Hello, dual-wheel-drive Web3 company.

Many years ago, doing a blockchain project involved an almost tacit "entry ritual"—first running off to some offshore jurisdiction to register a foundation, writing "non-profit," "open source," and "transparent" in the white paper, and repeatedly emphasizing "community governance" and "distributed autonomy" during roadshows. With a foundation as an endorsement, it looked quite the part. But after a decade, you will find a more interesting and more realistic trend: foundations are no longer the "orthodox posture"; project teams have begun to actively embrace the corporate form, and even directly put tokens into the financial statements of listed companies.

Whether it is Conflux injecting core assets through the Hong Kong-listed company Leading Pharma, or Tron taking over the Nasdaq small-cap company SRM Entertainment through a reverse merger and renaming it "Tron Inc.," or Sui pushing a US-listed company to allocate a massive amount of SUI tokens for treasury management, Web3 projects have shifted course and, with the help of traditional capital markets, completed a new way of realizing valuation. And right in this trend of "turning from ideals to transactions," Nasdaq's proactive application to the SEC to list tokenized stocks has handed the entire industry one final "compliance key," ready to open the last ajar door between "crypto assets" and "mainstream finance."

 

The ideal shell has been replaced by the shell of the capital market

On July 28 of this year, the US-listed company Mill City Ventures III announced the completion of a 450 million US dollar private placement, explicitly stating that it would allocate a large proportion of the raised funds to SUI tokens, transforming intothe "SUI treasury strategy"On August 25, the company further announceda name change to "SUI Group Holdings" and a change of ticker to SUIGOn September 2, they disclosedholding 101800 thousand SUI tokens(approximately 332 million US dollars at that day's price). This is an extremely clear path: put "tokens" into the "listed company" basket, and use annual reports, audits, and shareholder meetings to carry the part of the rights, responsibilities, and assets that were originally held under the foundation's name but could not be clearly explained. It is worth noting that this is no longer the drama of "the Sui Foundation acquiring a listed shell," but rather the listed company actively turning around, using brand reshaping and asset structure adjustment to connect with the SUI ecosystem—the path design is completely different from the early "foundation master key."

In early September,The Conflux Foundation has initiated a governance proposal to authorize its ecosystem fund to enter into treasury/fiscal cooperation with 'listed companies,' and proposes constraints including a lock-up period of no less than four years.This is not a news gimmick of 'announcing who is acquiring whom,' but rather a public and explicit incorporation of 'dealing with listed companies' into the governance process, meaning that token management, capital arrangements and ecosystem support will gradually migrate into a framework more readily understood and accommodated by traditional finance. The areas where the foundation's approach was 'ambiguous' in fundraising, compliance, custody and reputational endorsement have found a more robust vehicle.

And on September 8, Nasdaq took an even more critical step. Nasdaq proactively filed an application with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), explicitly seeking approval to list tokenized stocks. The significance of this step goes far beyond 'the exchange adding a new trading category': once the SEC grants final approval, the thousands of listed companies currently on Nasdaq could in theory complete the tokenization of their shares in a short period of time, achieving a painless migration on-chain. This would be the first time the U.S. national market system formally embraces blockchain underlying technology, equivalent to a breakthrough at the institutional level that truly opens up the barrier between Wall Street's traditional financial system and the crypto world, moving toward deep integration. Behind this, stablecoins would naturally become the optimal settlement medium, with demand set to grow explosively, reserving liquidity for the implementation of tokenized stocks. And STO (security token offering) exchanges, which had been testing the edges of compliance, would no longer be confined to niche assets, but could instead absorb the compliance demand spilling over from Wall Street, and might even become the 'core hub' connecting traditional securities and crypto assets.

 

Back to the underlying logic: why are foundations exiting?

First, the structural conflict between for-profit and non-profit.

Foundations wear the cloak of 'non-profit,' but the vast majority of project teams are entrepreneurs, not institutions writing academic papers. The essence of entrepreneurship is to create cash flow, to provide incentives, and to retain talent. Yet foundations are inherently unsuited to equity/option incentives, and it is inconvenient to transparently attribute the gains from 'token appreciation' to individuals or operating entities. This leads to a contradictory situation: nominally a 'public welfare organization,' but in practice 'commercialization in disguised form,' and still having to 'time the market and sell' at market peaks to sustain operations. The later the stage, the more difficult the dilemma.

TakingEthereum Foundation(EF)as a reference, financial reports published in 2024 show that the EF's treasury assets were approximately 970 million, of which789 million were crypto assets, the vast majority denominated in ETH; compared with the1600 milliondisclosed in 2022, over the two yearsa contraction of approximately 39%(the combined result of market volatility and expenditures). This does not mean the EF has "run into problems," but it reminds us that:the Foundation's finances are not equivalent to the ecosystem's commercial capabilities, nor are they equivalent to the ability to place a chain's commercialization and compliance within a framework that regulators can understand. In reality, what drives the expansion of the Ethereum ecosystem is a group of incorporated teams: L2 projects, infrastructure developers, development tools and service providers, rather than the Foundation itself.

Second, governance efficiency and the boundaries of responsibility.

DAO voting sounds wonderful, but commercial competition waits for no one. A parameter upgrade, an ecosystem incentive, a market window—many of these must often be measured in "hours." Governance by the Foundation and the DAO frequently requires going through procedures, canvassing votes, and further discussion; what ultimately gets done is, in all likelihood, merely a "compromise version." By contrast, under the corporate model: the board of directors, the shareholders' meeting, and management each perform their own functions, the decision-making chain is clear, and when problems arise, it is clear who is responsible.Speed and accountability: this is where the corporate model is inherently superior to the foundation model.

Third, compliance identity and capacity for dialogue.

What regulators require has never been "whether you are an idealist," but rather"who is responsible," "how the finances are calculated," and "how client assets are custodied."For example, the Hong Kong SFC's licensing requirements for virtual asset trading platforms directly take a "company" as the applicant entity, setting standards and procedures around custody, compliance, audit, and risk management. If you go to negotiate a license, a banking partnership, or entrusted supervision with a foundation, it is very difficult; if you go with a listed company, the logic connects instantly.This is not a contest of technology, but a dialogue between institutional languages.

 

It will be more intuitive to view these three developments along a timeline.

2017, when, amid the ICO wave, “foundation = orthodoxy” was almost an industry consensus;around 2020, the Tezos Foundation reached a class action settlement over ICO disputes for25 millionUS dollars, which to some extent sounded a warning about the “foundation as shield”: even if you call yourself a “foundation,” that does not mean you can circumvent securities regulation.2022—2024, regulators in various countries successively improved their frameworks: US regulatory enforcement intensity increased, and Singapore and Hong Kong introduced clearer licensing and prudential rules. By2025, SUI had connected the entire chain of “token—listed company—financial reports—capital markets,” and Conflux had written “cooperation with listed companies” into its governance agenda. The industry’s discursive power shifted from the “foundation myth” to the “corporate reality.”

Having come this far in the story, you can probably already accept one conclusion:The foundation is not 'bad'; it simply cannot solve today's core problems.Projects need efficiency, financing, organizational incentives, dealings with banks, auditors, broker-dealers and exchanges, and entry into valuation and risk-management systems that traditional finance understands. A foundation is a 'container for a vision'; a company is the 'container for transactions.' Once a blockchain project truly enters the stage of 'deep coupling with traditional finance,' that container must be replaced.

 

As the narrative shifts, how should enterprises position themselves in the era of on-chain Wall Street?

Looking back at SUI's 'corporate treasury' route: it is not 'a technology company borrowing a shell to go public,' but ratheran existing listed company proactively aligning its asset side, brand side and governance side with SUI—first raising money (private placement), then acquiring tokens (building a position), then changing its name (brand merger), and finally explaining clearly in public disclosures'what we hold, under what rules it is measured, and how it affects net asset value per share'This gives institutional investors a familiar coordinate system:what you invest in is a company, and part of its book assets is a certain public blockchain's token.Thus, the trust that originally relied on a foundation's 'endorsement' is replaced by audits, annual reports and board resolutions. This shift 'from ideals to accounting' is one of the industry milestones most worth remembering in 2025.

Now look atConflux: it did not directly take the old path of 'who merges with whom,' but instead put“Fiscal cooperation with listed companies”should be framed as governance authorization, withlong lock-up periodsand other “prudent constraints that traditional capital can understand.” The value of this step lies not in “news headlines,” but in bringing“ecosystem treasury—listed company—lock-up period—consideration arrangements”these four matters into public governance discussion. Procedurally, you acknowledge thatsuch cooperation is an important lever for ecosystem development, while using long lock-ups and governance processes to manage the risk of “short-term gaming.” For a domestic public blockchain, this is pragmatic.

These explorations by SUI and Conflux are, in essence, building scattered “small bridges” for “crypto assets to connect with traditional finance.” Only with the implementation of Nasdaq’s move are these small bridges truly linked into a traversable “main artery.”“Tokens entering financial statements—equity tokenization—mainstream trading”the three are linked into a replicable industry paradigm: SUI breaks ground on “crypto assets entering real entities,” Conflux explores “public chain compliance connecting with real entities,” and Nasdaq supplies the final link of “tokenized assets entering mainstream trading scenarios.” The integration of crypto and traditional finance thus shifts from case-by-case exploration to an implementation process supported by clear rules. This also strips the vague endorsement of “offshore foundations” of its irreplaceability, marking the industry’s true entry into the stage of “institutional framework + technological advantage,” and the flexibility and confidence of institutional participation will also increase substantially.

A friend asked:The Ethereum Foundation is still around, and so is the Solana Foundation. So how can anyone speak of the "demise of foundations"? By "demise" I do not mean the dissolution of legal entities, but rathera change of protagonists in the industry narrative。

. In the Ethereum ecosystem, the incremental growth you can actually perceive comes from a cohort of incorporated teams — L2s, Rollups, data availability layers, client and developer tooling companies, KYC compliance service providers, and financial technology firms handling clearing and settlement —growth and employment happen within companies, not within the foundations' financial statements.Foundations will continue to do several "someone has to do it" public-interest tasks: basic research, public goods funding, education and community. But they are no longer the protagonists of commercialization and the capital markets — that is what I mean by "demise".

This "change of roles" has also changedthe relationship between projects and capital. In the foundation era, what was invested in was"vision + consensus". In the corporate era, what is invested in is "capability + cash flow". Vision has not depreciated, but it must be placed into a structure that can be audited and held accountable. For startup teams, this is actually a good thing:incentives are clearer, financing is smoother, and business terms are more negotiable.For regulators and banks, it is easier to understand:who to look to, who to examine, and who to penalize.For the secondary market, the valuation anchor is also more stable:with annual reports and net asset value per share, there is "volatility that can be clearly explained."

The foundation is an ideal vessel for a generation of crypto participants, carrying the early romance of "autonomy" and respect for "open source." But the industry has moved past the stage where "ideals alone are enough to move forward." What we need now are "institutional interfaces" that can connect with banks and auditors, "legal interfaces" that can accommodate treasury and team incentives, and "governance interfaces" that can enter the capital markets while withstanding the cost of failure.The corporate form happens to provide these interfaces.This is not "the end of ideals," but rather "ideals finding a more suitable vessel."

You may worry: "Does decentralization then bid farewell?" I am not pessimistic. Decentralization is a question ofnetwork structure and ownership structure, while corporatization is a question ofgovernance efficiency and external dialogue. The two do not conflict. On the contrary, when the custody, bookkeeping, disclosure, and risk management of tokens are placed within the order of company law and securities law,The antifragility of networksmay be stronger: bad debts, malicious conduct and improper benefit transfers are more easily identified and punished. The direction of international regulation is also emphasizing this point:make clear “who is responsible”, and then discuss how technology can serve financial infrastructure.

For enterprises, a compliant equity structure enables engagement with institutional capital and improvement of governance systems, laying a solid “compliance foundation” for Web3 deployment; Token incentives, in turn, play the role of “activating the ecosystem and binding consensus,” but they are no longer the model of disorderly issuance by foundations in earlier years—they are an “ecosystem lubricant” deeply tied to the enterprise’s business and subject to compliance constraints.

The dual-wheel drive of a Web3 company can achieve “1+1>2” synergy: the compliance and financial strength brought by equity financing give Token incentives the “confidence to be implemented.” Together, the two point toward a mature form characterized by “clear books and a healthy ecosystem,” enabling enterprises in their Web3 deployment neither to deviate from the compliance track nor to miss the dividends of ecosystem innovation.

Finally,Farewell, crypto world foundations.

Hello, dual-wheel-drive Web3 companies.