Whether small-scale over-the-counter virtual currency trading is safe depends not on the size of the trading volume, but on whether the business activities fall within the scope of what is prohibited in China. Proprietary exchange, coin-to-coin exchange, market making, order matching and pricing, and collection and payment on behalf of others may all be characterized as illegal financial activities; a small scale only affects the degree of attention and the manner of handling, and does not change the characterization. Readers should confirm their own role, the flow of funds, and the relationship of control over accounts, immediately cease exchange, order matching, pricing, and collection and payment on behalf of others directed at mainland China residents, and verify names, promotional materials, contracts, and transaction records.

Is small-scale over-the-counter virtual currency trading safe simply because the volume is small?

A client asks: I am only doing a bit of coin-to-coin exchange on a small scale, the volume is not large, and my clients are all acquaintances—could there be a problem?

The following explains, from the perspective of mainland China regulation, how small-scale OTC business is characterized, what responsibilities each role bears, what risks arise from how funds move, and in what order rectification should be carried out.

First, the answer: regulators look at the business activities, not the scale of trading

Under the current regulatory framework in mainland China, whether a virtual currency business is prohibited is determined not by the size of the transaction amount, whether the clients are acquaintances, or how high the frequency is, but by what activities the business is carrying out.

A small scale only affects the degree of attention received and the manner of subsequent handling; it does not change the nature of the business itself.

Under the current regulatory rules, conducting business activities within China such as exchanging legal tender for virtual currency, exchanging virtual currency for virtual currency, buying and selling virtual currency as a central counterparty, and providing information intermediation and pricing services for virtual currency transactions constitutes illegal financial activity and is strictly prohibited without exception. The "exchange between virtual currencies" listed here is what clients often call "coin-to-coin exchange," and "buying and selling as a central counterparty" is market-making conduct in which one quotes prices oneself, takes orders oneself, and bears the fluctuation in coin prices oneself.

These two types of activities happen to be the most common forms of small-scale OTC.

The regulatory policy position prohibiting virtual currency is continuous. In its policy interpretation, the regulatory authority explained that China has consistently maintained a prohibitive policy toward virtual currency, and that the relevant business activities constitute illegal financial activities; at the present stage, virtual currency cannot effectively satisfy requirements such as customer identification and anti-money laundering, and there is a risk that it may be used for money laundering, fundraising fraud, illegal cross-border transfer of funds, and other purposes. This passage explains why regulation is so closely focused: it is not aimed at any particular transaction, but rather at the fact that this type of business is inherently difficult to subject to anti-money laundering identification.

Two levels of issues need to be distinguished here.

The first level is the characterization of the business: as long as the listed business activities are carried out within China, they fall within the scope of illegal financial activities. This is a judgment at the level of the rules and does not depend on the amount involved in an individual case.

The second level concerns subsequent handling: whether a case is formally opened, whether criminal liability is pursued, and how it is handled depend on factors such as the specific facts, circumstances, scale of funds, and degree of subjective knowledge, and constitute a case-by-case determination. Clients often conflate these two levels, assuming that "a small amount means it will not be characterized as such," when in fact characterization comes first and handling comes afterward.

Another common misjudgment is that "doing it occasionally does not count as a business." What the regulator enumerates are types of business activities, not a requirement that a certain frequency or scale threshold be met. Occasionally helping someone make an exchange and continuously providing exchange services to the public may both fall within the same category of conduct for characterization purposes; the difference lies in how the evidence is presented and the severity of the circumstances. If a client has publicly quoted prices, accepted orders, and maintained stable counterparties, it is difficult for them to argue that they were merely engaging in "occasional personal conduct."

Therefore, one judgment should be kept in mind first: for conducting business in mainland China involving the exchange of legal tender for virtual currency, currency-to-currency exchange, market making, or matching and pricing, the risk of being characterized as illegal financial activity is certain and does not disappear because the scale is small. As for whether this further constitutes a crime such as illegal business operations and how it is handled, that depends on the specific facts and circumstances; this article does not predict the outcome of individual cases.

Role Determines Liability

In OTC business as well, the liability of the four roles is entirely different.

The first is proprietary exchange. Quoting one's own prices, holding one's own coins, bearing one's own coin price risk, and receiving and paying one's own funds. This is the role that most directly falls within the prohibited scope, because it simultaneously completes the two actions of "exchange" and "buying and selling as a central counterparty." If a client uses their own account to receive RMB and transfer out stablecoins, or the reverse, they basically fall into this category. The characteristic of this role is that both funds and coins pass through one's own hands, and account transaction records and on-chain records will point directly to the individual.

The second is matching and market making. Not holding coins, but providing matching, quotation, and information intermediation. The regulator expressly lists "providing information intermediation and pricing services for virtual currency transactions" within the prohibited scope. Many clients believe that "I am only introducing buyers and sellers to each other, and as long as I do not touch the money, there is no problem," but providing pricing and matching are themselves enumerated actions. Even if the matching role does not touch funds, as long as it plays a pricing or matching role in the transaction, it has already touched the prohibited business conduct.

The third is collection and payment on behalf of others and payment channels. Providing accounts, payment settlement, and fund transfers for others' exchanges. The regulator expressly provides that financial institutions and non-bank payment institutions may not provide services such as account opening, fund transfers, and clearing and settlement for virtual currency-related business activities. If an individual or small team uses their own accounts to help others move funds, even if they do not hold coins themselves, they may be found to have assisted. The risk of this role lies in the fact that once an account is used for virtual currency-related fund flows, it is very difficult for the lender or operator to claim that they "did not know," especially when the transaction records show high frequency and multiple counterparties.

The fourth is purely technical services. Whether it is safe depends on whether there is actual knowledge or constructive knowledge, and whether it touches funds and pricing. Technological neutrality is not a ground for exemption. If a technical service provider knows that a client is conducting exchanges and still provides systems, interfaces, and settlement support for them, the risk is not much lower than directly conducting exchanges. Conversely, if a technical service provider is completely isolated from funds, pricing, and client funds, and has no actual or constructive knowledge of downstream uses, the risk is relatively manageable, but this boundary needs to be judged in light of specific facts and cannot be generalized.

For each role, four things must be judged separately: who signs the contract, who receives the money, who controls the account, and who bears the coin price and counterparty risk. The answers to these four questions determine on whom liability falls.

A common situation in practice is that the contracting party, the receiving party, the account-controlling party, and the risk-bearing party are different people. This misalignment creates great difficulty in subsequent explanations, because each party can claim that they were merely "helping out," but the records of funds and authority do not lie.

How the money flows determines who bears the risk

Many clients spend a great deal of time studying their business model, only to find that what ultimately triggers the problem is a single sum of money that arrives in a domestic account and that no one can clearly explain the reason for its entry. The fund path is not a technical detail; it directly determines who bears the risk and whether the matter can be clearly explained once identified.

Where domestic bank accounts or third-party payment channels are used, the risk is most direct. Financial institutions and non-bank payment institutions may not provide services for virtual currency-related business, and should strengthen risk monitoring and promptly report any leads they discover. Once identified, account freezes, restrictions and reporting of leads are common consequences. If a client believes that "switching to another channel will do", that merely moves the risk from one channel to another; the characterization of the business does not change. Moreover, switching channels itself leaves traces and may instead reinforce the impression of "deliberate circumvention".

Where personal accounts or "nominee accounts" are used, the risk is more complex. High-frequency, large-value inflows and outflows with multiple counterparties are readily identified by anti-money-laundering monitoring and may also implicate the persons who lend the accounts. What clients often describe as "I was just helping to receive some money" is, from the perspective of fund monitoring, a series of transactions that cannot be matched to any real business. Even if an account lender did not directly participate in the exchange, that person may still bear corresponding liability because the account was used for the relevant fund flows, a point that is often underestimated in practice.

Where overseas accounts or overseas entities are used, domestic risk is not automatically isolated. The regulators have made clear that overseas entities and individuals may not, in any form, unlawfully provide virtual currency-related services to domestic entities; domestic entities and individuals that, while knowing or ought to know that an overseas entity is unlawfully providing services to domestic parties, still provide assistance shall be held liable in accordance with law. If a domestic entity controls an overseas entity and the actual clients are domestic residents, the arrangement may still fall within the regulators' purview. The key to the assessment is not where the account is opened, but who actually controls the business, where the clients come from, and where the funds ultimately flow.

The flow of funds and of coins must correspond to real business. Without contracts, invoices and delivery records, it will be very difficult to explain the source and use of funds. This is especially fatal when an account is frozen or inquiries are made — if the client cannot produce the materials, it can only wait passively. In practice, parties able to provide materials covering the complete business chain clearly have more of the initiative when explaining the nature of funds; conversely, where there are only transaction records and no business background, the room for explanation is very limited.

Attention must also be paid to matching the fund path with the role. If a client claims to be merely a technical service provider but its accounts show large volumes of client funds flowing in and out, such a mismatch will directly undermine that claim. The fund path is an objective record and will not change because of a party's oral description; therefore, at the business design stage, the fund path should be kept consistent with the role positioning, rather than remedied after the fact.

Rectification: stop the business first, then clarify roles and funds

The first thing clients often say when they sit down is "how do we make it compliant?" That question is backwards. What should be asked at this point is three things: which actions must stop today, which materials must be pulled out and checked immediately, and which can only be judged after the facts are clear.

The first layer consists of actions to stop immediately: exchange, matching, pricing, and collection and payment on behalf of others, directed at domestic residents. So long as these actions occur domestically, they fall within the prohibited scope, and there is no room to "do it first and see". Stopping does not mean continuing under a different label; it means genuinely stopping these business actions. At the same time as stopping, evidence of the stoppage should be retained, such as ceasing to quote prices externally, closing the relevant order-taking channels, and stopping the inflow and outflow of funds in the relevant accounts; such records may be useful in subsequent explanations.

The second layer consists of actions requiring verification and cleanup: account permissions, contract texts, promotional materials, business scope, and historical transaction records. The regulators have made clear that the registered names and business scopes of enterprises and individual industrial and commercial households may not contain words or content such as "virtual currency", "virtual assets", "cryptocurrency", "crypto assets", "stablecoin", "real-world asset tokenization" or "real-world assets (RWA)". Clients need to check item by item: whether the company name, business scope, external promotions and contract terms contain any of these expressions; whether account permissions have been given to persons to whom they should not have been given; and whether historical transaction records can be matched to real business.

The third layer consists of actions requiring case-by-case judgment: how to wind down existing business, how to arrange overseas entities, and whether cross-border funds are involved. There is no uniform answer at this layer, and further verification is needed in light of the specific facts and the rules currently in force. Winding down existing business is especially complex, because transactions that have already occurred cannot be undone; they can only be handled by sorting through materials, clarifying the boundaries of responsibility and assessing subsequent risks, and cannot simply be dealt with by a "one-size-fits-all" approach.

It must be made clear what rectification cannot solve: changing channels, changing the name of the entity, or changing the settlement currency does not change the characterization of the business. Converting RMB into stablecoin settlement, replacing a domestic entity with an overseas entity, or replacing a bank account with a personal account — what the regulators look at is still the business actions themselves. If clients expect to use these methods to "achieve compliance", they are heading in the wrong direction. Not only do these operations fail to change the characterization, they may also aggravate the circumstances because of deliberate circumvention.

There is another aspect of remediation that is easily overlooked: internal communication and personnel arrangements. If team members continue to engage with clients externally, continue to quote prices, and continue to operate accounts, then even if the company has decided at the corporate level to stop, actual business activities are still taking place. Remediation must be implemented at the level of specific individuals and specific authorities, rather than remaining at the level of verbal decisions.

Verification Checklist

  • Confirm your role in the transaction chain: proprietary exchange, matching and market making, collection and payment on behalf of others, or pure technical services
  • Confirm who signs contracts, who receives funds, who controls accounts, and who bears coin-price and counterparty risk
  • Immediately stop exchange, matching, pricing, and collection and payment activities directed at domestic residents
  • Prepare contract texts, account authority records, historical transaction records, promotional materials, and business scope registration information
  • Check whether the company name, business scope, external promotions, and contract terms contain any prohibited expressions
  • Where existing business is being wound down, offshore entity arrangements are involved, or cross-border funds are involved, seek professional advice
  • If you receive inquiries, freeze notices, or restriction notices, do not explain on your own or continue operating

Reference Materials

  1. Notice on Further Preventing and Handling the Risks of Virtual Currency Trading and Speculation_State Council Department Documents_Chinese Government Website | People's Bank of China and nine other departments (published by the Chinese Government Website) https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2021-10/08/content_5641404.htm
  2. Notice of the People's Bank of China, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the National Financial Regulatory Administration, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Preventing and Handling Risks Related to Virtual Currency and Other Related Risks_China Securities Regulatory Commission | People's Bank of China, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration for Market Regulation, National Financial Regulatory Administration, China Securities Regulatory Commission, State Administration of Foreign Exchange (published on the website of the China Securities Regulatory Commission) https://www.csrc.gov.cn/csrc/c100028/c7614318/content.shtml
  3. PBOC and CSRC Officials Answer Questions on the Notice on Further Preventing and Addressing Risks Associated with Virtual Currencies and Related Matters_China Securities Regulatory Commission | People's Bank of China, China Securities Regulatory Commission (published on the CSRC website) | 2026-02-06 | Mainland China | official_disclosure | https://www.csrc.gov.cn/csrc/c100028/c7614320/content.shtml