesting dozens of signatures and would have triggered a circuit breaker within seconds after the first large anomalous movement was compressed into a single call and a single block.

III. Why the stolen stablecoins could be frozen with one click, while BTC and ETH could not

(I) USDT and USDC are not native on-chain assets; in essence they are IOUs issued by the issuer

Bitcoin and Ethereum have no issuing entity; the validity of the assets does not depend on any institution's redemption promise. If the on-chain ledger records the asset as yours, the asset belongs to you.

USDT and USDC are different: they are on-chain tokens issued by centralized enterprises such as Tether and Circle. Users deposit US dollars with the company, the company mints a corresponding number of tokens on-chain, and when users apply for redemption, the company burns the tokens and returns the US dollars. Therefore, the stablecoins we hold are in essence a redemption IOU written on-chain by the issuer, and this underlying attribute determines all of their operating rules.

(II) The stablecoin blacklist is a switch built into the contract

Stablecoins are minted by the issuer, and the contract is deployed and maintained by the issuer; what functions are built into the contract is set autonomously by the issuer. The contracts of USDT and USDC both embed a blacklist mechanism in advance. Once an address is placed on the blacklist, the corresponding tokens in that address cannot initiate transfers, and under USDT's rules the address simultaneously cannot receive tokens.

This mechanism does not modify the underlying public chain, nor can it roll back transactions already recorded on-chain; it merely locks the liquidity of that category of tokens in that address. Of the approximately 3750 million in assets stolen on the Ethereum chain, approximately 2400 million was frozen; of the approximately 630 million in stolen funds on the Tron chain, approximately 380 million was frozen. This is the intuitive manifestation of the blacklist in this incident.

(3) A freeze only locks up liquidity; it does not mean the funds have been recovered

The effect of a freeze is merely to prevent the illicit tokens from continuing to circulate, be cashed out and laundered; it does not automatically return the assets to the victim. For the funds to return to the hands of the rightful owner, it is usually necessary for the issuer to receive formal judicial documents, verify ownership, then burn the tokens in the blacklisted address and re-mint an equivalent amount of stablecoins to the rightful owner's new address. However, this step involves judicial proceedings and cross-border cooperation and is often far more protracted than the freeze itself.

(4) Why BTC and ETH cannot be frozen

Because BTC and ETH have no single issuing entity, naturally no one holds the blacklist switch. Once a transaction is confirmed by a block, it possesses mathematical irreversibility; there is no administrator and no customer service that can intervene in the backend or halt the transaction.

(5) The blacklist is both a loss-limitation tool and inherently controversial as to the boundaries of its power

Objectively speaking, in this incident, had the stablecoin issuer not acted urgently to freeze within a short period, the ultimate scale of losses would have been even more staggering. The blacklist mechanism is virtually the only loss-limitation tool in the current crypto industry that can be implemented quickly, and it is also the starting point for subsequent recovery of illicit assets.

But the other side likewise cannot be ignored: this control power is held in the hands of private commercial companies. In many scenarios, no prior judicial warrant is required, and a freeze can be effected without prior notice to the party concerned or a hearing, while post-hoc correction and remedy channels are also very limited. Once an erroneous determination occurs, innocent addresses will be wrongly affected; the rules and standards are not public, which also readily invites challenges of selective enforcement.

IV. How to assess the legal risks when illicit tokens flow into your address

(1) Passively receiving illicit funds at an address ≠ you constitute receiving stolen goods

Many people's first reaction is [illicit funds have entered my address—am I harboring stolen goods?]. It is not presumed so simply. Under the Criminal Law, the establishment of the offense of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds requires two core elements: subjectively, knowledge that the property is criminal proceeds and the gains therefrom; objectively, carrying out the act of harboring, transferring, purchasing, selling on behalf of another, or otherwise concealing or disguising.

Passively receiving funds on-chain precisely lacks these two core elements. This transfer was not initiated by you, and you do not even have the ability to refuse it; any user can transfer to any address—this is an inherent characteristic of the public chain protocol itself, and it does not equate to your autonomous will.

Although the Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Handling of Criminal Cases of Concealing or Disguising Criminal Proceeds and the Gains Therefrom (effective August 26, 2025) has included "receiving" and "holding" within the scope of "other methods," expanding the modes of conduct in the provisions does not mean that mere holding constitutes a crime; even if the pattern of conduct is listed, the two elements—subjective "knowledge" and conduct having the effect of concealing or disguising—must be satisfied simultaneously for the matter to fall within the scope of criminal law evaluation.

Merely receiving stolen crypto assets passively does not in itself constitute a crime; the real risk may arise from how you handle the funds after receiving them.

(II) Four typical scenarios and the corresponding handling approaches for each

1. Your wallet suddenly receives a large transfer from an unfamiliar source.

Core principle: Do not touch these funds, and in particular do not transfer them back along the original route. Initiating a transfer on-chain is an active act of transfer; once the funds are connected to illicit proceeds, you will have created a new fund trail initiated by you. Nor should you withdraw the funds, sell them via OTC, or exchange them into fiat currency and deposit the proceeds into a bank card. Channeling funds connected to a case into the bank settlement system is, in practice, the operation most likely to complicate matters.

Correct approach: Preserve the evidence in full, including screenshots of the transaction hash, transfer time, amount and sending address; you may also simultaneously apply a timestamp or on-chain evidence preservation. Keep records showing that the private key is held by you and that the transaction was not initiated by you, and where necessary, report the matter to the platform or consult a professional lawyer.

2. You had no prior knowledge, but you have already handled the funds after receiving illicit proceeds.

The dividing line for assessment is whether, at the time of handling, you knew or should have known that the funds were illicit proceeds.

If the handling occurred before you learned of the risk, and there was nothing abnormal about the transaction price or the counterparty, then the element of "knowledge" is difficult to establish. However, if you had already received a risk warning, your account had been flagged by risk controls, or the case-handling authority had already contacted you, and you nevertheless continued to transfer or liquidate the funds, it will readily be presumed that you should have known, and the nature of the matter will accordingly change.

Correct approach: Immediately stop all handling, and fully retain chat records, quotation evidence, transaction records and fund-flow records; do not delete any records. In practice, deleting communication records is often used by judicial authorities as supporting evidence for inferring subjective knowledge.

3. Your exchange account has been subjected to risk controls or frozen.

Contact the platform's customer service immediately and submit identity materials, proof of address ownership and an explanation of the source of funds, together with a full set of on-chain evidence. At the same time, maintain reasonable expectations: for domestic users using overseas exchanges, the remedies available are not smooth. Under the current regulatory policy, virtual currencies are not legal tender and the relevant business constitutes illegal financial activity; however, in judicial precedents, virtual assets may also be protected as property interests. These two sets of rules operate in parallel, and unfreezing often requires case-by-case communication and usually takes a relatively long time.

4. The police contact you, or your bank card is frozen.

First, clarify your status: whether you are being questioned as a witness or have already been listed as a criminal suspect. The two situations call for completely different approaches, so be sure to verify this clearly before making any formal statement.

Under the Criminal Procedure Law, investigative authorities may, as needed for handling a case, inquire into and freeze property involved in the case; however, a freeze is only a compulsory investigative measure and does not amount to a conviction, nor will it be automatically lifted simply because no case has been opened.

Correct approach: cooperating with an investigation does not mean making statements at will. For legal characterization issues such as "whether you knew" and "the reason for receiving the funds," it is advisable to sort out a complete timeline before responding, and to consult a lawyer first where necessary; submit on-chain evidence and materials on the transaction background; do not dispose of assets on your own that have already been frozen or are suspected of being involved in the case.

Conclusion

The recent Binance hack has brought the long-standing contradictions in the Web3 world into the open. On the one hand, we champion code trustworthiness, code is law, and on-chain autonomy; on the other hand, when assets are infringed, we have no choice but to rely on the centralized remedial system of stablecoin issuers' blacklists, platform risk controls, and judicial authorities' recovery of illicit gains. The one-click freeze function of stablecoins is currently the most powerful tool for recovering illicit gains and stopping losses, yet it also undermines the romantic imagination of a blockchain that is fully decentralized and free from intervention at the current stage.

The road for the Web3 world is still long, but it will ultimately be reached!


"Disclaimer: The content of this article is intended only for legal education and does not constitute any legal advice or legal consultation. Reading or forwarding this article does not create any lawyer-client relationship. Individual legal issues are highly specific, and it is recommended that you obtain professional legal advice from a practicing lawyer regarding your specific circumstances."