This is my 69th reading note of 2026. The book I am sharing today is Serhii Plokhy's The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union (also translated as The Collapse of a Great Power).

After finishing it, my biggest takeaway can be summed up in one sentence:

Unfinished matters will resurface in a more intense and uncontrollable manner, until you regain control of the direction, or both go down together. This holds true for nations and for individuals alike. The conclusion is that neither the Russia-Ukraine conflict nor the Middle East conflict will end any time soon; the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union was accompanied by a slow and painful aftermath. Extending this to the economic and investment spheres affected by macro politics, one should adopt pessimistic expectations and can only position for short-term dislocations and long-term undervalued areas.

From the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 to the Russia-Ukraine conflict still burning today, you will find that the Cold War never truly ended; it was merely temporarily covered with a lid.

First, a disclaimer: much of this book's content differs from what I previously understood, and can be called counterintuitive. This may be because the author is American and his perspective differs from our previous socialist viewpoint. While reading this book, some readers' comments mentioned the oblique style of writing, somewhat like Ezra Vogel's Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China. Nevertheless, understanding perspectives from different angles is also the value of this book.


I. The Soviet Union did not die a "natural death"; rather, two men turned off the lights

The most counterintuitive view in the book is:

What determined the fate of the world's last empire was not American policy, not the collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and not the abstract contradiction between the center and the localities,but the relationship between the two largest republics, Russia and Ukraine.

On December 8, 1991, in a small forest cabin in the Białowieża Forest in Belarus, Yeltsin and Kravchuk sat down to discuss Gorbachev's proposed new union plan. They could not reach an agreement, so the two decided: no more playing along, the Soviet Union would disband, and a Commonwealth of Independent States would be established.

Belarus and the Central Asian countries simply could not imagine a "Soviet Union without Russia," and no one was willing to accept a Soviet Union "without Russia, without Ukraine, and still led by Gorbachev." So they followed suit.

In other words:

The Soviet Union was not defeated by the United States, nor was it overthrown by the people overnight; rather, the Russian and Ukrainian political elites were no longer willing to seek solutions within the same state framework and, in passing, dissolved it.

George H. W. Bush's contribution was not 'bringing down the Soviet Union,' but rather ensuring that this process did not lead to nuclear war or weapons proliferation—keeping that gun on the stage under control.


II. The Final Four Months Were More Critical Than the Previous Seventy Years

Plokhy focuses his lens on the final four months, from August 19 to December 21, 1991.

  • August: Conservatives launched the 'August 19 Coup' in an attempt to save the Soviet Union;
  • Result: The coup failed, Gorbachev's authority existed in name only, and Yeltsin seized the spotlight;
  • Afterward: Independence movements in the republics avalanched;
  • December 8: At Belovezha, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus declared that 'the Soviet Union is gone';
  • December 21: At the Alma-Ata meeting, Soviet leaders acknowledged reality;
  • December 25: Gorbachev resigned, and the red flag came down.

The book relies on top-secret archives from the George H. W. Bush Library, telephone records and interviews with participants, focusing on four individuals:

Bush, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Kravchuk.

When you finish reading, you will find:

The collapse of a great power cannot be dismissed with the four words "historical inevitability"; it is the result of a series of misjudgments, face-saving, lust for power, fear, and unwillingness to compromise, layered one upon another.


III. Gorbachev's Tragedy: Wanting Reform, Also Wanting to Preserve the Country

In the traditional narrative, Gorbachev is often portrayed as the "gravedigger of the Soviet Union." Plokhy writes with greater complexity:

He wanted the Soviet Union to survive, but to survive in a new way—

glasnost, reform, military reductions, and détente with the West.

The problem arose:

  • Party conservatives thought he was selling out the country;
  • the military thought disarmament had not secured equivalent concessions from the United States;
  • Russian elites thought he was all talk;
  • Ukrainian elites thought, "Why should we still listen to Moscow?"

He was stuck in the middle:

Move forward, and the reformers complain it is too slow; move backward, and the conservatives want to turn back the clock; move downward, and the republics want independence.

The greatest irony is this: the more he tried to preserve the Soviet Union, the more he drove the people within it to start over on their own.


IV. Yeltsin and Kravchuk: If They Did Not Want to Renovate the House Together, They Tore It Down

The most central relationship in the book is not that between the United States and the Soviet Union, nor that between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, but ratherYeltsin and Kravchuk.

Russia wanted to escape the constraints of the center, while Ukraine feared being swallowed back by Russia.

Two peoples, two elites, two kinds of fear, colliding with one another.

The new union treaty could not be negotiated, not because of "technical details," but because neither side trusted the other:

  • Moscow did not trust Kyiv to dutifully hand over taxes and power;
  • Kyiv did not trust Moscow not to send the tanks back in one day.

And so the easiest solution appeared:

No more renovation; let us go our separate ways.

But some things cannot be dispersed—

borders, ethnicity, language, the military, nuclear weapons, the Black Sea Fleet, Crimea.

These were not resolved in 1991; they were merely temporarily covered over by the three words "Commonwealth of Independent States."


V. Why I Say: The Cold War Did Not End; It Merely Moved to Another Room

We were taught from childhood that "the Cold War ended in 1991."

But looking back from 2026, a more accurate statement is:

The confrontational logic of the Cold War did not end; it merely shifted from "capitalism vs. socialism" to "spheres of influence vs. sovereign security," "the Russian-speaking world vs. the European order," and "Russian memory vs. Ukrainian nation-building."

Ukraine's 1991 referendum on independence was the endpoint of the Soviet Union's dissolution;

Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale war in 2022 are continued examinations of the same question.

That question is:

When an empire dissolves, will the identities, borders and sense of security that were never clearly negotiated later be renegotiated with artillery fire?

We have already seen the answer.


Six: Bring the Lens Back to the Individual: Unfinished Business Will Come Back to Find You

The most striking thing about this book is not that it discusses great powers, but that it quietly mirrors every person's life:

  • A boundary left unspoken in a relationship will later be made up for through arguments;
  • Grievances left unaddressed in a job will later be made up for through resignation, depression, and internal friction;
  • A fear left un faced in a choice will later be made up for at a greater cost.

A state that puts off dealing with trust issues until it disintegrates pays the price in territory, war, and a generation;

An individual who puts off dealing with relationship issues until collapse pays the price in health, time, and self.

What is not resolved peacefully does not disappear; it only appreciates—and the interest is suffering.


Seven: Three Judgments This Book Gave Me

  1. The disintegration of a great power is not an ending, but the reissuance of unresolved contradictions. The Soviet Union was finished, but a Russian-European security architecture was never built, so the sequel to the Cold War has kept filming to this day.
  2. The most fatal split often occurs between "the two brothers who should most have stood together." Russia and Ukraine, the center and the republics, idealists and pragmatists—each believed it represented history, and in the end they smashed history together.
  3. The same is true for individuals: do not put off until a crisis the accounts that should be settled through negotiation. The cheapest time is when you can sit down and talk about boundaries, money, dignity, and fear.

VIII. Conclusion

Plokhy was writing about 1991, but the book should really be titled "On Stage and Behind the Scenes"—

On stage were the fall of the red flag, the leaders' speeches, and the signing of documents;

Behind the scenes were who distrusted whom, who feared whom, and who refused to take the first step back.

The real lesson of the collapse of the Soviet Union is not that "empires will fall."

It is this:

When people within a system no longer believe that "we can solve the problems together," they will solve them through dissolution, confrontation, and war.

This is true of nations, of marriages, of teams, and of the inner self.

The unfinished Soviet Union became the unended Cold War.

The unfinished you will also, on some late night, reunite with yourself in a more intense way.