This is my 68th reading note of 2026. The book I am reading today is Nudge (Nudge), co-authored by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein—a classic work that brought behavioral economics from the laboratory into the real world.
The chapter on "anchoring and adjustment" had me marveling—the authors used a particularly vivid example: they asked people from Chicago and people from Green Bay to guess the population of Milwaukee. The Chicagoans, anchored at 3 million, guessed 1 million; the Green Bay residents, anchored at 100 thousand, guessed 300 thousand. The true answer is 590 thousand—neither side guessed correctly, but their directions were entirely skewed by their respective anchors.
An even more absurd experiment: students were asked to use the last three digits of their mobile phone numbers to "anchor" the time when Attila the Hun ravaged Europe; students with higher anchors gave answers more than 300 years later than the actual date (452 AD).
Anchors are like an "invisible manipulator" that sneaks quietly into your brain. It does not need to have any relationship with the facts; as long as it appears before you first and takes precedence, it can distort your judgment.
This makes me think of an extremely realistic scenario—negotiating the terms of divorceThis may be one of the most complex, most emotional, and most strategy-testing negotiations an ordinary person faces in their lifetime. And the anchoring effect is precisely the sharpest and most dangerous weapon in this negotiation.
Today I want to combine the anchoring heuristic from Nudge to talk about how, in divorce negotiations, to proactively establish your own anchor and how to avoid being skewed by the other party's anchor.
I. Why the anchoring effect is especially dangerous in divorce negotiations
Nudge states it very clearly:"The deviation occurs because adjustment is usually insufficient."
You have a starting point in mind (an anchor), and then you adjust in the direction you believe to be correct. But the problem is that your adjustment is never sufficient. As in the Milwaukee example, the anchors on the two sides differ, and the final answers both deviate from the true value, yet both remain within the "gravitational range" of their respective anchors.
Why is divorce negotiation particularly prone to this trap? Three reasons:
First, emotion amplifies the power of the anchor. Nudge mentions that if you first ask "How long has it been since you went on a date?" and then ask "How happy are you?", the correlation jumps from 0.11 to 0.62. Why? Because the first question installs a "heuristic filter" in the brain, causing people, when answering the second question, to be unwittingly held captive by the framework of the first question. In divorce negotiation, if the other party first throws out an extreme condition ("The house goes to me, the children go to me, and you pay 20,000 per month in child support"), your entire psychological framework will be locked in by that condition, and all subsequent counteroffers will circle within its gravitational range.
Second, information asymmetry. One party may have a better understanding of the full picture of the family assets, while the other party may not even know how much savings the other has or what investments there are. The party with more information is naturally able to set a more favorable anchor.
Third, time pressure. Divorce negotiation is often accompanied by enormous life uncertainty—where to live, what to do about the children, whether the source of income will be cut off. This pressure makes people eager to "get it over with", and people who are eager to get it over with never adjust sufficiently.
II. How to proactively establish your own anchor
The example of taxi drivers in Nudge is particularly illuminating. When paying by card, the tip options on the screen started at 15%, 20%, and 25%, rather than the traditional 15%. As a result, the average tip level rose directly. Later, researchers compared two sets of default options: one set was 15%, 20%, 25%, and the other was 20%, 25%, 30%.The latter set significantly increased drivers' income.
The core logic is this:Whoever makes the first offer sets the anchor.
In divorce negotiations, strategies for establishing an anchor operate at several levels:
\1. Plant the seeds of the anchor during the information-gathering stage
Before negotiations have formally begun, you are in fact already "anchoring." Numbers mentioned casually in everyday conversation, assessments of the value of a particular asset, and expressions of preference regarding child custody arrangements will all become implicit anchors for the subsequent formal negotiations.
For example, during the consultation process, you can naturally mention: "I have looked into this apartment; recent transaction prices in the same residential compound are around 8 million." Whether or not the other party accepts this statement, the figure of 8 million has already entered their frame of reference.
\2. The first formal offer should be "high" (if you are the party asserting rights)
Nudge puts it plainly:"There is evidence that, within a legitimate and reasonable range, the more people ask for, the more they tend to get." A skilled negotiator opens with an extremely high price, and the other party then rushes to settle at half of that exorbitant figure, still feeling they have gotten a great deal.
In divorce negotiations, if you are the party seeking property or custody, your first offer should be 20%-30% higher than your true expectation. This is not an exorbitant demand, but rather leaves room for subsequent "adjustment."
For example: if you consider a reasonable child support amount to be 8,000 yuan per month, your first offer should be set at 10,000-12,000 yuan. When the other party counters at 7,000 yuan, you then "concede" to 8,000 yuan, and both sides feel a compromise has been reached. But if your first offer is 8,000 yuan and the other party counters at 5,000 yuan, you may ultimately have to accept only 6,000 yuan.
The anchor determines the "gravitational field" of the negotiation.
\3. The anchor must be "legitimate and reasonable" and must not be so outrageous that it triggers reactance
Nudge contains an extremely important warning:"If you are too greedy, you will very likely end up with nothing for all your efforts."
In the taxi experiment, the second group of drivers set the default tip options at 20%, 25% and 30%. Although the average tip increased, some passengers were deterred by the exaggerated default options and simply chose not to tip at all. This is related to the "reactance" in behavioral economics—if people find themselves being ordered around, they may become greatly annoyed.
In divorce negotiations, if one party makes clearly unreasonable demands (for example, earning a monthly salary of 20,000 yet demanding that the other party pay 30,000 per month in child support, or concealing most of the assets yet demanding an equal split of the remaining small portion), the other party will not only refuse to accept them, but may also abandon the negotiation entirely and proceed directly to litigation. Once litigation is initiated, the advantage of the anchoring effect is substantially weakened—the judge will not care where your anchor is.
A good anchor = slightly above a reasonable expectation + supported by sufficient reasons + does not trigger the other party's reactance.
III. How to prevent being locked in by the other party's anchor
The core insight in Nudge is:An anchor does not need to have any logical connection to the facts; as long as it appears first, it can distort your judgment.
This means that the first number the other party throws out, no matter how outrageous, will plant an anchor in your mind. What you need to do is actively "pull up the anchor."
\1. Set your own "independent valuation" in advance
The lesson from the Milwaukee experiment in Nudge is this: if you do not have your own independent judgment, you will be led entirely by the anchor.
Before divorce negotiations, you need your own "independent valuation" for each core issue:
- What is the total household assets (real estate, deposits, wealth-management products, equity, housing provident fund, and cash value of insurance)
- What is the market value of each asset
- What is the actual monthly cost of raising the child
- What is your minimum acceptable bottom line
With an independent valuation, the other party's anchor becomes "reference information" rather than a "starting point for decision-making."
\2. Use "re-anchoring" to offset the other party's anchor
If the other party bids first and the terms are extreme, do not bargain directly on that number. What you need to do isput forward your own anchor, to pull the negotiation back into your framework.
For example, the other party says: "The house goes to me, and I will compensate you 500 thousand." (Assuming the house is worth 5 million)
You should not say: "500 thousand is too little, make it 1 million." (This would acknowledge that 500 thousand is a reasonable starting point.)
You should say: "The market value of the house is around 5 million, and under the principle of equal division of community property, I should receive 2500 thousand. Considering that the child lives with you, I can accept 2 million, but 500 thousand is completely unrealistic."
You reset the anchor—pulling it back from 500 thousand to a range of 2000 thousand to 2500 thousand.
\3. Use an "anchor to the anchor" to counter an anchor
In Nudge, there is the example of lawyers suing large corporations: they successfully set the jury's anchor at the sky-high point of the "corporation's annual revenue."
In divorce negotiations, you can introducethird-party reference pointsto establish an anchor. For example:
- "In division cases involving similar properties in the same area, compensation is usually based on 50% of the market price."
- "According to court precedents, child support in such circumstances is usually between 20% and 30% of monthly income."
- "Under the Marriage Law, premarital property is not included in the division, so this portion should..."
Introducing legal provisions, market data, and precedents as an "anchor to the anchor" can effectively offset the other party's subjective anchor.
\4. Beware the trap of the "default option"
Nudge repeatedly emphasizes the power of the default option. The preset tip percentages on taxi card payment terminals are an example of using a default option to nudge behavior.
In divorce negotiations, the other party may, early in the negotiation, put forward some "seemingly reasonable" default frameworks:
- "Of course the child stays with me, because you're busy with work." (This defaults the allocation of custody.)
- "The house stays with the child; neither of us should sell it." (This defaults that the property cannot be liquidated and divided.)
- "You can pick whatever you want from the things at home; the rest goes to me." (This defaults that the "rest" is the bulk.)
Do not accept any "default option" that you have not actively evaluated yourself. Break each one down and ask yourself: Is this default framework favorable or unfavorable to me? If it is unfavorable, proactively propose an alternative.
IV. The "gentle use" of the anchoring effect in divorce negotiations
There is a sentence in Nudge that is particularly worth savoring:"A gentle nudge is still a nudge."
The anchoring effect is not necessarily a confrontational tool of head-on opposition. In a highly emotional setting such as divorce negotiations, you can also use a "gentle anchor" to guide both parties toward a more rational outcome.
For example:
- When discussing child custody, first put forward the anchor of "the child's best interests" rather than "my rights." This way, the framework for subsequent discussion shifts from "contesting" to "co-creating."
- When discussing the division of property, first anchor on "fairness" and "efficiency" (for example, "rather than spending hundreds of thousands on attorney fees in litigation, we could leave that money to our child"), which can reduce the other party's adversarial mindset.
- When discussing timing, first anchor on a specific and urgent deadline ("I hope we can settle this before the child starts school"), using a time anchor to drive decision-making.
V. Final Thoughts
The core idea of the book Nudge is "libertarian paternalism"—guiding people toward better decisions by designing choice architecture, without depriving them of their right to choose.
The anchoring effect is one of the most hidden yet powerful tools in choice architecture. It does not need to force you; it only needs to appear before you first to distort your judgment.
In divorce negotiations—one of life's hardest conversations—understanding the anchoring effect can give you at least three things:
First, knowing where your own anchor is. Prepare an independent valuation in advance so that the other party's numbers do not become your starting point.
Second, learning to set a reasonable anchor. Ask for slightly more within a legitimate range to leave room for adjustment, but not so much as to trigger reactance.
Third, identify the other party's anchor and proactively pull it up. Do not accept the other party's first number; use re-anchoring, third-party references, and breaking down default options to bring the negotiation back onto a fair track.
Thaler says in the book: "If people find themselves being ordered around, they may become quite annoyed—tell me to go east, and I will insist on going west."
In divorce negotiations, do not let the other party's anchor become the steering wheel of your life.
Drawing on the anchoring heuristic in Nudge (by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein), this article uses divorce-terms negotiation as a scenario to explore the application of the anchoring effect in real life. This is the 68th reading note of 2026, provided solely for thinking inspiration and not constituting legal advice. Please consult a professional lawyer for specific legal issues.

