This is my 58th reading note of 2026. Today I am sharing the book Why Exchange Rates Are Actually So Simple. Let us continue looking at the path Japan has taken, and at what we can learn from and avoid (Uniqlo's sudden wealth, the return of the richest man, and ordinary people's "old-age bankruptcy").

Many people may be like me: as soon as they hear "yen depreciation" and that the yen has become the world's cheapest currency, their first reaction is: it's over, Japan's economy is finished, groceries have become expensive for Japanese people, and traveling to Japan has become cheaper.
But after reading Why Exchange Rates Are Actually So Simple, I found that things are not that simple. For Japan as a whole, yen depreciation is actually
more beneficial than harmful
. And one recent development is particularly interesting: in June this year, the Bank of Japan raised interest rates again to 1%, the highest level in 30 years, yet the yen is still stuck at historic lows and has even become the world's cheapest currency!
What exactly is going on? Let me combine what I learned from the book with the latest developments and explain it in plain language.
1. Depreciation is not all bad; it can even be good for companies
You may think that the more valuable a currency is, the better, but that is not actually the case.
Japan has an indicator that surveys business sentiment, and the results reveal a pattern:
the more the yen depreciates, the easier things are for companies; when the yen appreciates, everyone instead looks worried.
Why is that?
- Exporting companies are delighted: For example, Toyota sells cars in the United States and earns US dollars, which it brings back and converts into yen. The less valuable the yen, the more yen it receives, and the better its income statement looks.
- Even domestic businesses benefit: Imported goods become more expensive, so people switch to buying domestic products. For example, vegetables grown by Japanese farmers previously could not compete with cheaper imported vegetables; now that imported vegetables have risen in price, local vegetables have become more competitive.
- The tourism industry has made a windfall: Foreigners think everything in Japan is cheap and flock there to shop and spend.
Of course, the costs are also very real:
Ordinary people's lives have become harder
Much of what Japanese people eat and use is imported. Once the yen depreciates, the prices of bread, milk and beef in supermarkets all rise. For small restaurants and 100-yen bento shops that rely on imported ingredients, costs have soared, leaving their owners miserable. Moreover, because the yen is worth less, the cost of hiring foreign workers is also higher, making the labor shortage even more serious.
So the book puts it very plainly: depreciation is generally good for the country and for companies, but bad for ordinary people's wallets.
II. The great historical pitfall: the Plaza Accord and the "lost 30 years"
For a long period after the war, the yen was in fact persistently undervalued (1 US dollar could be exchanged for 360 yen). At that time, Japan made huge profits through exports, and its economy grew rapidly.
But by 1985, the Americans had had enough. Japanese goods were too cheap, and America's domestic automobile and home-appliance industries had been completely undercut. The public was loud in its complaints, and a movement to "boycott Japanese goods" even emerged. The United States then brought Japan to the table to sign the Plaza Accord, forcibly depreciating the US dollar and appreciating the Japanese yen.
Japan panicked at the time, fearing its companies would not survive, so the government began spending money frantically on infrastructure and real estate. The result was too much money, which blew up a massive bubble; when the bubble burst, it produced the famous "lost 30 years."
The book contains a very profound insight:
An exchange rate is not inherently good or bad in itself; what matters is whether you can absorb the shock it brings.
III. Japan Has in Fact Quietly "Changed the Way It Makes a Living"
This is, in my view, the most impressive finding in the book.
In the past, Japan mainly made money by "manufacturing goods itself and selling them abroad" (a trade surplus). But that is no longer the case.
Starting in the 1990s, the yen kept appreciating, forcing Japanese companies to move factories abroad or to acquire companies and buy shares overseas. Toyota, for example, built plants in the United States, hired people in US dollars, bought materials in US dollars, and sold cars in US dollars; much of the money it earned was never converted back into yen but was reinvested locally.
The result is this:
The bulk of Japan's earnings today no longer comes from "selling goods" but from "interest and dividends on overseas assets."
Japan long ago changed from "a country that makes money by selling goods" into "a country that collects rent through overseas investment."
This leads to a rather surreal result: even if Japan itself runs a trade deficit (buying more than it sells), the country as a whole still runs a surplus, because overseas subsidiaries keep "sending money back" (or, put another way, keep generating money abroad).
IV. What Are "Good Depreciation" and "Bad Depreciation"?
The book specifically discusses these two concepts, which are particularly useful. Whether depreciation is good can be judged by two points:
- Is it fast or not?: Gradual depreciation gives enterprises time to adjust prices, which is a good thing; a sudden plunge leaves enterprises unable to react in time, resulting in severe losses.
- What is the cause?: If the depreciation results from everyone being optimistic about the Japanese economy and enterprises earning more, it is benign; if it is passive depreciation dragged down by external troubles and taking a beating, it is malignant.
Speaking of this, we must mention what happened on June 16 of this year.
The Bank of Japan raised interest rates to
1%
, the highest level since 1995! Logically, when a country raises interest rates, money becomes more valuable, and the yen should rise. What was the result?
The yen did not rise at all and remained hovering around 162 (162 yen per US dollar), just a tiny bit away from its historical low.
Why did it not rise even after the rate hike? Measuring it with the ruler from the book makes it clear:
- The driver is passiveThe Bank of Japan's rate hike this time was not a proactive move prompted by an exceptionally strong economy, but rather a forced one: domestic prices have risen too sharply (energy and food have all become more expensive), and without a rate hike the public would be in revolt.
- The pace was fast.In just over a year, the yen fell from around 150 to 162, a decline of nearly 8%.
- External factors are holding it back.The interest rate gap between the United States and Japan remains large (a difference of 2.5%), so money naturally flows to the United States, where interest rates are higher. Add to that the war in the Middle East keeping oil prices persistently high, and the yen, a "safe-haven currency," has instead fallen out of favor.
So this is a classic case of
"malignant depreciation"
—although the Bank of Japan has worked hard to raise rates, its efforts are too small to withstand the strong external headwinds.
The book listed several risks at the time, and in hindsight they were remarkably accurate:
- Problems with U.S. fiscal policy: the government owes too much money, which could cause the dollar to fall.
- War in the Middle East: Capital fled to the US dollar for safety, and the yen depreciated instead. In April of this year, the Bank of Japan originally intended to raise interest rates, but this was interrupted by the Middle East situation, and the hike was delayed until June.
- Trump took office: The book specifically analyzes what would happen if Trump were re-elected — he favors "America First" and might pressure the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates and push down the US dollar. It turned out that Trump did win, and he is still stirring up the Federal Reserve.
There is a very interesting conjecture: back then, the United States pressured Japan into signing the Plaza Accord to make the yen appreciate; could it now be the reverse — because the yen is too weak and is wrecking the Japanese economy, the United States might in the future instead give Japan a helping hand and arrange a "reverse Plaza Accord" to help the yen recover some strength? We onlookers can keep watching this.
VI. What inspiration does this offer for ordinary people's investments?
Having said so much about Japan, what does it have to do with us? Combining the logic in the book with the current situation, here are a few plain-language suggestions:
\1. Don't casually "borrow yen to speculate in US stocks" anymore
There used to be a seemingly surefire way to make money: borrow yen at almost no interest, convert it into US dollars, and buy US Treasury bonds or US stocks, earning the interest rate differential in between. But now Japan is raising interest rates, and the United States is also on the path of cutting rates; the interest rate differential between the two sides is getting smaller and smaller, and the yen could rebound at any time. What used to be "risk-free money" now carries much more risk — don't touch it casually.
\2. Traveling to Japan/buying property there is indeed a good time now, but don't be greedy
The yen is around 160, which counts as very cheap. For genuine needs (such as studying abroad, buying property, or traveling), you can exchange some, but don't think about "bottom-fishing and hoarding yen," because even if the Bank of Japan raises rates to 1.5%, that would be the end of it, and in the short term the yen will find it hard to rise substantially.
But for safety reasons, I personally would not travel to Japan. Those who are not afraid can go.
\3. A-share investment depends on the exchange rate's mood
If the renminbi appreciates against the US dollar (for example, it broke through 7 some time ago), export businesses (clothing, home appliances, machinery) will find things difficult, because their goods become more expensive when sold abroad.
Conversely, the pressure on airlines (which owe a mountain of US dollar debt) and paper mills (which buy imported pulp) will ease.
Although gold and US dollar assets may not look so attractive in the short term, keeping a little for protection over the long term is never a bad idea.
\4. Invest in overseas funds on a regular basis, and exchange currency when the renminbi is strong
When the renminbi is strong, the cost of exchanging for US dollars is low; investing in US stocks or broad-based overseas indices on a regular basis at such times is equivalent to getting a discount.
A few final honest words
There is a sentence in the book that is particularly suitable as a conclusion:
Exchange rates are not absolutely good or bad; there are only two criteria: "speed" and "cause."
The Bank of Japan raised rates to 1%, yet the yen is still stuck at 162 — this shows that Japan's rate hike cycle, from beginning to end, was set in motion only because it was being "roasted over the fire" by prices and the exchange rate, not because the economy was truly strong enough to tighten proactively. This situation of "taking a passive beating" will be very difficult to reverse completely in the short term.
For ordinary people like us, it is enough to understand this logic:
Do not be frightened by short-term exchange rate fluctuations, and do not blindly bet on one-way market moves. Benign changes can be held; for malign changes, remember to hedge.
Steadily managing your own asset allocation is better than anything else.
The book *The Exchange Rate Is Actually This Simple* is not especially thick, yet it explains clearly the story of Japan's exchange rate over the decades since the war.
For those who want to understand "why, after Japan's lost 30 years, the Nikkei can still hit a record high," "why money is still not worth much even after the central bank raises interest rates," or who want to see what experience and lessons Japan offers for a reverse appreciation of the renminbi, it is worth a look.

